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The decade from 1899 to 1909 was a critical period in the development of naval 
strategy.  The 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences and the 1909 London Conference 
debated, drafted, and formally imposed the laws of war on naval warfare.  
Consideration of the issues raised by the laws of naval warfare were vitally important 
for the Royal Navy – the acknowledged leading naval power in the world – and the 
US Navy – a small but ambitious force stepping onto the world stage following the 
Spanish-American War.  Both navies were concerned about the impact of the laws of 
naval warfare on their strategic naval planning and sought to mould them to suit their 
own situations.  The historiography of the pre-First World War era, however, has 
generally disregarded or minimized the significance of the laws of naval warfare for 
the navies of Great Britain and the United States.  The numerous analyses by modern 
historians of naval strategy before the First World War ignore the 1899 Peace 
Conference and at best only tangentially consider the laws naval warfare from about 
1905 onward.  This thesis fills this lacuna in the research and returns the laws of naval 
warfare to their proper place as an important factor in naval planning in both 
countries.  It establishes the foundational nature of the long-ignored 1899 Peace 
Conference, and reveals the significant planning and discussions in Great Britain and 
the United States with respect to the laws of naval warfare, the internal debates and 
conflicts that arose between the views and objectives of the naval leadership and their 
respective civilian authorities, and the conflicts that surfaced between the two 
countries, particularly at the 1907 Peace Conference.  This thesis thereby provides 
new insights and adds to the vibrant discussion of naval history prior to the First 
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Between mid-1899 and early 1909, the leading maritime powers in the world 
met on three separate occasions.  At the 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences held at 
The Hague and the 1909 London Naval Conference, they debated, drafted and 
formally adopted laws of war on naval warfare.  During this critical period of naval 
technological change and development, consideration of the issues and problems 
raised by the laws of naval warfare were vitally important for Great Britain’s Royal 
Navy (the acknowledged leading naval power in the world) and the US Navy (a small 
but ambitious force stepping onto the world stage following the Spanish-American 
War).  Indeed, the laws of war can influence strategic planning in a number of ways.  
Weapons may be outlawed or their use limited.  The laws of war may circumscribe 
the manner or extent to which warfare may be conducted and who its targets may be.  
More generally, the laws of war may approve, limit, or prohibit strategic actions that 
otherwise might be planned or preferred.  As Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge presciently 
observed only a few months before the beginning of the 1907 Conference, regulations 
governing the conduct of war ‘cannot be ignored in a study of naval warfare and the 
strategy that should guide its operations.  The strategist may have to reckon with the 
international jurist as well as with the enemy.’1  Brian Ranft concurred more than 
seventy years later, writing, ‘The acceptance of such restraints [on the conduct of 
naval warfare] raised fundamental questions about the utility of maritime strategy and 
operations.’2  Another scholar similarly concluded: 
The law thus plays a central role in clarifying by way of restrictions the 
goals set for sea power, the range of available options for its exercise 
and the classification of situations whose indeterminate character could 
otherwise lead to diffusion of energies and resources.  The study of law 
                                                
1 Cyprian Bridge, The Art of Naval Warfare:  Introductory Observations (London:  
Smith, Elder, 1907), 162.   
2 Brian Ranft, ‘Restraints on War at Sea Before 1945’, in Restraints on War:  Studies 
in the Limitation of Armed Conflict, ed. Michael Howard (Oxford, UK:  Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 39. 
 11 
in relation to sea power is, for this reason, a valid and important aspect 
of the responsibility of naval planning staffs.3 
However, the historiography of the pre-First World War era has generally 
disregarded or minimized the significance of the laws of naval warfare for the navies 
of Britain and the US.  The numerous analyses of naval strategy before the First 
World War ignore the 1899 Conference and only tangentially consider the laws of 
naval warfare (to the extent they consider them at all) from about 1905 onward.  Most 
research has been focused on other aspects of naval planning in Britain, often in 
comparison with Imperial Germany.  None of the research considers in any depth the 
development of the laws of war during the first decade of the twentieth century in 
relation to naval thinking and planning.  No work compares the laws of war and naval 
planning in Britain and the US during this period.  The Royal Navy began the era as 
the world’s undisputed sea power.  The US Navy was comparatively small and of no 
strategic concern to the Royal Navy.  The Royal Navy sought to modify and use the 
laws of naval warfare to maintain its pre-eminence in the world while the US Navy 
sought to ensure that the laws promoted its growth into a blue-water fleet in the 
Mahanian tradition.  The divergent positions of the two forces coalesced and 
converged until their views on the laws of naval warfare were nearly identical.  At the 
same time, naval leaders in Britain and the US often found themselves in conflict with 
their civilian masters.  In both countries, civilian leaders sought more restrictions on 
naval warfare, thereby limiting each navy’s freedom of action in strategic planning 
and execution of plans in time of war.  The governments of Great Britain and the US 
viewed international conferences as opportunities to limit naval armaments and 
expenditures, much to the consternation and dismay of their navies.  Different views – 
expressed internally and externally – often depended upon whether the country 
thought it was likely to be a belligerent or a neutral in the next war.  
The failure of historians to adequately consider the laws of war and their 
impact on naval planning commenced from the very beginning of major studies of the 
pre-First World War era.  Arthur J. Marder, in The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 
covered the 1899 Peace Conference in a single chapter entitled, ‘The Hague Fiasco’.  
                                                
3 D.P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Annapolis, MD:  Naval 
Institute Press, 1975), 4. 
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But his meagre consideration of the event focused on preliminaries of the conference, 
arms expenditures, and the retirement of Admiral Sir Frederick Richards from the 
Admiralty in August 1899, after the conference had ended.  Marder devoted most of 
his discussion to the reaction of the English popular press to the Tsar’s invitation to 
hold a conference and less than three pages to the conference itself.4  Marder revealed 
the likely reason for his lack of analysis in a draft article written decades later.  In 
August 1938 he had been granted access to every file he requested from the 
Admiralty covering the 1880-1905 time period except for two, one of which was the 
Admiralty’s file on the 1899 Conference, for reasons never disclosed to him.5  Since 
The Anatomy of British Sea Power, research on the laws of war and British naval 
planning has become more difficult.  While the Admiralty’s file on the 1899 
Conference largely still exists,6 many records were culled and destroyed during the 
1950s and 1960s and essentially none of the Admiralty’s files relating to the 1907 
Conference or the 1909 London Conference remain.7  Not surprisingly, therefore, in 
his post-Second World War volumes, Marder devoted even less attention to the 1907 
Conference and the 1909 London Naval Conference than the 1899 Conference.  He 
spent a few pages discussing the failure of the 1907 Conference to achieve a reduction 
in the naval arms race and the ‘disastrous consequences’ flowing from that failure.8  
Marder did not investigate the internal preparations at the Admiralty for the 
conference or the implications for naval planning of the various laws of naval warfare 
under discussion.  He did not consider the 1909 London Conference at all. 
Marder’s works were followed by the studies of Paul M. Kennedy, whose 
books The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery and The Rise of Anglo-German 
                                                
4 Marder (1940), 341-352. 
5 Marder, ‘Fate Knocks Three Times’, p. 4 (n.d.), Box 32, Arthur J. Marder Papers, 
MS-F 002, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of 
California, Irvine, CA.  (In September 2013, the author was the first researcher 
allowed complete access to all of Marder’s research papers held at the University of 
California at Irvine.  Previous researchers had been denied access to at least three 
boxes of materials.)  
6 See ‘Case 258’, ADM 116/98. 
7 Seligmann (2012), 96 note 25, 176. 
8 Marder (1961), 130-135. 
 13 
Antagonism have been hailed as ‘landmarks in naval history.’9  The former volume 
reviewed British naval grand strategy comprehensively and described itself as the 
‘first detailed reconsideration of the history of British sea power since that presented 
in A.T. Mahan’s classic The Influence of Sea Power upon History’.10  The critical pre-
First World War period was labelled as one of decline for the Royal Navy in which 
competition and antagonism with Imperial Germany grew.11  But the implications of 
the two conferences at The Hague did not merit analysis.  Kennedy’s later work, 
devoted to the development and growth of the rivalry between Britain and Germany, 
also neglected consideration of the adaptation and adoption of the laws of war to 
naval warfare, merely stating that the unsurprising failure of the 1907 Conference to 
achieve agreement on naval limitations increased the naval arms race between the two 
countries.12 
The revisionist interpretation of pre-First World War Royal Navy policies 
started by Ruddock F. Mackay’s biography of Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher13 
has been fervently propounded and expanded by Jon Tetsuro Sumida and Nicholas 
Lambert.  Sumida argued that limitations in naval budgets played an unappreciated 
role in British naval planning.  He also pointed to the development of a new fire 
control system for ships as a critical feature, both of which contradicted arguments of 
a general decline in the Royal Navy’s world position and the fixation on Germany as 
a factor in naval strategic planning in the first decade of the twentieth century.14  
Nicholas Lambert founded his monograph on ‘the premise that from the beginning of 
the twentieth century the overriding problem for British defence planners was the 
                                                
9  Andrew D. Lambert, ‘The Construction of Naval History 1815-1914’, The 
Mariner’s Mirror 97, no. 1 (Feb. 2011):  219. 
10 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst, NY:  
Humanity Books, 1998), xxvii. 
11 Ibid., 205-237.  For a contrary view, see Keith Neilson, ‘“Greatly Exaggerated”:  
The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914’, The International History 
Review 13, no. 4 (Nov. 1991):  695-725. 
12 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (Amherst, 
NY:  Humanity Books, 1980), 442. 
13 Mackay (1973). 
14 Sumida (1989); Jon Tetsuro Sumida, ‘Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought:  The 
Sources of Naval Mythology’, The Journal of Military History 59 (October 1995):  
619-638. 
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insufficiency of central government finance.’15  But neither Sumida nor Lambert 
considered the laws of naval warfare particularly relevant to their analyses.  The 
considerable amount of time and effort spent by the Admiralty preparing for the 
conferences again were ignored.  Moreover, neither Sumida nor Lambert discussed 
the efforts of the British government to use the opportunities presented by the two 
conferences to achieve reductions in expenditures by proposals for naval 
disarmament.   
The revisionist interpretation of pre-First World War British naval policy 
lately has morphed into an argument that naval planning, at least for some time after 
the 1907 Conference, was fixated on use of an economic blockade to bring Germany 
to her knees in any future war.  Avner Offer first argued that British naval strategy 
planned to use an economic blockade against Germany, regardless of the precepts of 
international law.16  Offer’s analysis begins a year or two before the 1907 Conference.  
He recognizes that under his interpretation, ‘The Royal Navy helped to negotiate, 
codify and promote a legal code that clashed with some of its own strategic ideas.’17  
Offer suggests that either the British naval delegates at the 1907 Hague Conference 
did not receive clear instructions or that First Sea Lord Fisher considered the rule of 
law of no moment in naval planning unless it was to Britain’s advantage.18  Offer’s 
view is a jaundiced one as to the relevance of the laws of war in general.  Moreover, 
neither suggestion addresses the time and effort spent by the Royal Navy considering 
the laws of war or the internal planning before the 1907 Conference.  Offer’s work 
does not deal with the efforts undertaken by the Royal Navy during the conference to 
achieve adoption of laws of naval warfare considered desirable to it. 
                                                
15 Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC:  University 
of South Carolina Press, 1999), 1. 
16 Offer (1989), 233-243, 270-284; Avner Offer, ‘Morality and Admiralty:  “Jacky” 
Fisher, Economic Warfare and the Laws of War’, Journal of Contemporary History 
23, no. 1 (Jan. 1988):  99-118. 
17 Offer (1989), 270. 
18 Ibid., 278-279.  Brian Ranft has argued that destruction of an enemy’s maritime 
trade and the effect of technological change would determine whether restraints on 
naval warfare were followed during war.  Ranft, ‘Restraints on War at Sea Before 
1945’, 39-43. 
 15 
Nicholas Lambert recently has offered a self-described ‘radical 
reinterpretation of the nature and significance of the relationship between economics 
and sea power before and during the First World War.’  Lambert ‘focuses on Great 
Britain’s development of a novel and highly sophisticated approach to economic 
coercion in the event of war against Germany’,19 which was secretly planned and 
developed by a small group of individuals.  In doing so, he pays minimal attention to 
the laws of war and develops his thesis primarily over the period from 1908 to 1915.  
He argues that the economic warfare plan was abandoned early in the First World 
War because it was too effective and inflicting too much collateral damage on the 
US.20  His analysis does not consider the 1899 Conference.  Furthermore, Lambert’s 
brief discussion of the Admiralty’s extensive planning and preparations for the 1907 
Conference leaves much to be desired. However, Lambert recently has recognized 
that ‘interpretations of international law had to be considered paramount in the 
formulation of maritime strategy, especially where it involved interdiction of 
communications’ in the years before the First World War.21 
The revisionists have generated ‘neo-revisionists’, who have sought to 
combine the original focus on Germany of Marder and Kennedy with economic 
means of warfare or a different analysis.  They have especially challenged the 
arguments of Nicholas Lambert, which has resulted in vigorous, if not excessively 
personal, attacks on each other’s views.22  Shawn Grimes challenges the revisionists 
                                                
19 N. Lambert (2012), 1. 
20 Ibid., 85-101, 497-504. 
21 Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘False Prophet?:  The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and 
Professional Military Education’, The Journal of Military History 77, no. 3 (July 
2013):  1074.  John Coogan critiques Lambert’s inaccurate consideration of 
international law in Planning Armageddon in John W. Coogan, ‘The Short-War 
Illusion Resurrected:  The Myth of Economic Warfare as the British Schlieffen Plan’, 
The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 7 (Nov. 2015):  1045-1064. 
22 For examples of the attacks and counter-attacks, see Christopher M. Bell, ‘Sir John 
Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered:  Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911-
1914’, War in History 18, no. 3 (2011):  333-356; Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘On 
Standards:  A Reply to Christopher Bell’, War in History 19, no. 2 (2012):  217-240; 
Christopher M. Bell, ‘On Standards and Scholarship:  A Response to Nicholas 
Lambert’, War in History 20, no. 3 (2013):  381-409. 
Most recently, the neo-revisionists have assaulted the research and reasoning 
underpinning the works of Sumida and Nicholas Lambert in an entire issue of The 
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and has argued, ‘Revisionist historians have further confused the issue [of naval war 
planning] through their alternative theories, arguing that Germany’s naval programme 
was not considered a serious threat until after 1905 while underplaying the wider 
diplomatic, international, and intellectual contexts that clearly influenced British 
naval strategy during the Fisher regime.’23  Grimes contends that the Admiralty 
possessed coherent war planning based on manoeuvres, war games, intelligence 
reports, and education from the late 1880s forward and that those plans began to be 
redirected toward Germany as early as 1902.  He rejects the idea that Admiralty war 
plans were based merely on the views of senior officers.24   However, despite 
criticizing the revisionists for not considering ‘the wider diplomatic, international, and 
intellectual contexts’, he too essentially ignores the 1899 and 1907 Conferences in his 
analysis.   
Matthew Seligmann also counters the revisionists and argues that Germany 
became a focus of British naval war planning much earlier than the revisionists would 
allow, and that the vulnerability of maritime commerce and hence its protection 
during time of war was the critical issue for the Admiralty during the years leading up 
to the First World War.  He focuses on the threat of armed merchant cruisers to 
British seaborne trade; a threat that did not in fact develop once war came.  Seligmann 
does consider the laws of war in his analysis, but basically only from the 1909 
London Conference onward.  He emphasizes the efforts of Rear Admiral Edmond 
                                                                                                                                      
Journal of Strategic Studies.  See Christopher M. Bell, ‘The Myth of a Naval 
Revolution by Proxy:  Lord Fisher’s Influence on Winston Churchill’s Naval Policy, 
1911-1914’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 7 (Nov. 2015):  1024-1044; John 
Brooks, ‘Preparing for Armageddon:  Gunnery Practices and Exercises in the Grand 
Fleet Prior to Jutland’, ibid., 1006-1023; Coogan, ‘The Short-War Illusion 
Resurrected’, ibid., 1045-1064; Stephen McLaughlin, ‘Battlelines and Fast Wings:  
Battlefleet Tactics in the Royal Navy, 1900-1914’, ibid., 985-1005; David Morgan-
Owen, ‘A Revolution in Naval Affairs?  Technology, Strategy and British Naval 
Policy in the “Fisher Era”’, ibid., 944-965; Matthew S. Seligmann, ‘Naval History by 
Conspiracy Theory:  The British Admiralty before the First World War and the 
Methodology of Revisionism’, ibid., 966-984; Matthew S. Seligmann and David 
Morgan-Owen, ‘Evolution or Revolution?   British Naval Policy in the Fisher Era’, 
ibid., 937-943. 
23 Grimes (2012), 2.  See also Shawn T. Grimes, ‘The Baltic and Admiralty War 
Planning, 1906-1907’, The Journal of Military History 74, no. 2 (April 2010):  407-
437. 
24 Grimes (2012), 2-6, 225-234. 
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Slade to change the laws of war at the London Conference, principally relating to the 
right of a belligerent to convert merchant ships into warships.25  While Seligmann 
thus admits of the relevance of the laws of war to strategic planning, he neither goes 
back to the 1899 Conference nor considers issues pertinent to topics other than 
commerce protection.  Instead, he decries the destruction of most of the Admiralty’s 
records relating to the 1907 Conference and the difficulties created thereby. 26  
However, as this study shows, much can be gleaned from a careful analysis of 
Foreign Office and other archival sources, as well as from sources in the US. 
Stephen Cobb recently has joined the debate, arguing that the Admiralty 
planned and prepared extensively for blockade warfare and defence of British trade in 
a European war utilizing armed merchant cruisers.  He contends that economic 
warfare utilizing armed merchant ships was more widely anticipated and planned 
before the First World War than previously understood and that it was widely 
recognized that an ‘economic and naval war against a major maritime power would be 
violent, à l’outrance, and would not be “over by Christmas”.’27  In presenting his 
argument for a strategic culture in the Royal Navy favouring blockade warfare with 
armed merchant cruisers, Cobb briefly considers the laws of naval warfare relevant to 
his thesis, including belligerent and neutral rights, contraband, seizure of private 
property, blockade, and conversion of merchant ships into armed vessels on the high 
seas following a declaration of war.  His analysis, however, only touches upon the 
1907 Conference and the 1909 London Conference.  The 1899 Conference receives 
no mention.28 
While research of the Royal Navy and British naval planning in the years 
before the First World War may be described as extensive, vibrant, and on-going, the 
same cannot be said of studies of the US Navy during the pre-First World War era.  
Standard treatments of US naval history do not address the 1899 and 1907 
Conferences or the effect of the laws of war on naval planning and strategy in the 
                                                
25 Seligmann (2012), 4-6, 89-108, 171-173. 
26 Ibid., 96. 
27 Cobb (2013), xxi. 
28 See ibid., 61-76. 
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nascent navy.29  Calvin DeArmond Davis published two volumes more than forty 
years ago regarding the United States and the two peace conferences.  While both are 
useful introductions, neither analysed the positions taken by the US in the context of 
naval planning or the laws of naval warfare.30  Several more recent studies do provide 
interesting comparative analyses.  Dirk Bönker studied the similarities between the 
naval elites in the US and Germany and contends that they pursued naval growth 
‘along strikingly similar, and parallel, national trajectories in the new global age’ of 
the years before the First World War. 31   Bönker presents a well-considered 
comparison of the two countries, and shows the similar positions and views of 
Germany and the US at the 1907 Conference and the 1909 London Conference.32  
Katherine Epstein’s recent monograph provides a comparative study of torpedo 
development and intellectual property law in the United and Britain.33  Neither of 
these recent studies, however, considers the laws of naval warfare and naval planning 
in the US.  But the US Navy was at the forefront of navies worldwide in adopting a 
formal naval war code in June 1900.34  Despite its withdrawal in early 1904, the 1900 
Naval War Code formed the basis for the United States’ positions at both the 1907 
Hague Conference and the 1909 London Conference.  The 1905 International Law 
Studies of the United States Naval War College was carefully studied in Britain and 
the United States in preparation for the 1907 Conference. 
                                                
29 See for example, George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power:  The U.S. 
Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1993); Kenneth J. 
Hagan, This People’s Navy:  The Making of American Sea Power (New York:  Free 
Press, 1991); Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 
1776-1918, with an introduction by Kenneth J. Hagan and Charles Conrad Campbell 
(Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1990 [1966 rev. ed.]. 
30 See Davis (1962); Davis (1975). 
31 Dirk Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age:  Naval Ambitions in Germany and the 
United States Before World War I (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2012), 4. 
32 Ibid., 158-164. 
33 Katherine C. Epstein, Torpedo:  Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the 
United States and Great Britain (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2014). 
34 See Charles H. Stockton, The Laws and Usages of War at Sea: A Naval War Code 
(Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1901); General Board of the Navy to 
the President, 30 Jan. 1904, RG 80, folder 438-7, NARA(I); Roosevelt to Moody, 30 
Jan. 1904, RG 80, folder 438-7, NARA(I). 
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One important bridge does somewhat connect the scholarship regarding the 
Royal Navy in the pre-First World War era with that of the US Navy.  Written more 
than thirty years ago, John W. Coogan’s The End of Neutrality:  The United States, 
Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915, reviews and analyses ‘the legal as well as 
the strategic and political contexts in which British statesmen evolved the blockade of 
Germany and American leaders responded to the consequent curtailment of trade.’35  
Coogan’s work, however, was focused more on foreign policy and diplomacy than 
naval planning.  He sought to explain the development of the United States’ positions 
on maritime rights and how the country eventually was forced by a desire to maintain 
its relationship with Britain to forego its status as a ‘neutral’ by 1915.  As part of this 
explanation, and contrary to Offer’s view, Coogan concludes, ‘that a viable system of 
international law did exist in 1914.’36  Coogan devotes little space to the 1899 
Conference and focuses on the question of immunity of private property at sea.  He 
does not consider broader issues of the laws of naval warfare or their implications for 
naval planning beyond Britain’s efforts to impose a blockade on Germany.   
As this historiographical review shows, a lacuna in the research exists 
regarding the laws of war and naval strategy in Britain and the US during the first 
decade of the twentieth century.  Neither the orthodox historians, nor the revisionists, 
nor the neo-revisionists have carefully considered and analysed the role played by the 
laws of war in naval planning in these two countries.  While some scholars have 
touched upon some of the issues, their focus generally has been on the period from 
about 1905 to the beginning of the First World War.  No one has fully described and 
analysed the topic by comparing Britain and the US during the 1899 to 1909 era. 
The primary goal of this study is to return the laws of naval warfare to its 
proper place as an important factor in pre-First World War naval planning in Great 
Britain and the United States.  To be sure, this is not to say that attention to the laws 
of naval warfare was the be-all and end-all of naval planning in Britain and the US.  
But this thesis will establish that in both nations, the laws of naval warfare were of 
much greater importance than has been the traditional view of naval historians.  
Furthermore, the development, adaptation, and adoption of the laws of naval warfare 
                                                
35 Coogan (1981), 15. 
36 Ibid., 16. 
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should be viewed and considered in toto during this critical period, and not piecemeal 
or beginning with a single weapons system from some selected starting point during 
the era.  By relying on evidence from more than twenty archives on both sides of the 
Atlantic, this study establishes importance of the long-ignored 1899 Conference.  It 
also fully reveals the significant planning and discussions in Britain and the US with 
respect to the laws of naval warfare at three distinct international conferences held in 
the space of only ten years.  It shows the internal debates and conflicts that arose 
between the views and objectives of the naval leadership and their respective civilian 
authorities, and the conflicts that surfaced between the two countries, particularly at 
the 1907 Conference.  These debates and conflicts often were based on whether the 
laws of naval warfare were viewed from the perspective of a belligerent or a neutral.  
In each nation, the prevailing perspective changed over time, thereby influencing the 
direction taken toward the laws of naval warfare.   
Chapter 1 provides a primer on the laws of naval warfare in the nineteenth 
century.  It introduces some of the key concepts and issues that greatly affected 
British and American relations during the period under consideration.  Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 provide a comprehensive analysis of the 1899 Conference from the perspective 
of its influence on the laws of naval warfare.  These chapters establish the 
conference’s foundational nature for consideration of the laws of naval warfare during 
the 1899 to 1909 period.  Chapter 2 places Tsar Nicholas II’s invitation to the Great 
Powers to an international conference in the context of the then on-going naval arms 
race, particularly between Great Britain, France, and Russia.  Britain’s agreement to 
attend the conference and to discuss international maritime law – something it had 
refused to do since the Declaration of Paris in 1856 – opened the door for future 
discussions of the laws of naval war.  For the Royal Navy, the proposed conference 
was a watershed, because it was forced to participate in an international proceeding at 
which limitations on naval warfare would be considered.  The third chapter considers 
the preparations in Britain and the US for the 1899 Conference.  This chapter fully 
reveals for the first time Britain’s secret proposal to Russia for naval disarmament in 
advance of the conference.  The serious – albeit grudging – preparations of the 
Admiralty for the conference are shown in stark contrast to the lack of preparations by 
the US Navy.  Chapter 4 analyses the 1899 Conference, particularly the positions 
taken by the naval delegates of Great Britain and the United States – two of the 
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leading navalists of the era:  Fisher and Mahan.  The chapter challenges the traditional 
views of these two individuals and provides new insights into their roles as the laws 
of naval warfare were adapted and adopted in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.  
Chapter 5 transitions this study from the end of the 1899 Conference to 1905.  
During that period, Britain and the US gained real-world experience on many of the 
issues relevant to the laws of naval warfare.  In addition, both nations engaged in 
theoretical analyses that later would influence their positions on many laws of naval 
warfare issues.  Chapters 6 and 7 cover the preparations for the 1907 Conference and 
the conference itself.  Chapter 6 discusses and analyses the preparations in both 
countries for the 1907 Conference from a new perspective.  It shows how Britain and 
the US came surprisingly close to flipping their traditional policies and adopting each 
other’s positions on the issue of the immunity of private property at sea.  Chapter 7 
reviews the 1907 Conference, again focusing on the contentious issue of the immunity 
of private property at sea.  It shows how the US and Britain clashed on that issue with 
adverse implications for Britain’s novel proposal to abolish the concept of contraband 
of war.  Finally, chapter 8 considers the 1909 London Conference, which resulted 
from Britain’s failure to achieve an international agreement on blockade, contraband, 
or the law to be applied by the new International Prize Court at the 1907 Conference.  
It shows the compromises Britain and the US made to obtain a unanimous agreement 
among the leading maritime nations on what the laws of naval warfare were, not what 
they might be in the future.  Contrary to conventional views, the understanding 
reached satisfied Great Britain’s strategic needs for naval warfare.  Although the 
leading sea powers failed to ratify the Declaration of London, it still provided 
guidance and a framework for the belligerents and neutrals at the beginning of the 
First World War.  The Conclusion summarizes the argument and the contribution of 







The nineteenth century was a period of immense change.  Connected advances 
in technology, trade, industry, politics, and population altered the world.  The changes 
in navies and naval warfare during this period were especially significant.  At the 
beginning of the century, ships travelled under vast sheets of sail, dependent on the 
winds for movement.  Wooden warships fired broadsides at one another from 
smoothbore muzzle loading cannon at ranges of less than a few hundred meters, while 
sharpshooters high in the masts fired muskets at enemy seamen below.  Engagements 
frequently were decided by boarding the enemy ship, followed by individual combats, 
until one side struck its colours.  Finding an enemy ship on the vastness of the oceans 
usually was the result of luck or an educated guess.  That vastness was perhaps the 
best means of protecting a nation’s sea borne commerce, with little more required in 
terms of naval strategy for merchant marine protection.  By the end of the century, 
warships were made of steel, powered by coal-fired engines, able to reach previously 
unheard of speeds and travel great distances.  They could move in any direction 
regardless of the wind, and hurl large explosive shells thousands of meters from ever 
more accurate breech loading rifled cannon at enemy warships protected by improved 
armour.  New weapons, such as submarines and torpedoes – albeit in their nascent 
stages – meant that navies faced previously unknown methods of attack and defence 
in time of war.  A warship could more readily and easily find its enemy as a result of 
new means of communication and improved navigation.  The increase in merchant 
shipping meant commerce protection required new strategies and new ideas.1 
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Despite these changes, navies and naval warfare had at least two constants 
throughout the nineteenth century.  One was the dominance of Britain’s Royal Navy.  
After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain was the unchallenged master of the seas.  New 
navies, armed with the new warships and weapons appeared on the horizon during the 
last decades of the century.  France and Russia, enemies less than forty years earlier, 
became allies and were the most likely opponents for the Royal Navy as the century 
closed.  The United States also possessed growing naval ambitions.  While its 
challenges and challengers changed as the end of the century approached and its 
supremacy was no longer as absolute as it had been at the beginning of the era, the 
Royal Navy’s dominance remained.2  The second constant was the uncertainties 
relating to the scope and nature of limitations on naval warfare:  what a belligerent 
was permitted or prohibited to do against an enemy ship – whether a warship or 
merchant vessel – or the ships of neutral nations.  The laws of naval warfare in the 
nineteenth century were such that one could say there was ‘no uniformity of theory or 
practice’ before 1856,3 and also that the principles ‘were established in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and were not in serious dispute’.4  Both were accurate 
statements. 
This chapter introduces the laws of naval warfare as they existed and 
developed in the nineteenth century as well as the tensions that arose as nations 
attempted to draw the line between the rights of belligerents and those of neutrals 
during time of war.  It first introduces some of the essential concepts used throughout 
the century and the period under study.  They were the result of decisions by courts in 
Britain, the United States, and elsewhere, as well as treaties and general agreement.  
This chapter then reviews the issues and the positions of the parties that arose during 
the nineteenth century.  The first period considered is from the beginning of the 
century to the eve of the Crimean War.  The second period focuses on the Declaration 
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of Paris in 1856, which was soon followed by the American Civil War, and the issues 
those two events raised for naval warfare and its regulation.  Finally, the last half of 
the century is reviewed as pressures increased to expand the rights of neutrals and 
Britain acted to limit discussion of the laws of naval warfare as its place as the 
world’s leading sea power was increasingly challenged. 
Essential Concepts 
The laws of naval warfare developed based to a great extent on decisions by 
prize and appellate courts that decided the legality of the seizure or confiscation of 
ships or their cargoes during time of war.  Often, these decisions were accepted by 
other countries and became agreed ‘customary’ international law, either through 
treaties or stated or unstated agreement.5  The issues and concepts discussed in this 
thesis did not exist, therefore, in a vacuum.  A substantial body of case law, orders, 
regulations, and treaties combined to create a framework within which the laws of 
naval warfare further developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.6  
Great Britain and the United States and their navies studied these sources carefully as 
the laws of naval warfare developed.7  Although areas of disagreement existed 
between nations, a country’s prize court decisions and orders usually revealed the 
likely outcome of a case brought before them.  Eight of the most critical concepts 
relevant to this thesis are generally defined below to introduce the relevant 
terminology, their meaning, and relevance to naval planning and strategy. 
Blockade:  A ‘blockade’ ‘is the blocking of the approach to the enemy coast or a part 
of it by men-of-war for the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels of all 
nations.’8  Any neutral vessel attempting to avoid or breach a blockade was subject to 
                                                
5 For a contemporary (to the period under study) discussion of the development of the 
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seizure by the blockading force.  Whether a blockade was ‘effective’ or valid was a 
critical issue.  Generally, for a blockade to be ‘effective’ it had to be declared by a 
belligerent; known by the neutral ship; and maintained by a sufficient force to ‘to 
really prevent access’ or to ‘create evident danger to ships attempting to’ breach the 
blockade. Issues existed regarding whether a blockade was a mere ‘paper blockade’ 
declared by a belligerent without warships on station to prevent ingress or egress of 
vessels from a blockaded port, or whether the blockade was a ‘cruising blockade’ in 
which an insufficient number of warships cruised up and down a blockaded coast or 
port attempting to intercept blockade runners.9 
Continuous Voyage:  The ‘Continuous Voyage Doctrine’ arose from British prize law 
and the Rule of 1765 during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763).  In its original form, 
a neutral ship and its contraband cargo is liable to seizure under this doctrine, even if 
allegedly in transit between neutral ports if it could be established that the ship’s 
ultimate destination is an enemy or belligerent port.  The entire trip is considered a 
‘continuous voyage’ to supply the belligerent.  This doctrine allowed a country 
adhering to it to prevent circumvention of a blockade or shipment of contraband to an 
enemy by the insertion of an intermediate stop on a neutral vessel’s voyage.10  The 
primary issue regarding the doctrine, particularly during the American Civil War, was 
its expansion to cover more indirect efforts to deliver contraband to the enemy. 
Contraband:  ‘Contraband’ is goods or cargo that enable a belligerent ‘to carry on the 
war with greater vigour.’  Contraband traditionally was divided into two classes:  
‘absolute’ and ‘conditional’.  Absolute contraband includes goods clearly intended for 
use by the enemy.  Examples include weapons, ammunition, materials for exclusive 
use by the enemy, and goods that have no other use than a military one.  Conditional 
contraband is ‘dual use’ goods, or goods that may or may not be used by the enemy, 
depending on their purchaser or destination.  Examples traditionally included money, 
coal, timber, hay, and horses.  Regardless of the nature of the goods as absolute or 
conditional contraband, they are not ‘contraband’ unless destined for the enemy.  A 
                                                
9  Ibid., 338-419; Thomas E. Holland, A Manual of Naval Prize Law (London:  
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belligerent was expected to declare and identify what goods it would treat in which 
category, especially ‘conditional contraband’.  A ship carrying contraband bound for 
the enemy was an exception to the ‘Free Ship – Free Goods rule.11  Which goods 
could be declared contraband as technology changed, especially conditional 
contraband, was the principal issue regarding the concept. 
Enemy Ships – Enemy Goods:  This rule relates to cargo or goods on board a ship 
owned or flying the flag of an enemy belligerent.  In general, an enemy’s merchant 
ship, including its cargo, could be seized during time of war.  However, could goods 
or cargo owned by a person or company from a neutral nation on board an enemy ship 
be seized?  Some nations adopted the view that neutral goods on board an enemy ship 
could be seized.  Other nations took the position that such goods had to be returned to 
the neutral owner or an indemnity paid.  Issues existed concerning how to determine 
ownership of the ship and its cargo.12  As will be seen, the Declaration of Paris in 
1856 recognized the principle that enemy cargo on an enemy ship could be seized. 
Free Ships – Free Goods:  This rule relates to cargo or goods on board a ship owned 
or flying the flag of a neutral or non-belligerent country.  A neutral ship could be 
stopped to determine its ownership, the nature of the cargo on board, and its 
destination.  Most nations accepted the rule that enemy-owned property on a neutral 
ship could not be seized unless it was contraband or the ship was attempting to evade 
a declared, lawful blockade.  However, some nations took a more stringent view that 
any enemy property on a neutral vessel could be seized.  Many issues existed 
regarding the manner of stopping and searching the vessel and the evidence required 
to establish ownership and destination.13  As with ‘Enemy Ship – Enemy Goods’, the 
Declaration of Paris formally recognized that enemy cargo on a neutral ship could not 
be seized, with exceptions for contraband or attempting to evade a lawful blockade. 
Immunity of Private Property at Sea in Time of War:  This principle would immunize 
from seizure any privately owned property in any vessel during time of war, subject to 
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the exceptions of contraband and a ship attempting to violate a lawful blockade.  It 
therefore was an elimination of the ‘enemy ship – enemy goods’ principle.  Privately 
owned enemy property would not be subject to seizure regardless of whether it was 
on board an enemy-owned merchant ship or a neutral ship.14  As will be seen, the 
United States endeavoured to secure international recognition of this principle 
throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.  This principle was a 
source of great conflict between Britain and the US. 
Privateers or Privateering:  ‘Privateers’ or ‘privateering’ refers to the ships not crewed 
or owned by a belligerent nation, but which are authorized by a belligerent nation, 
usually pursuant to a formal document known as ‘letters of marque and reprisal’, to 
search, capture as a prize, or in some circumstances destroy, an enemy ship or a 
neutral ship carrying contraband intended for the enemy.  A privateer could be owned 
and operated by a private citizen of a neutral nation or a belligerent.  Privateering 
sometimes is referred to as ‘legalized piracy’.  Privateers ‘were prone to abuses and 
tended to cause disputes wherever they operated’, especially diplomatic issues.15 
Rule of 1756:  During the Seven Years’ War, France formed a grand coalition to try 
to blunt the growing power of Great Britain and Prussia.  Britain formed its own 
coalition.  The war ranged virtually around the world.  Traditionally, colonial and 
coastal commerce was reserved to vessels owned by a nation’s citizens.  France lifted 
this ban in order to permit neutral nations to conduct trade and thereby avoid Britain’s 
maritime dominance.  In response, Britain announced a rule, which became known as 
the ‘Rule of 1756,’ which ‘declared all neutral trade during war to be illegal if the 
activity had been forbidden in peacetime.’  Britain ended its restrictions by 1850, 
although France and Russia maintained their limitations for some time thereafter.16   
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Early Agreements and General Disagreements 
In 1604-1605, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius defended the seizure of a Portuguese 
merchant ship by a private vessel owned by the Dutch East India Company in a tract 
on prize law.  Four years later, with Spain and Portugal claiming sovereignty over 
most of the world’s oceans and therefore the right to exclude other nation’s ships 
from their waters, Grotius published a chapter from his earlier volume to refute those 
claims.  His small book, entitled Mare Liberum (the free sea), argued that no nation 
could exercise dominion over the seas.17  This thesis is ‘the first principle of modern 
international maritime law that has prevailed from the seventeenth century to the 
present:  the open sea is free to the ships of all nations.’18  Like Spain and Portugal, 
England claimed sovereignty over the waters surrounding its lands.  Grotius’s 
argument therefore did not go unchallenged, at least in Britain.  An English jurist, 
John Selden, wrote Mare Clausum (the closed sea) a few years after Grotius’s book, 
and contended that the seas could be owned and controlled just like dry land, and that 
‘the King of Great Britain is Lord of the Sea flowing about, as an inseparable and 
perpetual Appendant of the British Empire’.19 
These two extremes – mare liberum or mare clausum – form the outer 
boundaries of the limitations on the conduct of naval warfare.  The essential strategic 
goal in naval warfare is to gain closure or command of the sea, either by a climactic 
battle that destroys the enemy’s fleet or ability to defend its commerce, or by gaining 
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control of the enemy’s maritime communications.20  However, neutrals may take the 
place of the belligerents’ merchant vessels and supply the materials necessary to 
continue the fight, thereby making achievement of the essential strategic goal more 
difficult.  A belligerent’s merchant ships also may continue a profitable trade with 
neutrals to the benefit of their home country.  To what extent are the rights of 
belligerents and their ships limited during war in order to further mare liberum or 
freedom of the sea?  Stated oppositely, to what extent are the rights of neutrals and 
their ships limited during war in order to further the goal of a belligerent to gain mare 
clausum or closure of the sea?  Restrictions on the type, manner, and method of use of 
weapons of belligerents also fit within these two boundaries.  Limitations on the 
conduct of naval warfare thus are epitomized by a tension between the rights of 
neutrals and the rights of belligerents.  The laws of naval warfare represent a general 
international agreement or understanding of where and how the line between these 
competing rights is drawn.  
The phrase, ‘the laws of naval warfare’, is of course an inaccurate description.  
There are no such ‘laws’ as that word is commonly understood.  No central 
governmental entity exists which promulgates regulations and imposes them even on 
unwilling subjects.  No international police force or prosecutorial entity exists to 
detain violators and to prosecute miscreants.21  As Jan Martin Lemnitzer recently 
asserted, ‘international law is best understood from its starting point as a set of rules 
created and respected by nations in their relations with each other.’  He has 
analogized international law to ‘House Rules’, for example in a condominium 
building, established by owners of the units.  The unit owners adopt rules to govern 
the conduct of everyone in the building.  Some rules are more important than others, 
but they work so long as the tenants recognize the need to follow them, because no 
formal enforcement mechanism exists.22  This analogy is especially apt with regard to 
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the development of the laws of naval warfare in the nineteenth century, with Britain 
playing the role of the largest tenant in the building, yet having its role as arbiter and 
determiner of the ‘house rules’ challenged and reduced as more tenants with different 
views entered the building.  For most of the century, the United States was the tenant 
that led the challenge. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, some general understandings – 
and general disagreements – regarding the rights of belligerent and neutral merchant 
ships during war existed.  Whether a nation supported belligerent or neutral rights 
usually was determined by whether it was a maritime or continental power.  Britain 
was a maritime power and so supported expansive belligerent rights.  France and the 
other European nations – certainly by the end of the Napoleonic Wars – were 
continental powers whose views tilted toward the side of neutrals.  Many of these 
general understandings and disagreements were the result of a multitude of bilateral 
treaties and agreements between nations.  Some nations, particularly the United States 
in its early years, entered into treaties with varying and often inconsistent provisions 
with different countries.23  France and most nations asserted that an enemy’s merchant 
ship, including its cargo, could be seized during time of war.  However, Britain 
claimed such goods had to be returned to the neutral or an indemnity paid for them.  
In a number of early bilateral treaties, the US agreed that neutral goods on board an 
enemy ship were subject to seizure.  Thus, for France – and in some cases the United 
States – an ‘enemy ship = enemy goods’.24   
                                                                                                                                      
outcome), betray each other (and thereby achieve an intermediate outcome), or have 
one prisoner betray the other trusting prisoner (and the betrayer thereby achieves the 
best individual outcome while the trusting player achieves the worst individual 
outcome).  Offer (1989), 282.  The difficulty with this analogy is that in the 
international community of nations, the players do not remain ignorant of the other’s 
choice.  If one nation decides to ignore accepted international law, the other nation 
soon learns of it and reacts, thereby achieving the intermediate outcome.  It also 
ignores the fact that adherence to international law typically is not a two player game.  
Thus, the highest individual outcome possible in the prisoner’s dilemma is not 
generally achievable.  The best outcome in international law results from mutual trust.  
23 See Savage (1934), 1-35, 114-118. 
24 Coogan (1981), 18-19; Ranft, ‘Restraints on War at Sea’, 43-44; Savage (1934), 2-
3, 114-115; Semmel (1986), 14-15. 
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Neutral merchant ships could be stopped and searched by a belligerent 
warship to determine its ownership, the nature of cargo on board, and its intended 
destination.  Such a search could be conducted in international waters or the territorial 
waters of the belligerent, not generally the territorial waters of a neutral.  The specific 
procedures to be followed as well as the documentation or proof necessary to 
establish ownership, the nature of the cargo, and the destination of the vessel were 
subject to various rules.  Neutral vessels, if engaging in ‘unneutral service’, carrying 
‘contraband’, or attempting to evade a blockade, could be seized.  Britain claimed the 
right to seize enemy property on board a neutral vessel.  The US originally took a 
similar position, but soon adopted the more recognized position of France and most of 
the world that enemy property on a neutral vessel could not be seized unless 
contraband or if the ship was attempting to evade a recognized blockade.  Thus, for 
most of the seafaring world except Britain – and in its early years, the United States – 
a ‘free (neutral) ship = free (neutral) goods’.25   
The two exceptions to the rule regarding immunity from seizure of enemy 
goods on board a neutral ship (contraband and blockade) were subject to varying 
interpretations.  Whether goods were ‘contraband’ depended on their character and 
intended use.  Contraband included weapons, ammunition, and the like.  Products that 
might have a military or naval use depending on their ultimate destination were left to 
ad hoc determinations, based either on a declaration as to how they would be treated 
by a belligerent during the war or the decision of a prize court.  Most nations’ lists of 
‘contraband’ were similar, with disputes generally arising out of new military uses for 
items, such as coal following the development of steam propulsion systems.  
Countries exercising expansive belligerent rights, such as Britain, broadly defined 
‘contraband’.  For example, during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain included ‘naval 
stores’, such as sails, pitch, tar, trees for masts, and rope within the definition, much 
to the consternation of France and other nations.  For neutral nations desiring to 
maintain or expand their trade with belligerents during war, the smaller the number of 
items declared ‘contraband’, the better.  The US, therefore, advocated a limited list of 
                                                
25 Coogan (1981), 18-19; John B. Hattendorf, ‘The US Navy and the “Freedom of the 
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contraband and even argued that the doctrine should be abolished as early as 1780.  
The treatment of food and provisions raised special issues because those items often 
were necessary for the welfare of a nation’s general populace.  Provisions could be 
considered ‘contraband’ if they were intended for enemy forces or a besieged city.  
The amount and nature of proof to establish that fact was not clear.26 
Issues also existed regarding whether a ‘blockade’ had been properly declared 
and effectively existed and thus could subject a neutral merchant ship to seizure for 
attempting to ‘run’ the blockade.  To be valid, a blockade had to be announced 
(although Britain took the position that constructive notice was sufficient) and 
‘effective’.  The critical question was how much naval presence was required and 
where for a blockade to be considered effective.  ‘Cruising’ or ‘paper’ blockades, 
declared by Britain during the Napoleonic Wars in reprisal for French actions, did not 
result in an ‘effective’ blockade because sufficient ships were not present.  The 
United States decried such ‘paper blockades’ and claimed that a legal blockade only 
was ‘where the presence of adequate naval forces virtually guaranteed the interception 
of ships trying to enter blockaded ports.’27  
Many nations found it difficult to maintain a sufficient number of ships to 
attack the trade of the enemy during war.  Building and sustaining a navy was 
expensive.  For centuries, therefore, countries authorized privateering as a further 
means of attacking enemy sea borne trade, thereby turning actions that otherwise 
would be considered piracy into lawful acts of war.  This practice generally favoured 
nations with small navies but large merchant fleets, which could be readily converted 
into commerce raiders.  Nations with small or greatly outnumbered navies would 
authorize foreign-owned vessels to act as privateers if necessary.  The potential 
reward – the ‘prize’ of a well-laden enemy vessel – was a significant financial 
incentive for privateers.  During the American War of Independence and the 
Napoleonic Wars, privateering was highly profitable and resulted in the capture of 
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thousands of British merchant ships.28  The US enshrined the right of Congress to 
issue letters of marque and reprisal in its Constitution.29     
From its foundation, the United States tried to obtain recognition of the 
principle of the immunity of private property at sea from seizure in time of war.  The 
principle arose from an analogy to efforts to ban plunder on land.30  As a small, new 
nation with no navy, the US did not consider it likely that it would become a 
belligerent, especially in a war involving European powers.  Accordingly, the country 
desired to maximize the ability of its merchant navy not only to continue to trade with 
belligerents, but also to expand that trade during a war.  The immunity of private 
property at sea, first enunciated on behalf of the United States by Benjamin Franklin 
in 1780, would immunize any privately owned property in any vessel from seizure.  
Whether the property was owned by a neutral or a belligerent or on board a neutral or 
belligerent merchant ship would not matter.  First included in a treaty between the 
United States and Prussia of 1785, the principle immunized all privately owned 
property from seizure, even if contraband (the concept of which was abolished in the 
treaty), and privateers were prohibited from stopping such vessels.31  The US pressed 
for international recognition of the principle throughout the century.  For example, in 
1823, American Secretary of State John Quincy Adams told Britain’s minister to the 
US that seizing enemy property on board a neutral ship was ‘a relic of the barbarous 
warfare of barbarous ages; the cruel, and for the most part, now exploded system of 
private war.’32  Adams instructed his minister in London to seek Britain’s agreement 
to the immunity of private property at sea during war.33  After five years of 
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unsuccessful efforts to gain the agreement of Britain, Russia, and France, the US 
temporarily abandoned its efforts.34   
Several examples illustrate Britain’s ability at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century to effectively ‘set’ the ‘house rules’.  During the American War of 
Independence, Britain aggressively stopped, searched, and interfered with neutral 
commerce with its rebellious colonies based on the Rule of 1756.  Irritated with 
Britain’s actions, in 1780 Denmark, Holland, Russia, and Sweden formed a League of 
Armed Neutrality and threatened war if Britain did not cease its excessive searches.  
They proposed general recognition of the rule that enemy property on neutral ships 
was not subject to seizure.  In 1782, England reached an agreement with Russia, the 
League’s leading nation, to curtail its searches of neutral vessels but did not recognize 
the principle that enemy goods on a neutral vessel were free from seizure.  In 1799, a 
British cruiser attempted to stop and search a Danish vessel travelling in convoy 
under an armed neutral escort.  Britain was dependent on Baltic naval stores for the 
Royal Navy.  Denmark protested this infringement of the rights of neutrals, and 
Russia and Sweden joined to create a new League of Armed Neutrality in 1800.  
Britain’s response was more definitive this time.  The Royal Navy, led by Admiral 
Lord Nelson, attacked and destroyed the Danish fleet in Copenhagen 1801.  Thus 
chastised, the new League agreed to a watered-down convention, one in which Britain 
still did not recognize the concept that enemy property on neutral ships was not 
subject to seizure.35  During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain reinstituted the Rule of 
1756, which made neutrals engaging in trade during war that they could not have 
undertaken during peacetime subject to seizure.  This declaration caused US merchant 
ships to land cargoes from the French West Indies in the US and then reship them to 
France.  In response, British prize courts adopted the ‘continuous voyage doctrine’, 
holding that such intermediate stops, when the goods were intended for an enemy 
port, were insufficient to break the continuity of the voyage.36   
                                                
34 Ibid., 120; Ranft, ‘Restraints on War at Sea’, 46-47. 
35 Semmel (1986), 14-22. 
36 Hattendorf, ‘US Navy, 1775-1917’, 166; Lemnitzer (2014), 148; Savage (1934), 
117-118. 
 35 
Nominally, the War of 1812 resulted from Britain’s rejection of ‘all respect for 
the neutral rights of the United States’ in the on-going war between Britain and 
France.  President James Madison told Congress, ‘Under pretended blockades, 
without the presence of an adequate force and sometimes without the practicability of 
applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our 
country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed 
at our agricultural and maritime interests.’37  The conflict settled nothing, and the 
Treaty of Ghent ending the war essentially was a return to the status quo ante bellum.  
The war did not resolve the legality of Britain’s blockades.38  However, it did solidify 
‘for Americans a national view towards neutral trade and the freedom of the seas.’39  
Andrew Lambert has argued regarding this early nineteenth century era: 
While Britain, as the dominant naval power, invariably adopted 
a different position on maritime legal issues to those of weaker naval 
rivals and neutrals, the British regime was tempered by practical 
politics.  A clear distinction can be drawn between the legal policy 
applied in ‘total war’, when limitation was generally ignored, and a 
‘limited war’ when the views of significant neutrals influenced the 
execution of policy.40 
Britain did not completely ignore the rules previously agreed with the other ‘tenants 
in the building’ based on the nature of the conflict.  Britain applied its prize courts’ 
interpretations of the laws of naval warfare.  Moreover, although it did not agree 
entirely with the rules promoted by the other tenants, Britain often moderated its 
actions in response to their demands, even during its existential war with Napoleonic 
France.  It also used its position to refuse to discuss maritime rights at the Congress of 
Vienna in 1814-1815.41  Britain was still the largest tenant in the building.  But global 
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sea trade was changing with the development of new technologies and Britain’s 
maritime commerce was expanding with its empire, thereby creating new interests in 
favour of greater commerce protection.  The Crimean War of 1853-1856, followed by 
the American Civil War, presented new opportunities and challenges for the 
development of the laws of naval warfare. 
Two Wars, Two Different Directions42 
In March 1854, Great Britain and France declared war on Russia, joining the 
Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War.  Though now allies, Britain and France had 
long maintained different positions regarding the treatment of enemy and neutral 
property on board merchant ships during war.  To resolve these conflicts, the two 
countries compromised, with each nation giving up one of its positions.  For the 
duration of the war, neutral property on enemy ships would be free from seizure, as 
would enemy property on neutral ships – subject to the exceptions for contraband and 
attempting to breach a blockade.  Britain and France also agreed not to authorize 
privateers during the war.  England agreed to the compromise at least in part due to 
concerns of Russia authorizing US merchant ships to act as privateers.  A less 
aggressive approach toward neutral commerce made privateering not as attractive.  
England reserved the right to return to its previous position regarding enemy property 
on neutral ships in the future.43  However, a right once surrendered is very difficult to 
get back. 
The US viewed the announcement by Britain and France as an opportunity to 
turn the laws of naval warfare toward a more pro-neutral orientation.  Almost 
immediately America began a campaign, through bilateral treaties, to gain 
international acceptance of the principle that free ships make free goods except for 
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contraband.44  The campaign nearly succeeded, but was deftly parried primarily by 
Britain, which did not support international acceptance of the principle and also 
desired international recognition of a ban on privateering.45  When Prussia suggested 
such a ban in response to the United States’ proposed treaty, President Franklin Pierce 
rejected the offer, saying ‘the commerce of a nation having a comparatively small 
naval force would be very much at the mercy of its enemy in case of war with a 
power of decided naval superiority.’  However, Pierce then returned to the long-
cherished immunity of private property at sea principle.  ‘Should the leading powers 
of Europe concur in proposing as a rule of international law to exempt private 
property upon the ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by 
privateers, the US will readily meet them upon that broad ground.’46  However, that 
‘broad ground’ would remain fallow. 
On 30 March 1856, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, 
and Turkey signed the Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War.  At the ‘after 
congress’ on 8 April, France offered a major revision to the laws of naval warfare – a 
surprise to the delegates other than from Britain.  The French proposed to make 
permanent the temporary agreement with Britain regarding the treatment of property 
on board neutral and enemy merchant ships, to ban privateering, and to define an 
effective blockade.  The British government recognized that having given up long-
held belligerent rights two years earlier it would be virtually impossible to restore 
them.  However, the abolition of privateering offered a significant benefit to Britain.  
Less than two weeks after France made its proposal, on 16 April, the same seven 
nations that had signed the Treaty of Paris executed the Declaration of Paris.47   
In four short articles, the signatories of the Declaration not only formalized the 
temporary rules of naval warfare adopted by Britain and France before the war as 
accepted international law, they went farther in limiting naval warfare than ever 
before.  In the Declaration, the seven countries agreed: 
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1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished; 
2. The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of 
contraband of war; 
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not 
liable to capture under enemy’s flag; 
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, 
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the 
coast of the enemy. 
. . . 
The present Declaration is not and shall not be binding, except 
between those Powers who have acceded, or shall accede, to it.48 
The British government had not consulted with the Admiralty prior to signing 
the Declaration.  Discussion of the proposed terms in the Cabinet occurred over less 
than two weeks.49  The treaty seemed to deny Britain significant belligerent rights on 
which it had relied for its protection in numerous wars.  Although liberals and 
commercial interests supported the Declaration, others condemned the treaty in 
almost hysterical terms.50  For example, Lord Derby, in a strident speech in the House 
of Lords after the agreement was announced, declared it  
to be not only humiliating and derogatory, but absolutely dangerous to 
the prime interests of England.  …  The declaration … ha[s] taken the 
country completely by surprise.  …  I am of the opinion that the course 
which has been pursued amounts to an abandonment of the naval 
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superiority of this country….  My Lords, I look upon this act of the 
Government as cutting off the right arm, as it were, of the country.51   
Other peers decried the Declaration in similar terms.52  Paul Kennedy has described 
Britain’s act as ‘an incredible gesture by the world’s strongest sea power in favour of 
the continental states’ view that the nationality of any merchant vessel should cover 
its cargo:  at one stroke the weapon of the blockade had been neutered.’53  John 
Hattendorf has described the Declaration as ‘a major British concession that severely 
reduced the advantages of its naval supremacy.’54 
Much analysis has been focused on why Britain agreed to such apparent 
limitations on its rights as a belligerent.55  Lemnitzer has argued that Britain ‘realised 
that any return to the old right of search would interfere with the new realities of 
British-dominated globalized trade, and greatly upset a large number of countries.’  
Abolishing privateering, the ‘main strategic weapon’ of the US, was a valuable gain 
for relinquishing old belligerent rights.56  Andrew Lambert has stated that ‘the reality’ 
of the Declaration ‘was far less clear-cut’ than asserted by contemporary 
commentators and historians.57   
Regardless why Britain agreed to the Declaration of Paris, the treaty offered 
any semi-skilled lawyer (and therefore certainly Britain) numerous loopholes and 
opportunities for argument.  Nations eventually evaded the ban on privateering by 
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arming merchant ships as auxiliaries.58  ‘Contraband’ was not defined, which meant 
that by expanding the list of goods considered contraband, a belligerent could reduce 
the scope of protection afforded by clauses 2 and 3.59  The evidence required to 
determine the nationality of a ‘neutral’ ship or ownership of property was not 
established.  The criteria for an ‘effective’ blockade – ‘maintained by a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy’ – was subject to 
interpretation.60  In addition, Britain maintained its concept of continuous voyage as a 
further weapon against blockade evaders.  Finally, the Declaration only applied to 
conflicts with other nations that agreed to be bound by its terms.  Its application, 
therefore, was not universal.  However, irrespective of the potential porousness of the 
Declaration, Britain had agreed to new ‘house rules’ that limited belligerent rights.  
Virtually alone among the major nations, the US did not agree to be bound by 
the Declaration, because it could not and would not abolish privateering. 61  
Regardless of constitutional restrictions, the US again attempted to leverage the 
movement toward greater neutral rights by urging adoption of the total immunity of 
private property at sea as the quid pro quo for acceptance of the abolition of 
privateering.62  Surprisingly, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston told the Liverpool 
Chamber of Commerce on 7 November 1856 that he hoped ‘those principles of war 
which are applied to hostilities by land may be extended, without exception, to 
hostilities by sea; so that private property shall no longer be the object of aggression 
by either side.’63  In June 1859, American Secretary of State Lewis Cass used the 
beginning of the Second Italian War of Independence to propose a comprehensive 
reform of the laws of naval warfare.  His proposal addressed three topics.  First, Cass 
considered the principle of immunity of enemy property on board a neutral ship to be 
established international law by virtue of the 1856 Declaration.  However, he argued 
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that neutral nations did not need to accede to the treaty in order to gain the protection 
of their commerce granted by the Declaration.  Cass next addressed the issue of 
blockades.  He sought to limit ‘effective’ blockades to those established outside ports 
under siege.  Finally, he considered the ‘lamentably vague’ law of contraband.  Cass 
presciently recognized that as technology advanced, new articles might fall within its 
‘shifting’ scope.  He used coal as an example of a product which ‘is an article, not 
exclusively nor even principally used in war, but which enters into general 
consumption in the arts of peace, to which it is now vitally necessary.’  He therefore 
proposed that contraband should be ‘rigidly confined within the narrowest limits 
compatible with an honest belligerent policy; … those limits ought to be made to 
include only arms and munitions of war.’64  In return for these further limitations and 
the immunity of private property at sea, the US would agree to abolish privateering.65  
While the US did not directly achieve Cass’s goals, it did so indirectly.  As a result of 
a commercial treaty with France, Britain effectively agreed not to treat coal as 
contraband.  When the Second Opium War began in 1860, England dropped its 
position that the neutral rights granted by the 1856 Declaration only applied to 
signatories.66   
Thus, Britain had successfully blocked America’s efforts to achieve 
recognition of the immunity principle, narrow the scope of effective blockades, and 
restrict contraband.  But Britain’s ability to set the ‘house rules’ on naval warfare had 
eroded in the face of desires of the other tenants in the building. 
The beginning of the American Civil War found the United States and Great 
Britain exchanging their traditional positions toward limitations on naval warfare.  
The US was a belligerent against the secessionist Southern states and therefore 
promoted more expansive belligerent rights.  Britain, as a neutral, now supported 
neutral rights, although without great enthusiasm in many respects.  The main issues 
between the two nations were what constituted an effective blockade and the related 
doctrine of continuous voyage.  But first, the US offered in April 1861 to adhere to 
the Declaration of Paris without requiring acceptance of the immunity of all private 
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property at sea during war.67  The reason for this apparent volte-face was the 
immediate impact of Confederate privateers preying on Northern commerce.  The 
proposal foundered when Great Britain and France insisted that accession of the 
United States to the Declaration at that time would not apply to the on-going civil 
war.68 
The US declared a blockade of the entire coast of the Confederacy in April 
1861.69  Since 1784, the US had taken the view that ‘to be valid, a blockade must 
present a direct hazard to shipping trying to enter a port.’70  Initially, therefore, the 
declaration likely was an ineffective ‘paper blockade’ – certainly under France’s view 
of international law.  However, the US increased the number of warships cruising 
outside the Southern ports and up and down the coasts, and created a viable risk of 
interception for blockade-runners.  The position of the United States on what 
constituted an ‘effective’ blockade conformed more to that of Britain, which 
‘allow[ed] for cruising blockades as long as they created real danger for any blockade 
runners and thus frightened off honest merchants who were too timid for smuggling.’  
Britain did not forcefully object to the status of the blockade.  The United States’ 
position as a belligerent regarding what constituted an effective blockade thus 
supported Britain’s interpretation of article 4 of the 1856 Declaration.71 
The second area of conflict related to America’s expansion of the doctrine of 
continuous voyage and the seizure of neutral ships allegedly carrying contraband.  
One of the first seizures was that of two Confederate diplomats travelling on the 
British mail steamer Trent to England in November 1861.  The US initially took the 
position that enemy persons could be seized as contraband.  Britain strongly protested 
the action and the two countries verged on war.  However, the US retreated, saying 
the entire vessel should have been seized and taken to port as a prize.  Moreover, 
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Britain pointed out that contraband could only be seized if destined for a belligerent 
port, not a neutral one.72   
A number of British merchant ships, seeking to avoid the North’s blockade of 
the South, claimed to be bound for a neutral port despite carrying contraband.  A 
neutral destination arguably absolved them from seizure.  In a series of decisions, the 
US Supreme Court expanded the concept of continuous voyage.  The Bermuda, a 
British ship seized by the US Navy bound from England ostensibly to Bermuda, 
carried munitions including cannon, thousands of shells, gunpowder, and documents 
indicating the ultimate destination was the port of Charleston, South Carolina.  The 
prize court held the continuous voyage doctrine applied to blankets and boots if it was 
established they were intended for the enemy forces.  The US Supreme Court 
affirmed the seizure of both the cargo and the ship, and held that a neutral ship could 
not carry contraband ‘ostensibly for a neutral port, but destined in reality for a 
belligerent port, either by the same ship or by another, without becoming liable, from 
the commencement to the end of the voyage, to seizure’.73  Subsequent decisions 
further expanded the doctrine.  In The Springbok, the US Supreme Court affirmed the 
seizure of the entire cargo (even though only a small part was contraband), but not the 
ship, because the cargo was shipped with the intent to violate the blockade.  The 
Court ruled, ‘liability to condemnation, if captured during any part of that voyage, 
attached to the cargo from the time of sailing.’74  The Court further expanded the 
doctrine by making clear that further transport of contraband, whether by the same or 
another ship, or by overland transport, did not prevent its application.  In The 
Peterhoff, the Court affirmed the seizure of contraband based on evidence those items 
were to be transhipped to the Confederacy by land after being off-loaded in a neutral 
port, not by a further sea voyage.75 
Britain did not significantly protest the seizures of these vessels or the ultimate 
decisions.  The fact the ship owners and shippers in these cases were notorious 
blockade-runners reduced sympathy for their plights and the ability of Britain to 
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challenge the prize court decisions.76  For example, the government initially told the 
Springbok’s owner it would do nothing other than observe the prize court 
proceedings.77  After the prize court announced its bare judgment, the government 
took the position that the seizure was improper based on an analysis by the Crown’s 
Law Officers.  But it deferred any protest until the court’s opinion was released.78  
Once the government reviewed the detailed opinion, it told the ship’s owner it would 
not interfere in the proceedings.79  Similarly, after reviewing the evidence regarding 
seizure of the Peterhoff, as well as another British ship, the Dolphin, Britain again 
decided it would not officially protest.80  Based on its review of the evidence before 
the prize courts in both cases, ‘Her Majesty’s Government, without adopting all the 
reasons assigned in these Judgments (in some of them, indeed, they do not concur), 
are not prepared to say that the decisions themselves, under all the circumstances of 
the cases, are not in harmony with the principles of the Judgments in the English Prize 
Courts.’81   
The US, as a belligerent, thus had expanded the doctrine of continuous 
voyage, a principle originally created by Britain during the Seven Years’ War.  It also 
had adopted Britain’s more lenient position on what constituted an effective blockade.  
Some of the belligerent rights Britain arguably had lost following the Crimean War 
were retrieved during the American Civil War.  Moreover, the refusal of European 
nations to allow Confederate privateers access to their ports effectively ended 
privateering, without the agreement of the US.82  Two different mid-century wars had 
taken the laws of naval warfare in different directions. 
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New Challenges and Challengers 
After losing and then regaining some belligerent rights during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century, Britain focused on not allowing any further 
restrictions on naval warfare for the remainder of the century.83  It also responded to 
the rise of new challengers to its dominant position as a sea power.  In contrast, the 
nation agreed to international limitations concerning land warfare.  It readily acceded 
to the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration.84 
After the end of the American Civil War, the US again tried to gain 
international acceptance of the immunity of private property at sea.  The Franco-
Prussian War had important implications for the development of the laws of naval 
warfare, particularly regarding contraband, blockade, and auxiliary vessels.85  When 
Prussia announced in 1870 that private property at sea would be exempt from seizure 
without regard to reciprocity from France, the US told its minister to the North 
German Confederation to obtain recognition of the principle.86  However, the only 
success achieved was in a treaty between the United States and Italy.87  In Britain, 
supporters of the principle kept the issue alive in British politics and advocated for its 
adoption without success.88 
Britain still exercised its position to preclude discussion of limitations on 
maritime warfare.  In 1874, Russia proposed that an international conference take 
place in Brussels to discuss an ‘International Convention on the Laws and Customs of 
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War.’89  The British government’s response made clear it was ‘firmly determined not 
to enter into any discussion of the rules of international law by which the relations of 
belligerents are guided, or to undertake any new obligations or engagements of any 
kind in regard to general principles.’  Having heard that at least one country intended 
to send a naval delegate and naval matters might be considered, Britain wanted to 
make its position quite clear.90  The secretary of state for foreign affairs, Lord Derby, 
asked Britain’s representatives in all countries invited to confirm that the conference 
‘shall not entertain in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to maritime 
operations or naval warfare.’91  After meticulously obtaining precise responses from 
each invited nation, Britain accepted the invitation, based on ‘the assurances thus 
given by the Russian and other Governments that the Conference will not entertain 
any questions relating to maritime operations or naval warfare; and … there is no 
intention of enlarging the scope of the Conference so as to include the discussion of 
general principles of International Law.’92  Lord Derby instructed Britain’s delegate 
‘to guard carefully against being led, in the course of deliberations on other matters, 
into any discussions which may, however remotely, affect the subject of maritime 
warfare … and if any papers are attempted to be presented to the Conference, or any 
statements made which refer to it, you will protest against such papers or statements 
being received’. 93   The result of the conference was merely a record of the 
proceedings, at which Britain’s delegate made clear he was not taking part in any 
discussions on controverted questions of international law.94 
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Britain also faced threats to its dominance on the seas from other nations.  In 
1885, France declared food – rice – contraband in its war with China.  Declaring food 
contraband was a new precedent that caused neutrals, including Britain, to protest.  
Although not technically a violation of the Declaration of Paris, the action suggested 
that previously sacrosanct lines could be crossed in war.95  In 1886, the French 
government appointed Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Théophile Aube as minister of 
marine.  Aube was a proponent of the jeune école theory of naval strategy, often 
called ‘the strategy of the weak’.  Under that school of thought, Britain was the 
primary enemy and the French navy was to engage in ruthless commerce destruction 
and bombardment of coastal defences.  Contests between fleets of battleships were a 
thing of the past.  Aggressive and relentless guerre de course would result in victory 
over England.  Moreover, the self-propelled torpedo – developed by Englishman 
Robert Whitehead but ignored at the time by the Royal Navy – made the tactics of the 
jeune école appear not just feasible, but likely to succeed.  Torpedoes threatened the 
viability of traditional blockades and would allow forces from several stations to 
make concentrated, coordinated, and rapid attacks on the enemy.96 
The jeune école had a more sinister side regarding international law and the 
laws of naval warfare.  ‘Commerce warfare, as it was advocated by the jeune école, 
raised difficult strategic, moral, legal and practical questions that were tightly 
interlocked.’  In the view of its proponents, the 1856 Declaration grossly favoured 
Britain and left France in an inferior position (contrary to the general view in 
England).  In any war, the Declaration therefore would have to be ignored.  The 
planned use of torpedoes, merciless commerce raiding, and the ruthless bombardment 
of undefended harbours, cities, and industrial centres inevitably would violate 
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international law.  Indeed, the jeune école ‘disputed the very idea that international 
law was valid in war.’97 
Aube’s short and ineffective tenure as navy minister and the jeune école 
rendered the French Navy discordant and divided for years.  However, Britain took 
the threat arising from the expansion of the French fleet seriously.98  Coupled with 
disclosures of weaknesses and deficiencies in the Royal Navy in the late 1880s, 
Britain announced in March 1889 that it would follow a ‘two-power standard’, 
pursuant to which the Royal Navy would be maintained as large as the next two naval 
powers combined.99  The Naval Defence Act of 1889 started the naval arms race 
between Britain and France – and after the announcement of the Franco-Russian 
alliance in 1891 with Russia as well – that would continue until the early years of the 
twentieth century.100 
The US Navy also emerged as a potential, though still distant, competitor for 
Britain.  In 1890, the US Navy was the twelfth largest in the world.  Its focus since 
founding had been coastal defence and protection of commerce during war.101  The 
US previously had been content to argue for limitations on naval warfare to permit its 
maintenance of a small fleet.  However, the 1890 Naval Act provided for a 
significantly modernized and expanded naval force.  While the modern steel 
battleships authorized were limited to a 5,000 mile cruising range, for the first time 
the US Navy would not rely essentially on cruisers or frigates for its operations.  It 
would have the potential for more extensive actions in time of war than in the past.102  
In addition, Alfred Thayer Mahan burst upon the world with his theory of naval 
strategy and sea power as expressed in The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
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1660-1783.  Mahan studied the British Navy in the age of sail, and he saw in that 
navy and its operations a focus on maintaining control of the sea during war, climactic 
sea battles, and the road to a nation’s growth and wealth.  Contrary to the jeune école, 
commerce raiding was at best a secondary means to force the enemy fleet to engage in 
the climactic battle for control of the sea.103  For Mahan, the US Navy needed to 
emulate the Royal Navy of the past in order to safeguard and secure the country’s 
future prosperity.  The United States needed to become a sea power.   
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, Britain still was the largest tenant in 
the international ‘condominium’.  The rest of the world could not discuss the laws of 
naval warfare without its agreement and participation.  The Netherlands approached 
Britain in 1893 and suggested an international conference to discuss extension of the 
Declaration of Paris ‘by agreeing to the principle that private property of subjects or 
citizens of a belligerent on the high seas should be exempt from seizure.’104  Prime 
Minister Lord Rosebery’s response was a curt instruction to tell The Netherlands that 
‘Her Majesty’s Government regret that they do not see their way to accede to such a 
proposal.’105  At the diamond jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1897, Great Britain 
assembled the largest and most powerful naval force the world had ever seen to 
celebrate the occasion.106  The Declaration of Paris also retained its vitality more than 
forty years after its adoption.  After the US declared war on Spain in April 1898, 
President McKinley announced the country would not authorize privateering and 
would adhere to the other provisions of the 1856 Declaration.107   
Conclusion 
The nineteenth century began with some generally accepted laws of naval 
warfare and a number of areas of disagreement.  Great Britain, as the predominant 
naval power, essentially managed and controlled the ‘house rules’.  For most of the 
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century, it refused to participate in discussions and blocked efforts to limit naval 
warfare.  The one exception – the Declaration of Paris in 1856 – resulted in 
limitations on belligerent rights to the dismay of many in Britain.  For nearly all of the 
century, the US endeavoured to expand neutral rights, especially international 
adoption of the immunity of all private property at sea during war.  Britain 
successfully blocked these efforts, and as a neutral in the American Civil War, gained 
some expansion of belligerent rights.  In the last half of the century, Britain faced new 
challenges and challengers to its dominant maritime position.  With the expansion of 
other navies and increased naval expenditures, Britain was no longer the predominant 
tenant in the international ‘house’.  The stage was set for another attempt at 







On 24 August 1898,1 Tsar Nicholas II changed naval strategic thinking and 
planning forever – although that was not his intention.  On that date, he invited the 
leading nations of the world to an international peace conference.  This invitation 
ushered in an unprecedented period of focus on the laws of war and their adaptation 
and adoption to naval warfare.  This chapter places the Tsar’s invitation in context 
from a naval standpoint.  It situates on-going the naval arms race, especially between 
Great Britain and Russia, in the context of the conference’s origins and returns the 
conference to its proper place in the pre-First World War naval historiography.  The 
initial reactions and responses of Britain and the United States to the Tsar’s invitation 
are compared.  This chapter shows how civilian and naval leaders in Britain and the 
US were confronted with the potential implications of the proposed international 
conference for naval warfare, albeit from very different perspectives and with very 
different reactions.   
The Tsar’s Invitation 
The ambassadors and ministers to the court of Tsar Nicholas II went to the 
Foreign Ministry on 24 August 1898, expecting their regular weekly meeting with the 
foreign minister.  Instead, they received a ‘mighty surprise’. 2   Count Mikhail 
Muraviev, the Russian foreign minister, informed them, ‘The maintenance of general 
peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all 
nations present themselves, in the existing condition of the whole world, as the ideal 
towards which the endeavours of all Governments should be directed.’  Nicholas II 
wanted to convene an international conference to seek ‘the most effective means of 
ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all of 
limiting the progressive development of existing armaments.’  Indeed, most of the 
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official message handed to the foreign representatives emphasized the economic 
burdens being imposed by increasing armaments.3   
Nicholas II believed his backward nation’s economy was being unduly 
burdened by the cost of the on-going arms race in the late nineteenth century.4  The 
genesis of the proposal and who promoted the idea within Russia has been the subject 
of various speculations and investigations.  Sir Charles Scott, Britain’s recently 
appointed ambassador to St. Petersburg, advised Prime Minister Lord Salisbury that 
he had been told the ‘eloquent appeal’ had been ‘drawn up at the dictation of the 
Emperor.’5  Rumours soon surfaced among diplomats – although generally dismissed 
at the time – that the invitation was inspired by the work of Ivan S. Bloch, a Polish 
economist and banker received by Nicholas II, and who argued that war was 
impossible due to advances in technology and economic interdependence of nations.6 
However, the proposal originated from more practical concerns regarding 
Austria-Hungary’s adoption of new rapid-firing artillery and the expense that Russia 
would incur making comparable changes to its army.  War Minister Aleksei 
Kuropatkin initially suggested Russia should negotiate with Austria-Hungary to agree 
that neither country would proceed with the change to new artillery.  Count Sergei 
Witte, the Minister of Finance, took sole credit in his self-serving memoirs for 
translating Kuropatkin’s proposal into a general appeal to the Great Powers for 
disarmament and limitation of military expenditures.7  But the development of the 
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proposal and its alteration into a more general plea for reduction of armaments had 
multiple parents, including the Tsar.8  The most recent examiner concluded the Tsar’s 
invitation was the result of both pragmatism (the need to reduce or eliminate the 
additional military expenditures that would result from matching Austria-Hungary’s 
adoption of new artillery) and idealism (a genuine desire to reduce military spending 
and the significant drain on finances that could otherwise be used elsewhere).9  The 
first analysis of the genesis of the Tsar’s invitation flatly declared ‘that the Russian 
government most certainly did not intend to include the limitations of naval 
armaments in its plan.’10   
The on-going naval arms race, especially between Great Britain and Russia, as 
well as to a lesser extent the deteriorating relations between those two countries, has 
generally been lost in the analysis or ignored in considering the factors that resulted in 
the Tsar’s invitation.  Arthur Marder discusses the on-going naval arms race between 
Britain, France, and Russia in his brief discussion of the 1899 conference, but does 
not consider it in relation to the Tsar’s invitation.11  Jon Tetsuro Sumida describes the 
substantial British naval expenditures at the end of the nineteenth century and 
generally states they ‘were countered by French and Russian programs’.12  Nicholas 
Lambert provides a fuller exposition of Britain’s spending on the Royal Navy during 
the time period in response to French and Russian naval programs.13  However, 
neither Sumida nor Lambert provides any linkage to the Tsar’s invitation for a peace 
conference, because neither mentions the 1899 Conference in their analysis.  Other 
recent scholars, while arguing that Germany became the focus of the Royal Navy’s 
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concerns much earlier than previously contended, also do not consider the naval arms 
race in the context of the Tsar’s proposal for a peace conference.14 
Diplomatic relations between Britain and Russia were worsening in 1897-
1898.  The two countries had been in conflict in the Far East, particularly China, for 
some time.15  By August 1898, Britain was upset with Russia’s procurement of a 
railroad concession from the Chinese government and its acquisition of Port Arthur.  
Rumours spread that war was possible and that the United States and Germany were 
interested in forming an anti-Russia coalition with Great Britain.16  Only a few 
months later, Britain confronted France at Fashoda in East Africa.  England gained a 
diplomatic victory due to the role of the Royal Navy and its overwhelming strength.17 
More importantly, the last years of the nineteenth century marked a substantial 
increase in naval expenditures in a number of countries, especially Britain.18  In 
March 1897, First Lord of the Admiralty George J. Goschen told the House of 
Commons that the country was ‘moving at a very great rate in the direction of 
increasing, the Navy, and within a comparatively short space of years’.19  Later that 
year, Imperial Germany announced the Navy Law of 1898, which provided for a 
massive increase in naval spending.20  Goschen justified his request for an increase in 
the number of battleships and cruisers to be constructed in 1898-1899 based on 
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Russian and French shipbuilding.  He predicted, however, ‘a diminution in the 
amount required for shipbuilding in 1899-1900.’21  Goschen asked the House of 
Commons to approve ‘a colossal sum for the Navy estimates’ of more than £25.5 
million, the largest in British history.  In making this request, he advised that ‘the 
Japanese fleet is a new factor in strategic considerations, and there are naval 
developments by Germany and other nations.’22  Indeed, the US Navy had been 
expanding since 1890 and in 1898 the total naval appropriation in the US was $57 
million.23   
But on the same day Nicholas II issued a ukase (a proclamation of the Tsar 
with the force of law) appropriating 90 million rubles without recourse to a loan for 
naval construction over the following seven years.24  While Goschen had some 
‘intimation’ of Russia’s plan in late February, he told the Cabinet in June that the 
Admiralty would have to take Russia’s new ‘gigantic programme’ of ship building to 
account in the budget proposal for 1898-1899.  The Cabinet, therefore, had to decide, 
‘whether or not the extraordinary Russian programme must, or need not, be met by 
additional efforts on our part.’25  Goschen undoubtedly thought the answer must be 
‘yes’.  The Cabinet agreed that the government ‘must meet the Russian programme 
whatever it might be’, but left determination of what that would involve to Goschen 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks Beach.26  Hicks Beach was 
sceptical of the bases for Goschen’s demands, but in a series of letters just days before 
his presentation to Parliament, Goschen convinced Hicks Beach of the accuracy of his 
facts regarding Russia’s program and the need for additional naval construction, 
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especially cruisers.27  Goschen presciently warned Hicks Beach, ‘so that there may be 
no misunderstanding’, that in view of the cruiser program of Russia and France, ‘we 
must resolutely face the necessity of our having to add considerably to ours in next 
years ordinary programme. … What I am proposing now is not in alleviation of next 
years’ estimates.’28 
Accordingly, just over four months after asking the House of Commons for a 
‘colossal sum’, and barely a month before issuance of the Tsar’s invitation to a peace 
conference, Goschen asked the House for an additional £15 million to be spent over 
the next four years for four more battleships, four more cruisers, and twelve torpedo 
boat destroyers.  On this occasion he explicitly named Russia and its naval building 
program as the reason for the supplemental request.29  Thus, the years and months 
leading up to the Tsar’s invitation were characterized by massive naval armaments 
expenditures in Britain and other maritime nations, with much of Britain’s focus 
being on Russia. 
It was in this context that the Tsar invited the world’s powers to a conference 
to discuss arms reductions and peaceful means for the resolution of disputes.  The day 
after receiving the Tsar’s invitation, Ambassador Scott told Balfour he had ‘no doubt 
whatsoever of the sincerity of the Emperor’s pacific sentiments and earnest desire to 
arrive at a friendly understanding on all questions with England.’30  Approximately 
two weeks later, Scott wrote Lord Salisbury that Witte’s financial policy was being 
‘seriously jeopardized by large demands for artillery & naval purposes.’31  Any 
suggestion that the global naval situation played no role in the Tsar’s invitation to a 
peace conference is undercut not only by the vast increases in naval armaments in 
Britain, Russia, and other countries in the years and months immediately preceding 
August 1898, but also by the number of topics relating to naval matters that 
eventually were agreed for discussion at the 1899 Conference.  Appreciating the naval 
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and diplomatic context surrounding the Tsar’s proposal is important to understanding 
subsequent events.   
Initial Reactions 
Nicholas II’s invitation generally was met with scepticism among the various 
heads of state and their senior ministers.  Pacifists and peace-seekers were excited by 
the prospect of such a conference.  However, the ‘chancelleries of Europe handled it 
like a parcel that might contain a bomb.’32  Nevertheless, no nation wanted to be the 
one to say ‘no’.  Great Britain and the United States took vastly different approaches 
to the Tsar’s invitation.  Indeed, the reactions and responses indicate the different 
levels of concern in each country regarding naval matters and the proposed 
conference. 
The Tsar’s invitation came less than two weeks after the US had concluded an 
armistice with Spain ending formal hostilities in what the then American ambassador 
to Great Britain (and soon-to-be US secretary of state) John Hay famously described 
as ‘a splendid little war’.33  The US ambassador to Russia recommended the Tsar’s 
announcement ‘to the absorbing interest of the President and people of the United 
States’ promptly after receipt.34  On 3 September, Count Muraviev provided a brief 
synopsis of the conference program, concluding that while present armaments would 
not be considered, ways to avoid further increases in armaments would be 
discussed. 35   Only twelve days after the Tsar’s invitation, President William 
McKinley accepted, saying rather inconsistently that while the ‘war with Spain 
renders it impracticable for us to consider the present reduction of our armaments, 
which even now are doubtless far below the measure which principal European 
powers would be willing to adopt’, the country would send a delegate to the proposed 
conference.36  For the US, the Tsar’s invitation represented an opportunity to further 
step onto the world stage as a power to be reckoned with following its defeat of Spain.  
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Naval considerations played no role in President McKinley’s decision to accept the 
Tsar’s invitation. 
Britain took a more cautious view, initially indicating that because Prime 
Minister Salisbury was out of the country and the other members of the Cabinet 
‘scattered’, it was impossible to give any reply other than that it ‘warmly 
sympathize[d] and approve[d] the pacific and economic objects’ of the Tsar’s 
proposal.37  Ambassador Scott had further meetings with Foreign Minister Muraviev.  
On 1 September, Muraviev informed Scott regarding the invitation’s object of 
reducing arms expenditures: 
The question of the heavy burdens imposed on the populations by 
steadily increasing military Budgets affected more particularly the 
Continental States of Europe, but Great Britain … could not be 
insensible to it, as her very natural desire to maintain her naval 
superiority must also oblige her to incur similar sacrifices in order to 
keep pace with the increasing navies of other Powers and the 
inventions of science for multiplying the forces of destruction and 
defensive armour.38  
Thus, Muraviev attempted to entice British acceptance of the Tsar’s invitation as a 
possible means of reducing the country’s naval expenditures. 
The government of Lord Salisbury carefully surveyed other nations to 
determine whether they intended to accept the Tsar’s invitation.39  Most thought they 
had little choice but to accept.  Japan believed (incorrectly) that the US would decline 
the invitation.40  The Belgian government ‘should much prefer the Emperor of Russia 
should not have made his proposal, but as His Imperial Majesty has done so, … it 
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must be accepted.’41  By 10 September, Scott advised Salisbury that seven nations, 
including the US and Germany, had already accepted the Tsar’s invitation.42  As of 
the end of September, Britain had not accepted, however.  Russia was still being told 
Salisbury was absent from England,43 even though he had been receiving and sending 
multiple communications to his ministers and ambassadors regarding the proposed 
conference.  In late September, Salisbury asked Sir Thomas H. Sanderson, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘to draft an acceptance in 
properly sympathetic terms indicating rather vaguely the desirability of a programme 
of some kind.’44   By 5 October, a draft response had been prepared and provided to 
the Cabinet for review.  It was, as Salisbury desired, a vague document, expressing 
sympathy with the objects of the Tsar’s invitation and recognizing the increasing 
amounts spent by many nations on armaments and the desire to reduce the burdens 
such expenditures caused on the general population.45   
In instructing Scott to accept, Salisbury noted that popular opinion in Britain 
greatly supported the Tsar’s call for a conference.  He also asserted, ‘The perfection 
of the instruments thus brought into use, their extreme costliness, and the horrible 
carnage and destruction which would ensue from their employment on a large scale, 
have acted no doubt as a serious deterrent from war.’  Thus, increasing armaments 
preserved peace – a late nineteenth century version of ‘mutually assured destruction’.  
At the same time, Salisbury recognized that the burdens imposed on the general 
populace from ever-increasing arms expenditures ‘must, if prolonged, produce a 
feeling of unrest and discontent menacing both to internal and external tranquillity.’46  
The stage was now set for some sort of conference on disarmament, which the major 
powers in the world would attend. 
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First Skirmishes 
Any chance that naval issues would not feature in some fashion at the 
proposed conference quickly disappeared, although the initial skirmishes over them 
took place in the United States, not Britain.  Once more, the issue of the immunity of 
private property at sea raised its head in the US following the Spanish-American War, 
in which it had followed to the Declaration of Paris.  On 4 November, Charles H. 
Butler, a New York lawyer, presented a memorial to President McKinley urging him 
to convene an international congress ‘to consider and formulate rules for the freedom 
from capture of private property on the sea, whether belonging to neutrals or non-
combatant citizens of belligerent nations, except in the case of contraband of war or 
violation of blockade.’  He recognized the great increase in the size of the US Navy 
and ‘the present uselessness of privateers’.  In any future war the ‘destruction of 
private property and the resulting paralysis of commerce would be terrible, 
unprecedented, and irretrievable.’ 47  Butler petitioned the Committee on Commerce 
of the New York Chamber of Commerce, which approved his position.48  He followed 
his memorial with a letter to the New York Times arguing that the principle would not 
affect the rights of belligerents against combatants.49  The newspaper endorsed 
Butler’s proposal, urging that the topic be taken up at the Tsar’s conference.  
Recognizing Britain’s long-standing opposition to the principle, the newspaper 
editorialized that ‘Great Britain’s interests would all lie in the protection of property 
at sea’, similar to all other nations, because of the extent of its maritime commerce.50 
The growing support for Butler’s position was too much for one man who 
would figure prominently throughout the next ten years as the laws of naval warfare 
were debated and developed:  Alfred Thayer Mahan.  Widely known for authoring 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Mahan had been catapulted to 
international fame as a historian, naval strategist, and supporter of American 
imperialism.  His book developed a worldwide following and was translated into 
numerous languages.  Kaiser Wilhelm II, for example, considered The Influence of 
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Sea Power to be ‘a first-class work and classical in all points.’51  A renowned 
Anglophile, Mahan had received honorary degrees from Oxford and Cambridge.52  As 
one naval historian has written, ‘Never has one book on naval history and strategy 
meant so much to so many.’53  Mahan had retired from the US Navy in 1896, 
although he had been recalled from a European holiday to serve on the Naval War 
Board during the Spanish-American War.54 
Mahan quickly swung into action, writing a letter to the New York Times 
countering Butler’s arguments.  He argued that destroying the maritime commerce of 
an enemy in war ‘would reduce its powers of resistance, and so hasten peace.  It is 
against commerce only that the present practice of seizing the merchant ships and 
cargoes of an enemy is directed.  The strictly private property of the individuals on 
board, nor for purposes of trade, is inviolable’.  Mahan claimed that the risk of having 
their property seized or destroyed would cause commercial interests to exercise a 
deterrent effect toward war.  Moreover, while decades earlier the large American 
merchant marine and the small size of the US Navy necessitated support for the 
immunity of private property at sea, with the American merchant marine now ‘almost 
naught’, the United States was ‘rather interested to hold over the heads of a possible 
enemy the chance of serious injury befalling him by stopping his maritime 
commerce.’55  The New York Times responded, saying Mahan’s view ‘is bound with 
the progress of enlightenment to be abandoned.’  It opined that if Mahan’s arguments 
were adopted, the US would ‘be forced to increase our navy in the ratio that our ocean 
trade grows.’  American funds would be better spent re-building the nation’s 
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merchant marine.56  Mahan and then Butler fired further broadsides.57  Butler even 
privately printed and disseminated a lengthy rebuttal to Mahan’s views on the issue.58 
The debate over the principle of the immunity of private property at sea 
quickly left the purely domestic arena of the US and entered the international sphere.  
In his annual message to Congress, President McKinley briefly mentioned the Tsar’s 
proposal.  He told the Congress that because of the small size of the US military vis-à-
vis its population, territorial size, and wealth, the Tsar’s proposal could have ‘no 
practical importance save as marking an auspicious step toward the betterment of the 
condition of the modern peoples and the cultivation of peace and good will among 
them; but … it behooves us as a nation to lend countenance and aid to the beneficent 
project.’59  More importantly, McKinley announced that the US desired, 
in common with most civilized nations, to reduce to the lowest 
possible point the damage sustained in time of war by peaceable trade 
and commerce.  …  This purpose can probably be best accomplished 
by an international agreement to regard all private property at sea as 
exempt from capture or destruction by the forces of belligerent powers.  
The United States government has for many years advocated this 
humane and beneficent principle, and is now in position to recommend 
it to other powers without the imputation of selfish motives.  I 
therefore suggest … that the Executive be authorized to correspond 
with the Governments of the principal maritime powers with a view of 
incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle 
                                                
56 ‘Capt. Mahan on Commerce and War’, New York Times (19 Nov. 1898), p. 6. 
57 See A.T. Mahan, ‘Commerce and War’, New York Times (23 Nov. 1898), p. 6; 
Mahan to Editor of The New York Times, 21 Nov. 1898, LP/ATM,II:  613-614; 
Charles H. Butler, ‘A Reply to Capt. Mahan’, New York Times (27 Nov. 1898), p. 4. 
58 Charles Henry Butler, A Letter Addressed to Captain A.T. Mahan in regard to 
Freedom of Private Property on the Sea from Capture during War (Washington, 
D.C.:  n.p., 1898), 1-7.  Captain Charles H. Stockton, then president of the US Naval 
War College and later a delegate at the 1909 London Conference, also published a 
rebuttal to Butler.  See Charles H. Stockton, ‘The Capture of Enemy Merchant 
Vessels at Sea’, The North American Review 168, no. 507 (Feb. 1899):  206-211. 
59 McKinley, ‘Message of the President’, 5 Dec. 1898, FRUS 1898, LXXXI. 
 63 
of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, 
from capture or destruction by belligerent powers.60   
McKinley’s proposal quickly gained the attention of Britain.  Sir Julian 
Pauncefote, Great Britain’s ambassador to the United States, advised Salisbury of the 
memorials and resolutions engendered by Butler as well as the President’s statement 
in his message to Congress.  He told the Prime Minister that letters supporting the 
immunity principle were being circulated in response to the arguments advocated by 
Mahan and resolutions supporting President McKinley’s statement would shortly be 
introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives.  Pauncefote enclosed copies 
of Butler’s petition and letters, including his response to Mahan.61 
Surprisingly, Balfour indicated his support for reconsideration of Britain’s 
long-standing opposition to the principle of the immunity of private property at sea.  
In a note to Salisbury, he advised: 
 In my judgment the question of capture of private property at 
sea, and certain allied problems, deserve and require immediate 
consideration.  I am inclined to think that our national interests would 
gain by the change; they would almost certainly gain if the change was 
limited to the relief of commerce not attempting to run effective 
blockade.  In defence of such limitation the practice of war on terra 
firma might be in some respects pleaded.62 
Salisbury quickly rejected Balfour’s suggested reconsideration of Britain’s position, 
saying: 
Like all stipulations which are supposed to hold good even 
while the parties making them are at war with each other, I do not see 
how the exemption is to be enforced.  Contraband of war and ships 
trying to run a blockade will still be liable to seizure.  It will be easy 
for a captain to shelter himself under one of these exceptions in most 
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cases.  And to whom is the captured vessel to appeal?  Certainly not to 
the captain; and no one else will meddle with it. 
Prize Courts in France would be a poor reliance.63 
These exchanges, between Butler and Mahan, and between McKinley, 
Balfour, and Salisbury, illustrate one of the essential conflicts that would characterize 
the adaptation and adoption of the laws of naval warfare throughout the years to 
come.  That conflict depended on the point of view one took of the issue:  as a neutral 
in time of war, or as a belligerent.  Butler, McKinley, and at least to some extent 
Balfour, viewed the question of the immunity of private property at sea more from the 
standpoint of a neutral.  Despite the recent success of the Spanish-American War, the 
civilian leadership in US could hardly conceive of becoming a belligerent in a war 
with a maritime power.  As the New York Times pointed out, it was far better 
economically to spend the nation’s resources on re-building the country’s merchant 
marine than expanding and maintaining a large navy.  Mahan and Salisbury, in 
contrast, viewed the issue from that of a potential belligerent and the creation (in the 
case of the US) and maintenance (in the case of Britain) of naval power and prestige.  
Mahan especially considered the issue from the standpoint of someone who wanted 
the United States to become a great naval power, particularly in the image of the 
Royal Navy.  For him, the exercise of naval power required the ability to destroy the 
enemy’s commerce so as to draw his fleet into a climactic naval battle.64  Salisbury 
thought the immunity principle too easy to avoid and therefore impractical.  
Moreover, the Royal Navy was the preeminent naval power in the world.  It was 
Britain’s primary defensive shield and had to be maintained above all else.  The 
essential question of ‘point of view’ would arise in both countries at the civilian and 
military levels repeatedly. 
The Proposed Topics for the Conference 
In the meantime, little seemed to be happening regarding the Tsar’s invitation 
of the previous August.  The American interim chargé d’affaires in Russia reported 
that as of 24 November, Muraviev had not determined any program for the 
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conference and that most of his attention was focused on the reduction of armaments 
and related expenses.65  The attention of President McKinley returned to the difficult 
negotiations of a peace treaty with Spain, which finally culminated on 10 December 
1898.66  Sanderson wrote a private letter to Scott on 29 December, stating he 
suspected that ‘Russian Naval Circles’ and ‘high, perhaps very high but unofficial 
quarters of St. Petersburg Society’ were opposed to any understanding with 
England.67  In a typically odd Christmas letter to his ‘Most beloved grandmamma’, 
Kaiser Wilhelm II ridiculed the Tsar’s proposed conference.68 
On 11 January 1899, Russia’s Foreign Minister provided notes to all nations 
that had accepted the Tsar’s invitation, listing subjects for consideration at the 
conference.  The note identified two objectives:  ‘1. To check the progressive increase 
of military and naval armaments, and study any possible means of effecting their 
eventual reduction;’ and ‘2. To devise means for averting armed conflicts between 
States by the employment of pacific methods of international diplomacy.’69  The 
Russian note went on to propose eight subjects for discussion: 
1.  An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present 
effective of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same 
time not to increase the Budgets pertaining thereto; and a 
preliminary examination of the means by which a reduction might 
even be effected in future in the forces and Budgets above-
mentioned. 
2. To prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kind of fire-
arms what-ever and of new explosives, or any powders more 
powerful than those now in use either for rifles or cannon. 
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3. To restrict the use in military warfare of the formidable explosives 
already existing, and to prohibit the throwing of projectiles or 
explosives of any kind from balloons or by any similar means. 4.  To prohibit the use in naval warfare of submarine torpedo-boats or 
plungers, or other similar engines of destruction; to give an 
undertaking not to construct vessels with rams in the future.	
5. To apply to naval warfare the stipulations of the Geneva 
Convention of 1864, on the basis of the Additional Articles of 
1868. 
6. To neutralize ships and boats employed in saving those overboard 
during or after an engagement. 
7. To revise the Declaration concerning the laws and customs of war 
elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels, which has 
remained unratified to the present day. 
8. To accept in principle the employment of good offices, of 
mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves 
thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between 
nations; to come to an understanding with respect to the mode of 
applying these good offices, and to establish a uniform practice in 
using them.70 	
Five of the eight proposed subjects now dealt with issues of naval warfare 
either in whole or in part.  The motivation for the Tsar’s invitation had moved in the 
direction of naval armaments and warfare and away from Austria-Hungary’s new 
rapid-firing artillery.  In a private letter to Salisbury, Scott expressed doubts whether 
the Russian government actually would follow through with these topics, because 
they raised contentious issues.  He also advised that Nicholas II was surprised his 
proposal had been labelled as ‘quixotic’, ‘utopian’, or ‘impractical’ because he had 
always described the conference as a ‘Disarmament Conference’ and desired ‘to 
check the constant drain on his State Treasuries of sums required for the welfare and 
peaceful prosperity of the populations to fill the private coffers of inventors and 
manufacturers of new engines to destroy human life, and who became millionaires in 
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proportion as they stimulated this drain by seeking about for new and more 
formidable destructives.’71 
In submitting Russia’s second circular to Salisbury, Scott advised that 
Muraviev stated the Russian government had noted the increasing armament 
expenditures by ‘certain Powers’, and that therefore it might not be an opportune time 
to hold an international conference of the sort envisioned by the Tsar.  Muraviev had 
told him, ‘Great Britain had been one of the Powers which had been recently arming.’  
Scott denied the accusation.  Muraviev also indicated that the fact certain points were 
contained in the proposed agenda did not necessarily mean Russia would ultimately 
agree to discuss or agree with all of them.72  Calvin DeArmond Davis, in his history 
of the United States and the 1899 Conference, asserts that Muraviev thought Britain 
would never agree to limit the Royal Navy and anticipated the US would never agree 
to limit its army.  He therefore hoped they would decline the conference and thereby 
‘put both Britain and America in a bad light.’73  Muraviev’s statements to Scott 
suggest that he was not genuinely interested in discussing restraints on warfare or 
disarmament.  If true, Muraviev’s hopes were soon dashed.  On 4 February the United 
States stated it would send a delegate to the conference.74  Ten days later, in response 
to a further query from Muraviev, the US explicitly approved the topics suggested by 
Russia for discussion at the Conference.75  No evidence exists that the US Department 
of the Navy was consulted prior to accepting Russia’s proposed topics. 
Given the number of topics touching upon naval issues, the Admiralty needed 
to be consulted, although the British Foreign Office was not that interested in what the 
Admiralty might have to say, and the Admiralty certainly was not interested in 
wasting time responding to such a silly proposition as the Russian agenda.  Two days 
after receiving the Tsar’s proposed topics for the conference, the Foreign Office sent 
to the Admiralty the unofficial list of the proposed subjects received from Scott.  The 
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Foreign Office advised that ‘[a]s soon as the text of the Note is received at the 
Foreign Office a copy will be transmitted for Their Lordships’ Observations.’76  The 
next day, Sanderson advised Scott that printed copies of the disarmament proposal 
were being sent ‘to War Office and Admiralty for the observations of the Naval and 
Military Authorities and I am rather curious to see the result.’77  When Sanderson sent 
the official copy of the Russian note to the Admiralty, he directed, ‘Lord Salisbury 
will be obliged if Their Lordships will favour him with any observations they may 
have to offer on the contents of this communication.’78 
The Admiralty’s response was predictable.  Indeed, tensions with the Foreign 
Office in the months leading up to commencement of the 1899 Conference are 
obvious from the Admiralty’s files.  On 18 January, Goschen minuted the First Naval 
Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, that he had written to Salisbury ‘to ascertain 
whether the F.O. really wishes at this point to have our “observations”.’79  The same 
day, Goschen wrote Salisbury: 
If the Tsar’s extraordinary conference is to come off soon, it 
will be necessary for us to talk the matter over in good time, as if a 
naval officer should have to attend as an expert he should need a great 
deal of coaching. 
I presume the great object will be with every Power to make it 
appear that it is one of the others who causes the inevitable collapse.  
So we shall have to proceed gravely, as if the proceedings were 
serious. 
The subjects brought forward in the Empr circular [show] the 
absurdity of the whole business conclusively.80 
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Four days later, Goschen again wrote to Salisbury, stating:  ‘The F.O. have sent us the 
Russian circular & asked for our observations thereon.  Need we communicate on the 
document at present?  We should have to point out absurdities & impossibilities in 
every line, so is it necessary, or even expedient, to do so early & to put all our 
objections on record?’81  Clearly, the First Lord did not wish to spend time and effort 
detailing the Admiralty’s objections to Russia’s proposed agenda. 
While the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Royal Navy may have thought 
the Foreign Office’s request for ‘observations’ questionable, and the Tsar’s entire 
proposal absurd with the only real issue being how to ensure some other country was 
blamed for the conference’s ‘inevitable collapse’, they soon learned that neither was 
the case.  Long before the Admiralty presented its ‘observations’ to the Foreign 
Office, the Cabinet resolved to accept Russia’s 11 January proposal of topics for the 
international conference.  Specifically, Great Britain ‘gladly accept[ed]’ the Tsar’s 
invitation for a conference to discuss reduction of land and sea armaments and means 
for preventing armed conflicts by diplomacy.  With regard to the eight points 
specifically proposed for consideration, however, the government was more cautious, 
stating it ‘would prefer for the present to abstain from expressing any definite 
opinion.’82  In a private communication to Scott, Salisbury acknowledged, ‘that it will 
be a very arduous task to put [Russia’s eight] general proposals into a shape in which 
they would command the assent of all the European Powers.’  He specifically advised 
Scott of two areas of concern:  the need for clear definitions of terms in any 
agreement, and the method by which such agreements would be enforced. 83  
Regardless, Britain had joined the international community in accepting the eight 
topics for consideration at the conference.  The Admiralty now would be forced to 
take the upcoming conference seriously.  
Conclusion 
The 1899 Conference generally has been ignored by naval historians of the 
pre-First World War era.  This chapter has shown that the Tsar’s proposal for an 
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international conference arose in the context of an ever-expanding naval arms race, 
especially between Great Britain and Russia.  The possibility of naval disarmament 
motivated the Tsar’s invitation at least in part in light of the number of topics agreed 
for the conference that touched naval warfare.  The reaction of the leading nations 
generally was one of scepticism.  The US, which recently had thrust itself on to the 
world’s stage as a new imperial, global power, quickly accepted the Tsar’s invitation.  
Britain, cognizant of its status as the world’s naval superpower and hesitant to agree 
to any conference that might hinder the extent or exercise of that power, reluctantly 
agreed to attend.  In the US, the proposed conference was recognized as a means to 
drive international acceptance of the nation’s long-cherished policy of the immunity 
of private property at sea.  While the US Navy was not consulted regarding this 
policy, Alfred Thayer Mahan quickly rose in opposition, a position he would continue 
to assume throughout the next ten years.   
In Britain, the Admiralty recognized the possible consequences of the topics 
proposed for the conference, the majority of which directly implicated naval planning 
and warfare.  Its initial response was one of incredulity and a view that the 
government surely would not take the conference seriously.  But the government did 
accept the proposed agenda likely because of the potential for a reduction in 
armaments spending.  The Admiralty was not able to overcome the desire for 
financial relief.  As First Lord Goschen recognized, the government had agreed 
implicitly to consider questions affecting the Royal Navy, contrary to previous 
international conferences such as the Brussels Conference of 1874.84  Thus, for the 
Royal Navy, 24 August 1898 was a watershed.  Unlike the 1856 Declaration of Paris, 
which was adopted without its consultation, the Royal Navy now was forced for the 
first time – begrudgingly and against its will – to participate in an international 
conference at which limitations on the conduct of naval warfare would be considered.  
Once opened by Tsar Nicholas II’s unexpected invitation and Great Britain’s 
acceptance, the Pandora’s Box of the laws of naval warfare was never to be closed. 
                                                





Once the United States and Great Britain agreed to attend the conference and 
accepted the basic principles and eight topics for discussion, they needed to prepare.  
Neither nation took the upcoming conference lightly, but the focus in each was 
decidedly different from a naval standpoint.  The US Navy had no involvement in 
preparations for the conference.  The focus of the United States primarily was to 
follow the lead of Britain in terms of composition of the delegation.  However, in one 
significant respect – the adoption of the principle of the immunity of private property 
at sea – the goals of the US for the conference were diametrically opposed to those of 
Great Britain.  Britain’s actions preceding the conference were surprising given the 
previously sacrosanct status of the Royal Navy.  Within two weeks of accepting the 
conference’s proposed topics, Britain made a secret offer to reduce naval expenditures 
to Russia.  This proposal, apparently made without the knowledge of any uniformed 
member of the Royal Navy, revealed the extent to which Lord Salisbury was willing 
to use the upcoming conference as an impetus for a reduction in naval expenditures, at 
least vis-à-vis Russia.  This proposal, and the Admiralty’s views on the proposed 
topics, further exposed the tensions between the government and the Senior Service 
that had first appeared in January 1899.   
This chapter first details Great Britain’s secret, back-channel offer of a 
reduction in naval expenditures to Russia.  While Salisbury’s proposal served a 
variety of domestic and international needs, the fact it was made shows that at least as 
of March 1899, Russia was viewed as a significant potential adversary and that 
Britain was willing to engage in real naval reductions.  The selection of the British 
and American delegations to the conference is then discussed.  The traditional history 
of the events surrounding the appointment of then-Vice Admiral Sir John A. Fisher to 
be Britain’s naval delegate is challenged and corrected.  In contrast to the British 
process, the selection of the United States’ delegation, including Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, is shown to have been far less thoughtful.  The Royal Navy’s extensive 
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efforts to evade or minimize involvement in the conference then are discussed.  The 
Admiralty wanted to avoid a repetition of the events surrounding adoption of the 1856 
Declaration of Paris, when it was not consulted.  Finally, the instructions to the 
delegations of each country are discussed as the stage is set for the 1899 Conference. 
Great Britain’s Secret Offer to Russia 
Great Britain’s secret, back-channel offer to reduce naval expenditures to 
Russia has not previously been fully revealed or discussed.  None of the published 
pre-First World War naval histories reveal the offer.  Arthur Marder briefly discusses 
Goschen’s public proposal for naval arms limitation before the House of Commons 
on 9 March 1899 in two paragraphs, but he does not reveal the direct proposal to 
Russia made days earlier.1  Indeed, there is no evidence Marder was aware of the 
secret offer.  Neither the official ‘public’ nor the ‘confidential’ publications of 
Britain’s correspondence relating to the 1899 Conference mention it.2  The existing 
Cabinet files for the relevant time period do not mention the proposal.3  No indication 
of the offer exists in the extant Admiralty files relating to the 1899 Conference.4  
While the offer was discussed and approved by the Cabinet and apparently disclosed 
to Queen Victoria, the only individuals directly involved appear to have been 
Salisbury, Goschen, and Sir Charles Scott, the ambassador to Russia.  No evidence 
exists that any member of the Royal Navy knew of the offer.  Indeed, the proposal 
appears to have been raised, agreed, and made in the space of twenty days, with the 
critical acts occurring over less than a week.   
Britain’s secret offer arose out of the on-going naval arms race, especially 
with regard to Russia.  Goschen revealed his naval estimates for 1899-1900 to Hicks 
Beach in January 1899, much to the latter’s consternation.  Goschen warned that 
while he had endeavoured to reduce the estimates as much as possible, the increase 
                                                
1 Marder (1940), 346. 
2 See generally Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Peace Conference 
Held at The Hague in 1899 (Miscellaneous No. 1) (London:  HMSO, 1899); 
Correspondence Respecting the Peace Conference Held at The Hague in 1899 
(Confidential), FO 412/65. 
3 See generally CAB 37/49, CAB 37/50, CAB 37/51. 
4 See generally ‘Case 258’, ADM 116/98; ‘Respecting the Exemption from capture of 
private property in vessels in time of War’, ADM 1/7422B. 
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still would be ‘very large’.  He reminded Hicks Beach of his warning that the July 
1898 supplemental program requested and obtained then did not mean the naval 
estimates for 1899-1900 would be lower.5  Hicks Beach complained to Salisbury that 
he was ‘only just able to make any forecast of the financial position for 1899-1900: 
for Goschen delayed all discussion of his estimates until [sic] Wednesday, and has not 
yet given me his final figures.  But I am sorry to tell you that the prospect is very 
disagreeable.’  Hicks Beach was concerned how the increases could be financed.  He 
favoured a tax increase, and asked Salisbury to call a meeting of the Defence 
Committee following the Cabinet meeting set for 1 February to discuss the issue.6 
Salisbury called a Defence Committee meeting as requested.  However, while 
he told Hicks Beach, ‘Goschen is insatiable’, Salisbury’s concerns also were about 
how to finance the increased naval expenditures.  Salisbury preferred a loan to a tax 
increase.  He also thought Goschen might reduce his request.7  Indeed, Goschen 
reduced his estimates by £220,000.  Goschen proposed estimates he ‘could defend as 
absolutely necessary in [his] judgment’, and if Hicks Beach had ‘the intense vexation 
or anxiety of having to find the money for this gigantic expenditure & surprises which 
you consider sprung upon you, I can assure you that I, too, have my full share of 
worry & anxiety’. 8   Hicks Beach warned Salisbury that even with Goschen’s 
reductions, the new budget would be an ‘alarmist budget … because of the amount 
                                                
5 Goschen to Hicks Beach, 22 Jan. 1899, ibid. 
6 Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 27 Jan. 1899, D2455/X4/1/1/13, ibid. 
7 Salisbury to Hicks Beach, 28 Jan. 1899, D2455/X4/1/1/12, ibid.  Hicks Beach later 
told Goschen directly that he was ‘insatiable’.  See Goschen to Hicks Beach, 23 Feb. 
1900, D2455/X4/1/1/32, ibid. 
Marder suggests that Salisbury and Hicks Beach opposed Goschen’s estimates 
per se.  See Marder (1940), 345-346.  Nicholas Lambert, without reference, asserts 
that Salisbury ‘did not … forbid Hicks-Beech [sic] from canvassing his other Cabinet 
colleagues for support over the issue.’  Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval 
Revolution (Columbia, SC:  University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 30-31.  
Neither position is correct.  Salisbury and Hicks Beach’s concerns were regarding 
how to pay for the increased naval expenditures.  As Hicks Beach told Salisbury over 
a year later, ‘I need not remind you that I have never seriously resisted any increase of 
expenditure on our Navy.’  Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 21 Oct. 1900, 
D2455/X4/1/1/13, Hicks Beach Papers. 
8 Goschen to Hicks Beach, 29 Jan. 1899, D2455/X4/1/1/32, ibid. 
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proposed to be expended, not because of the way in which that amount may be 
provided: and we should not make it less alarmist by borrowing instead of taxing.’9   
On 31 January 1899, Goschen presented the naval estimates for 1899-1900 to 
the Cabinet.  He ‘[r]egret[ted] that the Estimates which I have to submit to the 
Cabinet should be of unprecedented magnitude, exceeding by a very large sum the 
swollen Estimates of last year.’  Goschen advised that his previous estimates had been 
based upon the shipbuilding of France and Russia.  However, the Tsar’s extraordinary 
ukase, amounting to the equivalent of about £9 million, would result in Russia starting 
construction of eight new battleships over three years.  With regard to cruisers, both 
France and Russia were building more first-class armoured vessels, and ‘both are 
pushing ahead as fast as they can.’  France, in particular, had ‘begun to recognize that 
it is by cruisers rather than by battleships that they can damage us most.’  In order to 
keep up with France and particularly Russia, Goschen presented a total navy estimate 
of more than £26.6 million, an increase of nearly £2.9 million over his ‘colossal sum’ 
presented in March 1898.  This budget included two additional battleships and five 
new cruisers.10  Goschen later ‘sold’ the estimates to Hicks Beach and the Cabinet by 
deferring some of the actual expenditures proposed for 1899-1900 to subsequent 
financial years and assuring Hicks Beach that, ‘Except under extraordinary pressure, 
no fresh liabilities will be incurred in 1899-1900.’11 
The seed that ultimately became the proposal for reduction of naval 
expenditures to Russia apparently was planted at the Defence Committee meeting on 
1 February.  Arthur Balfour apparently suggested that Goschen should not make any 
specific reference to the two new battleships in his presentation to the House of 
Commons.  While Goschen thought there was ‘extreme difficulty’ in carrying out 
‘Balfour’s idea’, he told Hicks Beach that he could be vague as to the type of new 
ships proposed to be built in his printed statement and appendix to the House.  ‘Thus, 
I am free to say as much or as little in explanation, as I please.’  Goschen then told 
Hicks Beach: 
                                                
9 Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 30 Jan. 1899, D2455/X4/1/1/13, ibid. 
10 ‘Navy Estimates, 1899-1900’, 31 Jan. 1899, CAB 37/49/7, 1-11.  
11 Goschen to Hicks Beach, 4 Feb. 1899, D2455/X4/1/1/32, Hicks Beach Papers.  See 
also Hicks Beach to Goschen, 24 Jan. 1900, ibid.; Goschen to Hicks Beach, 23 Feb. 
1900, ibid. 
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I can make the statement verbally as to the Russian conference 
(if this should be thought wise), or as to the question of their 
continuing their programme and commencing or not further battleships 
in execution of their original design (or another plan would be to state 
the two battleships in the usual manner in the printed statement, but to 
explain that their construction would be dependent on Russian 
action.)12 
While Goschen thought Russia would start construction of additional battleships, he 
recognized the advantage in vagueness, which would not allow France and Russia ‘to 
assert that we are laying down more battleships.’13 
The Cabinet resolved at its meeting on 14 February to accept Russia’s earlier 
proposal of eight topics for the conference.14  However, acceptance of the Tsar’s 
proposal for the conference was not the only topic of discussion on that date.  As 
Salisbury informed Queen Victoria the next day, ‘It was also proposed that the 
Emperor’s government should be invited to consider the question of postponing 
certain specified naval expenditures on each side until next year.  But after long 
discussion it was thought better to take no step of the kind till after the naval estimates 
had been produced.’15  Several weeks later, Queen Victoria implied her consent, 
telling Salisbury that she opposed an increase in income taxes and ‘hopes naval 
expenses may soon diminish’.16 
By 1 March Salisbury, with the undoubted assistance of Goschen,17 had 
decided to make a direct proposal to reduce naval expenditures to Russia before 
                                                
12 Goschen to Hicks Beach, 4 Feb. 1899, ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Salisbury to Scott, 14 Feb. 1899, FO 412/65 at 30. 
15 Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 15 Feb. 1899, RA/VIC/MAIN/A75/51. 
16 Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 8 Mar. 1899, Series F, ‘Letters from the Queen, 1899’, 
Salisbury Papers. 
17  Given his background, Goschen cannot have been unaware of the financial 
implications for the nation of his proposed naval estimates.  Goschen had served as a 
director of the Bank of England at a young age, his family was in banking, and he was 
Salisbury’s chancellor of the exchequer from 1886 to 1892.  While he promoted 
increased naval building in response to the programs of Russia and other nations, 
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presentation of the new, record naval estimates to the House of Commons.  In a 
‘confidential’ letter to Salisbury, Goschen advised the Cabinet was concerned of  
the possibility of the Russian Government, or the Czar himself, being 
startled at the very large increase in our Naval Estimates for 1899-
1900, with the international disarmament Conference in prospect; and 
that it may be expedient under the circumstances that Sir C. Scott 
should have some acquaintance with the causes and scope of this 
increase, which amounts to about £2,800,000 over the estimates of the 
present year.18 
Goschen then set forth in detail the prior year’s supplemental estimates and the fact 
Russia’s ‘extraordinary programme of ship-building’ announced in the spring of 1898 
and its appropriation of 90 million rubles for four battleships and additional cruisers 
had necessitated Britain’s need to add four battleships and four cruisers in its 
supplemental estimates for 1898.  ‘The Czar can therefore not be surprised at the 
increase in our Estimates, nor see anything in them inconsistent with our readiness to 
enter the Disarmament Conference which he has initiated.’  Goschen stated that in 
addition to the previously announced naval construction, the government intended to 
include two new battleships for 1899-1900.  ‘I may frankly say that we propose to lay 
them down, in the main to balance the further construction of battleships which has 
been announced from Russia.’19  Then Goschen’s letter, ostensibly to the Prime 
Minister but likely for the benefit of Sir Charles Scott, suggested that Britain make a 
proposal for mutual reduction of naval expenditures to Russia: 
The question may fairly arise, if Russia and we are prepared 
in an international conference to enter at all upon the subject of a 
diminution in constructing battleships, whether we could not 
exchange views as to the possibility of Russia on her side 
                                                                                                                                      
Goschen certainly was not an unthinking navalist who did not understand finance.  
See Thomas J. Spinner, Jr., ‘Goschen, George Joachim, first Viscount Goschen 
(1831-1907)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, UK:  Oxford 
University Press, 2004) http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33478. 
18 Goschen to Salisbury, 1 Mar. 1899, A93, ff. 101-103, Salisbury Papers. 
19 Ibid. 
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undertaking not to order or commence any new battleships in 1899-
1900 beyond the four ordered under the … ukase, and we 
undertaking not to proceed with the two inserted in our forthcoming 
Estimates.  Such a hint might test the sincerity of Russia, and at the 
same time afford a proof of our sincerity. 
The Cabinet seemed inclined to wish that I should publicly 
throw out such a suggestion in moving my Estimates on the 9th of 
March, as it would show the British public that we were not 
unprepared to respond in some measure to the peaceful overtures 
implied in the invitation to the conference, but I presume this should 
be kept open till the next Cabinet.20 
Whether the Cabinet imagined a formal, public offer in the context of 
Goschen’s presentation of the naval estimates or anticipated a secret proposal to 
Russia is not clear.  Goschen’s letter to Salisbury suggests further consultations were 
expected.  However, given that Ambassador Scott subsequently communicated the 
Tsar’s response to the secret offer directly to Goschen, the two of them must have 
discussed the plan.  In any event, Salisbury decided to act immediately, because on 
the same date he sent a copy of Goschen’s letter, marked ‘private’ to Scott,21 stating 
that Goschen wanted him to have it because it explained ‘the very large addition to 
our warlike estimates at a time when we are preparing to enter a Conference of which 
the object is to reduce armaments.’  He then told Scott, ‘It is for you to use exactly so 
far as you judge expedient.’  Salisbury pointed out that Russia was being duplicitous 
by continuing to arm unless and until all the other nations agreed to ‘retrench their 
armaments’.  He also did not see how any agreements with Russia could survive its 
recent actions in China, where it was taking a position contrary to the Newchwang 
Railways Loan Agreement of September 1898 and the Anglo-Russian understanding 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 It is not easy to confirm that Salisbury sent Goschen’s letter of 1 March to Scott on 
the same day.  The two letters are in different files (A93 and A/129) in the Salisbury 
Papers.  However, Scott’s papers at the British Library establish that Salisbury sent a 
copy of Goschen’s letter on the same date.  See Salisbury to Scott, 1 Mar. 1899, Add 
MSS 52297, ff. 89-90, Scott Papers; Goschen to Salisbury, 1 Mar. 1899, ff. 91-93, 
ibid. 
 78 
regarding the terms of the loan repayment.22  Scott apparently understood, or was told 
in some manner by Salisbury, that he was to make a proposal directly to Russia to 
reduce naval expenditures, because that is what he almost immediately did upon 
receipt of Salisbury’s communications.   
On 6 March, Scott ‘made use of the large discretion’ Salisbury had given him.  
He met that day with Foreign Minister Muraviev and read him most of the contents of 
Goshen’s letter to Salisbury, squarely placing the blame for the forthcoming increases 
in Britain’s naval estimates on Russia’s shipbuilding program.  Scott told Muraviev 
that the Tsar should not be surprised, therefore, by the increases, and that they would 
be under discussion that week in Parliament.  Scott then advised Muraviev, ‘but I 
have received a private hint, which I am at liberty to make a discreet use of in talking 
with you on this subject’, that the two countries should ‘exchange views as to the 
possibility of Russia on her side undertaking not to order or commence any new 
battleships in 1899-1900 beyond the 4 ordered … and England on her side 
undertaking not to proceed with the two battleships inserted in our forthcoming 
estimates.’  Scott asked that Muraviev should regard the ‘hint’ as a ‘strictly 
confidential & private form, for use, if you think proper, in approaching’ the Tsar.  
Muraviev agreed that the offer would be kept secret between Scott, the Tsar, and 
himself.23   
                                                
22 Salisbury to Scott, 1 Mar. 1899, A/129, f. 295, Salisbury Papers.  On 26 February 
1899, the Russian chargé d’affaires accused Great Britain of violating the terms of the 
agreement reached in September 1898 by placing a mortgage on the property of the 
Chinese railway line to ensure repayment of the loan to British banks.  Salisbury 
quickly responded and rejected the accusation.  See MacDonald to Salisbury, 28 Feb. 
1899, in Foreign Office, Correspondence between Her Majesty’s Government and the 
Russian Government with regard to their respective Railway Interests in China 
(China No. 2 (1899)) (London:  HMSO, 1899), 65-66; Salisbury to MacDonald, 2 
Mar. 1899, ibid., 66.  For a discussion of the China issues in early 1899, see T.G. 
Otte, The China Question:  Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905 
(Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 171-173. 
23 Scott to Mouravieff, 6 Mar. 1899, inclosure to Scott to Salisbury, 9 Mar. 1899, 
A/129, ff. 182-184, Salisbury Papers. 
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Several days later, Scott received the Tsar’s response from Muraviev and 
immediately advised Salisbury and Goschen.24  The urgency of the communications 
to them was because Goschen was to announce the new naval estimates to the House 
of Commons on 9 March.   Muraviev told Scott that while the Tsar was favourably 
impressed with the ‘hint’, he did not think the time was ripe for mutual restrictions on 
each country’s naval expenditures.  The Tsar also said the ‘sole object’ of Russia’s 
shipbuilding program ‘was to bring her naval forces up to the standard which her 
position required & this ought not to be inferior to that of Japan for instance.’  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Muraviev further indicated the Tsar was less optimistic that 
topics relating to naval disarmament would be successful at the forthcoming 
conference.25   
Goschen’s speech to the House of Commons the evening of 9 March 
masterfully hid the fact that only three days earlier a secret naval reduction proposal 
had been made to the Russian government.  The British government, contrary to past 
practices, had not published the proposed naval estimates in advance.  In his speech, 
Goschen first covered the more modest increases in the estimates relating to 
personnel, repairs, and construction under previous estimates.26  He then turned to the 
naval construction estimates for the new year.  Goschen stated that he did not want 
the estimates to be publicized without first having the opportunity to explain the 
reasons for their significant increase lest they ‘be considered the Estimates of 
                                                
24 Scott to Goschen, 9 Mar. 1899, Add MSS 52303, f. 14, Scott Papers; Scott to 
Salisbury, 9 Mar. 1899, A/129, ff. 182-184, Salisbury Papers; Scott to Salisbury, 10 
Mar. 1899, f. 189, ibid. 
25 Scott to Salisbury, 9 Mar. 1899, A/129, f. 182, Salisbury Papers; Scott to Salisbury, 
10 Mar. 1899, f. 189, ibid. 
Scott also communicated information obtained regarding Russia’s 
shipbuilding program, as separately requested by Goshen.  He told Goschen that the 
Admiralty’s information regarding battleships and cruisers in hand was correct, but 
only one battleship, one first class cruiser, and four second class cruisers were 
projected to be delivered in 1903 or 1904.  Scott thought Russia would find it very 
difficult to complete its supplementary naval building program due to lack of cash 
when needed, and in any event the program was not actually being completed as 
quickly as had been reported.  Scott to Goschen, 7 Mar. 1899, A/129, f. 181, 
Salisbury Papers; Scott to Goschen, 9 Mar. 1899, Add MSS 52303, f. 14, Scott 
Papers. 
26 Hansard 4th ser., HC Deb., vol. 68, cols. 306-319 (9 Mar. 1899). 
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aggression’.  Goschen’s presentation, therefore, was the first that members 
definitively learned of them.27  Goschen reminded the House that the supplementary 
estimates the previous year had been caused solely by Russia’s ukase of 90 million 
rubles.  He added that France, Russia, the United States, Japan, Italy, and Germany 
were all increasing their naval expenditures, but that he had to look at ‘one case in 
particular’.  When he considered the naval expenditures of ‘the two most powerful 
nations’, France and Russia, France’s increase was ‘very small’.  In contrast, Russia’s 
increase in naval estimates was very large and Britain had to respond to protect itself.  
Accordingly, Goschen proposed that Britain build two additional battleships and five 
more cruisers.28  He stated the reason for the addition of the five cruisers was because 
the country’s potential enemies – Russia and France – had adopted a strategy  
to wear out the patience of this country by prolonged attacks upon our 
commerce, our food supply, and our sources of production. … The 
plan now is to build very fast cruisers which shall prey upon our 
commerce.  …  We cannot sit still in the face of construction of 
cruisers intended for that purpose.  We know that purpose, and it is our 
bounden duty to defeat it.  It is in consequence of this that our 
Programme for the present year has been proposed.29 
Goschen then turned to the forthcoming ‘International Conference’. He 
covered the secret proposal to Russia by generally and vaguely proposing that ‘if the 
other great Naval Powers should be prepared to diminish their Programme of 
shipbuilding, we should be prepared on our side to meet such a procedure by 
modifying ours.’  This proposal was evidence Britain genuinely wanted the 
                                                
27 Some indication of the magnitude of the estimates was revealed in a one-paragraph 
notice in The Times of 9 March.  Although the notice over-estimated the total for the 
naval budget, the allocation to new shipbuilding in response to Russia was 
underplayed.  See ‘The Naval Programme’, The Times (London), 9 Mar. 1899, p. 10, 
col. 1.  When asked by a member of the House to explain why the figures had 
appeared in The Times that morning, Goschen first chastised the member for 
interrupting him.  He then claimed, ‘the Admiralty have no knowledge of the matter,’ 
and attributed the newspaper report to ‘some breach of trust in some quarter or 
another.’  Hansard 4th ser., HC Deb., vol. 68, cols. 321-322 (9 Mar. 1899). 
28 Ibid., cols. 319-323. 
29 Ibid., cols. 322-323. 
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forthcoming conference to ‘succeed in lightening the tremendous burdens which now 
weigh down all European nations’.30   
Salisbury had carefully crafted Britain’s offer to Russia.  The decision to make 
the offer in great secrecy and with a minimum of persons involved is shown by the 
critical correspondence between only three individuals.  Moreover, Goschen did not 
reveal the extent of the naval estimates for 1899-1900 to the House prior to taking the 
floor on 9 March.  He thus retained the ability to make changes if Russia had 
responded affirmatively.  That Britain would make such a secret offer shows the 
pressure being placed on the economy and the government by the naval arms race.  
Making the proposal undoubtedly quieted efforts in the Cabinet to reduce naval 
expenditures.  The offer also placed the country in a positive light with Russia, with 
whom diplomatic conflicts were continuing, and thereby served to calm international 
tensions.31  Indeed, Goschen eventually thanked Scott for his efforts and told him ‘it 
seems as if we … were the one of all the Governments of Europe, who have met the 
Czar’s invitation in the most cordial spirit.’32  At the same time, the offer held no real 
risks to Britain.  The government’s proposal was a no-lose proposition.  Due to its 
preponderant size compared with the Russian navy (or the navies of other possible 
adversaries), if Russia had accepted the offer any reduction in naval expenditures 
would have left the Royal Navy still in a far more powerful position than any enemy 
fleet or combination of fleets.  But the fact that Britain felt compelled by the on-going 
naval arms race with Russia to secretly propose to reduce naval expenditures shows 
the extent to which at least the civilian leadership was willing to consider the 
upcoming conference as a means for limiting the previously sacrosanct Royal Navy.  
                                                
30 Ibid., cols. 306-324. 
31 Within weeks of the disarmament offer, Britain and Russia reached an accord on 
Chinese railway interests, generally eliminating the source of friction between the two 
countries that had existed for some time.  See Scott to Salisbury, 15 Mar. 1899, in 
Correspondence in China (China No. 2), 71; Scott to Mouravieff, 20 Mar. 1899, ibid., 
77; Scott to Salisbury, 29 April 1899 and Inclosures 1 and 2, ibid., 89-90.  See also 
Otte, The China Question, 173-176. 
32 Goschen to Scott, 30 Mar. 1899, f. 174, Add MSS 52301, Scott Papers. 
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Selecting the British Delegation:  Fisher ‘is cunning’ 
Once Britain accepted Russia’s proposed program for the conference and 
agreed to attend on 14 February, the question of who would comprise the delegation 
naturally arose.  Speculation in January was that the delegation would consist of 
Salisbury, Lord Rosebery (former Liberal prime minister), and the Prince of Wales 
(the future King Edward VII).33  Goschen previously had asked Lord Salisbury if he 
would have to send a naval officer.34  Goschen renewed his query on 25 February, 
telling Salisbury he ‘may have to bring a naval delegate from a distance, or to make 
arrangements for keeping one officer here who would otherwise go abroad.’35  
Serious consideration of who the members of Britain’s delegation would be did not 
occur until after Russia turned down the offer of naval disarmament.  Salisbury 
apparently decided on Britain’s representatives in little more than a week. 
In response to a request from President McKinley to Ambassador Pauncefote 
regarding the composition of the British delegation, Salisbury responded that while a 
definitive answer could not be made until the starting date for the conference was 
set,36 the British delegation would comprise at least one well-recognized diplomat and 
military, naval, and legal experts to assist him.37  Nevertheless, Salisbury had already 
decided that Pauncefote would lead the delegation, accompanied by another diplomat 
and legal, military, and naval representatives.38  
                                                
33 Holls to White, 3 Jan. 1899, box 20, vol. 19, Holls/Columbia Papers; Holls to 
White, 21 Jan. 1899, ibid. 
34 Goschen to Salisbury, 18 Jan. 1899, A93, ff. 98-99, Salisbury Papers. 
35 Goschen to Salisbury, 25 Feb. 1899, Series E, ‘G. Goschen correspondence, 1899-
1900’, f. 7, Salisbury Papers. 
36 Salisbury actually had learned on 8 March that the starting date for the conference 
would be 18 May 1899.  Howard to Salisbury, 8 Mar. 1899, FO 412/65 at 38. 
37 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 9 Mar. 1899, FO 412/65 at 39; Draft, Salisbury to 
Pauncefote, 10 Mar. 1899, FO 83/1699; Salisbury to Pauncefote, 10 Mar. 1899, FO 
412/65 at 41. 
38 Hay to McKinley, 11 Mar. 1899, series 1, reel 6, McKinley Papers.  Pauncefote’s 
selection likely was due to his success in negotiating an arbitration treaty with the US 
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That Vice Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher was Britain’s naval delegate to 
the Conference is well known.  But the basis of his selection has not been examined 
adequately.  Late in life, Fisher attributed his selection to having strongly argued 
against Lord Salisbury’s brother-in-law while serving as director of naval ordnance in 
1886.  According to Fisher, he was unexpectedly selected by Salisbury, without 
consultation with Goschen, because Salisbury knew from his exposure to Fisher in 
1886 that Fisher ‘should fight at the Peace Conference.’39  Fisher claimed he learned 
the story of his selection from Count Nigra, the Italian ambassador to Austria-
Hungary.40  Fisher’s biographers have generally repeated this story.41  However, the 
dates of the events related by Fisher (or Count Nigra) do not correspond with the 
known timeline relating to the 1899 Conference and the events leading up to it, and 
therefore Fisher’s hearsay-based story is questionable on its face. 
Fisher had been appointed commander-in-chief of the North America and 
West Indies fleet in August 1897, approximately four months after being promoted to 
vice admiral.42  He was then fifty-six years old and had been in the Royal Navy since 
1854.  He had served as Third Naval Lord – Controller of the Navy – in the Admiralty 
from 1892 until his appointment to the West Indies Fleet.43  The West Indies Fleet 
was a backwater of the Royal Navy, and Fisher undoubtedly expected to retire from 
that position.   
Fisher had made a favourable impression on Goschen during the 
approximately two years they were both in the Admiralty (1895-1897), and also had 
long been a favourite of Queen Victoria.44  At least as of 10 March 1899, after the US 
asked who would comprise the British delegation, Salisbury had not yet made up his 
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mind regarding any appointee other than Pauncefote.45  However, by 17 March he had 
decided to appoint Fisher as naval delegate.46  Some time prior to that date, Goschen 
and Salisbury had conferred, and Goschen had suggested Fisher to Lord Salisbury ‘as 
probably the best man; and I don’t think we could do better.  He knows a great deal & 
is cunning, but I doubt his speaking much French.’47  No evidence has been found that 
Salisbury or Goschen considered any other naval officer.  By 19 March, Goschen had 
heard ‘indirectly’ that Fisher’s name had been submitted to the Queen and asked for 
confirmation, so that Fisher could be ordered from the West Indies at once.48  
Salisbury apparently confirmed his decision, because Fisher received a telegram from 
Goschen on 22 March advising he had been selected to be the naval delegate to the 
conference and that afterwards he would become commander-in-chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet.  Fisher feigned disappointment at having to leave the West 
Indies, but acknowledged that the Mediterranean ‘is the tip-top appointment of the 
Service, and, of course, if there’s a war, there’s a peerage or Westminster Abbey.’49   
The day after receiving the telegram Fisher sent a letter to then-Captain 
Wilmot Fawkes, who was serving as private naval secretary to Goschen.  Fisher’s 
letter suggests his selection as naval delegate had not come as a complete surprise and 
intimates that Fawkes may have played some role in Fisher’s selection and promotion 
to command the Mediterranean Fleet. 50   Moreover, in a letter sent during the 
Conference, Fisher stated he did not ‘know if it entered into Mr. G’s calculations 
when he selected me, but the fact of my being nominated as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Mediterranean has fetched all the foreigners very much … and it has helped us 
along very much.’51  Thus, contrary to Fisher’s later ‘recollection’ as repeated by his 
biographers, his appointment to the 1899 Conference resulted from deliberate 
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discussions between Goschen and Salisbury.  Despite his deficiencies in the language 
of diplomacy (French) and his lack of previous diplomatic experience, Fisher was 
selected because he was ‘cunning’. 
At the same time, Salisbury also decided that Major General Sir John Ardagh, 
then the director of military intelligence, would be the military representative.52   Ten 
days after receiving the official invitation to send a delegation, Salisbury announced 
that Pauncefote and Sir Henry Howard, Great Britain’s minister to The Netherlands, 
would be the first and second plenipotentiaries, and that Fisher and Ardagh would 
join them as naval and military delegates.53  The British delegation thus was fixed 
with a minimum of internal discussion and without any apparent outside influence.  
Selecting the United States Delegation:  Mahan as a Postscript 
In contrast to selection of the British delegation, determination of the 
American delegation involved much more political and behind the scenes 
manoeuvring.  Still, the final selection process was completed in a matter of weeks 
based largely on the composition of Britain’s delegation.  As early as October 1898, 
political activists started trying to influence the membership of the US delegation.54  
But after accepting Russia’s invitation to the international conference, President 
McKinley’s attention quickly turned to the growing insurrection in the Philippines 
and efforts to obtain ratification of the peace treaty with Spain.55  However, that did 
not stop individuals from pressing their suggestions on the president.  A group visited 
McKinley in January 1899 to urge the appointment of the president of Northwestern 
University. 56   Others urged the appointment of Andrew D. White, the former 
president of Cornell University and the US ambassador to Germany.57  A number of 
individuals lobbied for their own appointment, including Bishop John Ireland of St. 
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Paul, Minnesota.58  McKinley’s reaction was to do nothing.  By early February 1899, 
he had decided he would not decide on the delegation or its size until he learned what 
the European powers intended to do.59  Serious consideration of who should comprise 
the American delegation therefore did not begin until after Pauncefote advised 
Secretary of State Hay of the general composition of the British delegation.  Hay 
immediately advised McKinley.60   
Over the next three weeks, Assistant Secretary of State David Jayne Hill and 
Republican political activist, international lawyer, and conference supporter Frederick 
William Holls worked hard to guide the president and Hay on the appointment of 
civilian members.61  However, selection of the delegation’s civilian members was not 
easy.  Although Ambassador White had long been considered the logical choice to 
chair the delegation, he had to be convinced at the last moment not to decline.62  
Several individuals turned down the opportunity to be on the delegation or were 
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rejected.63  The two most interesting appointments, particularly in light of their later 
conflicts at and after the Conference, were Alfred Thayer Mahan and Frederick W. 
Holls. 
Neither McKinley nor Hay appears to have carefully considered Mahan’s 
appointment.  One historian has argued Mahan was appointed because he was ‘certain 
to act as a watchdog of American interests and take a hard-headed view of the 
proceedings with which by no stretch of anyone’s imagination could he be considered 
in sympathy’.64  But this is the logic of hindsight.  In reality Mahan’s selection and 
appointment was literally an afterthought.  In an 18 March 1899, letter to McKinley 
that related only partially to the selection of the American delegation, Hay penned a 
postscript that stated in its entirety, ‘Do you not think Mahan would be a good man to 
attend the conference on behalf of the navy?’65   
Why was Mahan appointed?  Several possibilities exist.  Admiral George 
Dewey, the ‘Hero of Manila Bay’, was then in the Philippines and desperately wanted 
to return to the US.66  Admiral William Sampson, who previously had been proposed 
to the president,67 was embroiled in a dispute with Commodore Winfield Schley 
regarding his role in the Battle of Santiago during the Spanish-American War.68  
None of the Navy’s leaders from the war with Spain therefore were possible 
selections.  Given the care with which the other appointees were considered and 
selected, one reason for Mahan’s selection may be that McKinley and Hay had no real 
alternative naval representative available. 
Furthermore, the US Navy at that time was administratively decentralized and 
lacked a governing body such as the Board of Admiralty in Britain.  Indeed, the 
uniformed naval leadership in the US was seeking greater autonomy and control 
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beyond the civilian Secretary of the Navy.69  Secretary of the Navy John D. Long was 
notoriously disconnected from the operations of the Navy.  He was not a supporter of 
naval expansion.70  While Long was asked to assist in identifying a suitable civilian 
member of the delegation,71 he was not involved in the selection of Mahan.  To speak 
of Mahan as the Navy’s delegate therefore is incorrect.  Unlike Fisher, he was not 
really a naval delegate.  Mahan had retired from the Navy in 1896 after more than 
forty years of service, having ‘disliked virtually every minute of the experience’,72 
and so had no uniformed superior to whom to report.  Mahan had returned to active 
duty to serve on the Naval War Board for approximately four months during the 
Spanish-American War, an experience that did not change his lack of fondness for the 
US Navy.73 
Mahan also may have been selected because of his prominence as the 
contemporary naval strategist of his time and the fact he was an Anglophile.  At the 
same time, Hay and McKinley did not put much thought into Mahan’s selection.  
Although recognized worldwide for his 1890 naval history, Mahan had no diplomatic 
experience.74  His views were widely known to be antithetical to the goals of the 
conference.  He opposed arms limitations, believing large armaments were necessary 
to deter war.75  He thought efforts to reduce the horrors of war would only make war 
more likely.76  Mahan also disagreed with the arbitration of international disputes.  
His opinions on this issue were formed at least by early 1896.  In his view, arbitration 
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was no substitute for being prepared for war.77  Most importantly, as previously 
discussed, Mahan disagreed with a basic tenet of American foreign policy:  the 
immunity of private property at sea during war.  It seems unlikely that neither 
McKinley nor Hay were aware of Mahan’s newspaper communications on the 
immunity of private property during the late fall of 1898.  Moreover, Mahan had 
written Hay regarding the difficult peace treaty negotiations with Spain in early 
November 1898.  Hay thanked him for the letter and encouraged him to provide his 
views ‘as often as convenient to you.’78   
While imperialists, neither McKinley nor Hay was generally opposed to 
limiting the consequences of war.  They were in favour of international arbitration 
and worldwide adoption of the immunity of private property at sea.  Hay told peace 
activist W.T. Stead that he was doing ‘all in my power to bring about the realization 
of the beneficent projects of the Emperor of Russia’.79  Thus, the United States hardly 
needed a ‘watchdog of American interests’ at the Conference.  Prior to Hay 
suggesting Mahan as a possible appointment, McKinley had been considering the 
appointment of three ambassadors plus a fourth representative.80  McKinley and Hay 
carefully vetted and ultimately rejected President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard 
University as an appointee, because his views did not align closely enough with those 
of the president.81  Mahan was an internationally well-known alternative, but the 
president and secretary of state do not appear to have adequately considered Mahan’s 
contrary views.  His selection certainly was careless, and given his subsequent 
conduct at the conference, irresponsible. 
When Hay asked Mahan if he would agree to be a member of the US 
delegation, his response was equivocal.  Unlike Fisher, who had the ‘reward’ of 
command of the Mediterranean Fleet to look forward to once the conference was 
finished, Mahan had nothing to induce him to accept the appointment.  He had no real 
interest in being a member of the United States’ delegation to the so-called ‘Peace 
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Conference’.  Since his retirement from the navy nearly three years earlier, he had 
embarked full speed on his literary career, building on the worldwide fame that The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History had brought him.82  In April 1899, he had a full 
plate of writing endeavours and was working hard to revise his book on the life of 
Lord Nelson.83  Mahan sought guarantees the government would pay his expenses and 
provide remuneration.  Hay assured him the Second Comptroller of the Treasury 
would pay.84  Despite these assurances, Mahan asked to borrow money from his 
publisher to pay his expenses pending reimbursement. 85   Mahan accepted the 
appointment in spite of his concerns about being paid.  He described his selection to 
the American delegation as ‘wholly unexpected’.86 
While Mahan may have been reluctant to accept the president’s invitation, 
Holls actively lobbied for appointment as the delegation’s secretary.  In fact, the 
Republican activist pestered the president and others regarding his appointment as the 
delegation’s secretary for months.87  Ultimately, Holls convinced Ambassador White 
to request his appointment as secretary, in response to which Hay wrote the president, 
‘de gustibus non est disputandum’.88  Likely because of Holls’ incessant lobbying, 
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McKinley approved, telling Hay, ‘At least we have got him [Holls] out of the country 
for a while.’89 
 McKinley ultimately appointed five men to serve as the United States’ 
delegation.  White led the delegation.  Stanford Newel, the minister to The 
Netherlands, joined White.  Seth Low, the president of Columbia University, was 
finally selected as the third civilian delegate.90  The Army’s representative was not 
Hay’s first choice.  In contrast to the selection of Mahan, Hay consulted with the 
Army’s adjutant general about the appointment.  After it was determined that the first 
candidate’s selection would work a great inconvenience on him, Hay selected Captain 
(later Major General) William Crozier because he was ‘one of the most accomplished 
officers in the army, acquainted with the very latest developments in the technical art 
of war, especially engineering, ordnance and armament of all sorts.’91  Mahan was the 
other appointee.92  Although appointed the commission’s official secretary, Holls was 
to be accorded all the rights and privileges associated with being a delegate to the 
Conference.93  Before the announcement of the US delegation, Hay confidentially told 
Pauncefote of the president’s appointees.94  Thus, the United States’ delegation almost 
perfectly paralleled Britain’s in its composition.  
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The Admiralty Plays Defence 
Shortly after the unsuccessful secret offer to Russia and his determination of 
who the delegates to the conference would be, Prime Minister Salisbury received 
several petitions asking the government to reconsider its traditional opposition to the 
immunity of private property at sea.  The chambers of commerce of Liverpool and 
Birmingham sent resolutions urging the adoption of an international agreement 
exempting ‘all private property at sea from capture or destruction in time of war, 
unless contraband or seized in violating blockades.’95  The Chamber of Shipping of 
the United Kingdom later sent a similar request, which also sought a ‘clearer 
definition of the term “contraband of war”.’96 
The resolutions were forwarded to the Admiralty for comment.  Goschen 
immediately recognized the risks such resolutions raised.  He was concerned how the 
government might respond.  After receiving Liverpool’s resolution from the Foreign 
Office, he minuted that the issue of the immunity of private property at sea had to be 
‘carefully and elaborately’ studied.  ‘There will be an increasing body of opinion in 
this country favourable to the view of the chamber of commerce, & I don’t know 
what the view of the members of the Govt may be as they have not yet studied the 
question.’97  The issue was forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) for 
consideration. 
Captain Reginald N. Custance had been appointed DNI in March 1899, a 
position he held until November 1902.  He was the first in a series of DNIs who 
considered the implications of the laws of naval warfare vis-à-vis naval strategy.  At 
the time of his appointment, Custance was well regarded for his intelligence in the 
naval community.  He is now remembered primarily as an advocate of the study of 
war and as a vocal critic of the Admiralty in the last years of Fisher’s administration 
as First Sea Lord.  He was an advocate of Mahan’s vision of sea power, but rather 
muddled and simplistic in his views and resistant to changes in naval technology and 
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thinking.98  Three days after receiving the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce’s 
resolution, Custance, to whom Liverpool’s resolution also had been forwarded, 
submitted a fourteen-page memorandum and attachments for consideration.  He 
summarized the arguments in favour of Britain retaining its traditional opposition to 
the immunity of private property at sea.  Custance began by stating:  
The fundamental principles which govern the capture of private 
property at sea are –  
(a) The sinews of war is wealth. 
(b) Wealth depends upon commerce. 
(c) The objectives in Naval war are – 
1st.  The fighting ships of the enemy which protect his 
wealth. 
2nd.  The wealth of the enemy itself, i.e., his commerce. 
He noted that nations with a superior fleet historically had been able to protect their 
own trade and destroy that of the enemy.  ‘Therefore so long as [Britain] have a 
superior fleet it is to our interest to capture private property at sea.’  Exempting 
private property at sea from capture would weaken all navies compared to that of land 
forces.  Such weakening would be contrary to the interests of weaker powers who 
looked to Britain for ‘protection against the military powers of the continent’.  
Furthermore, as the dominant naval power, Britain had always opposed the immunity 
principle.  In this regard, Custance asserted that the Declaration of Paris ‘was 
accepted without being properly considered’.  He described how the government and 
Queen Victoria had agreed to the Declaration after less than three days’ consideration, 
and that coupling agreement to the abolition of privateering ‘was thought would 
balance the concession’.  When the US refused to agree, Britain was left saddled with 
the Declaration.  However, ‘contraband of war’ was liable to capture under the 
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Declaration, and that was ‘an elastic term.  No agreement has ever been come to as to 
what is or is not contraband.  The decision depends upon the relative strength of the 
belligerents and of neutrals, and upon the conditions at the moment.’  He concluded 
his analysis by arguing that adoption of the immunity principle would ‘remove one of 
the strongest influences inclining men toward peace.’  Custance then interpreted 
‘contraband of war’ more broadly than ever before, defining merchant ships 
themselves as contraband:   ‘If we are a belligerent, and private property at sea, except 
contraband of war, is exempt from capture, our shipping trade will not be saved, 
because ships can be used as instruments of war and must be treated as contraband, 
and therefore liable to capture.’99  The Naval Prize Manual stated a neutral ship was 
subject to seizure only if ‘fitted as a Vessel of War, and [it] is going for sale to a 
Hostile destination’ or if caught violating a proper blockade.  Mere carriage of 
contraband would not suffice for seizure.100  Custance’s comment is consistent with 
Admiralty fears of an adversary arming its merchant ships to wage a guerre de course 
against Britain.101 
Custance also made his views regarding the persons who submitted the 
resolutions quite clear: 
My impression is that the people who forward these resolutions in 
favour of exempting private property at sea from capture are under a 
delusion.  … 
Supremacy at sea has been won by the sword.  The carrying trade of 
the world is the prize of victory.  It is believed that it can only be 
retained by being ready to fight for it.102 
First Naval Lord Richards had even stronger views regarding those pushing for a 
change in Britain’s position on immunity of private property.  He noted: 
                                                
99 Custance, Memorandum, 22 Apr. 1899, ADM 1/7422B. 
100 Thomas E. Holland, A Manual of Naval Prize Law (London:  HMSO, 1888), 24-
25, 40. 
101 See Cobb (2013), 149-163; Seligmann (2012), 5-6. 
102 Custance, Minute, 22 Apr. 1899, ADM 1/7422B. 
 95 
The pusillanimous spirit in which certain chambers of 
commerce are in these latter days nibbling at the maritime power of 
their country is in strong contrast to the manly utterances of men like 
Mr. Cobden and John Stuart Mill. 
A war entered upon under the influence of such a spirit as is 
indicated in these resolutions would be foredoomed to ignominious 
failure.103 
After reviewing Custance’s analysis, Goschen thought there was a stronger 
argument against the immunity principle.  If adopted, the principle would eliminate 
one of the strongest arguments in favour of ‘an efficient and sufficient fleet of 
cruisers.  The “protection of our trade” carries our [naval] estimates.’  Given his 
background in banking and finance, Goschen well understood the potential 
implications – and benefits to naval estimates – from this asserted risk to British trade.  
Without those reasons, the Admiralty’s building program would be reduced with 
disastrous consequences when war came.  Much as Custance had broadly defined 
‘contraband’, Goschen did so as well, although not quite as far.  Goschen stated, ‘All 
provisions would be declared contraband of war’, which would mean all private 
property could be captured after all, and the Royal Navy would ‘be without the power 
of effectively protecting it.’104  Opposition to the immunity of private property at sea 
therefore was necessary to justify the Admiralty’s increasing naval expenditures and 
ship building program, especially for cruisers to protect its maritime trade during war. 
Regarding the government’s official stand on the immunity issue, the 
Admiralty need not have worried.  Salisbury ‘was prima facie opposed to the idea of 
immunity’.105  Salisbury was too much the politician to make his view clear to 
proponents of the principle, however.  The draft response to the Chamber of Shipping 
was ‘somewhat evasive’, although it accurately told the Chamber that the topic of the 
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immunity of private property at sea was not mentioned in the Tsar’s list of topics for 
the conference ‘and that its discussion must depend on a joint agreement of the 
plenipotentiaries to include it in their deliberations.’106  The British government 
would not allow that topic to be raised.   
After setting forth the arguments against the principle of the immunity of 
private property at sea, Custance prepared a response to the Foreign Office’s January 
request for the Admiralty’s observations on the topics proposed by the Tsar.  
However, the Foreign Office had little interest in assisting him.  On 4 May, Custance 
asked for copies of dispatches relating to the Geneva Convention of 1864 to assist in 
the preparation of the Admiralty’s ‘observations’.107  The Foreign Office’s response 
was remarkable, and suggests the tensions that existed within the government 
regarding the upcoming conference.  The Foreign Office responded that it was  
directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to inform you [Custance] that 
the Correspondence in question … is bound in two volumes which 
cannot be conveniently spared from this Office.   
If, however, you will depute a gentleman to come and examine 
them at this Office, the Librarian and Keeper of the papers will be 
happy to shew them to him any day between the hours of 12 and 5 
P.M.108 
Custance never obtained the documents.  Nevertheless, he prepared a nine-
page memorandum on the topics to be addressed at the conference, along with a first 
draft response to the Foreign Office’s request for observations ‘if it is considered 
desirable to send one.’109  He included four pages of estimates of the number of naval 
personnel, ships being built, and expenditures for the navies of Britain, France, and 
Russia with his memorandum.110  Custance’s analysis was a multi-page attack on 
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every object and nearly every proposed topic for the conference.  His initial remarks 
rejected any suggestion of disarmament or limitation of naval budgets or restriction 
on new armaments.  He thought disarmament impossible without some international 
force to ensure compliance.111  Custance asserted that  
no proposal restricting the power of the British Fleet can be entertained 
which does not at the same time limit that of the Fleets of Japan, 
United States and all other Navies.  Further the strength of the British 
Fleet depends upon that of Foreign armies and not alone upon that of 
Foreign navies.  It was the stringency of the Blockade instituted by the 
British Fleet which eventually wore out and broke down the armies of 
Napoleonic France when no other Navies existed.112 
Custance similarly thought the Tsar’s proposal to prohibit the use of new firearms and 
explosives was ludicrous.  He ascribed the critical factor as not the implements of 
war, but the ‘courage, discipline, and experience’ of the men who comprised the 
forces in conflict.  ‘Veterans will stand more punishment than conscripts.’113 
However, one agenda item did gain his favour:  the proposal to outlaw 
submarines and ‘other similar engines of destruction’.  With regard to this topic, 
Custance wrote: 
The submarine boat is the arm of the weaker navy.  It would be to our 
interest to prohibit it, as well as mines and torpedoes of all kinds, 
because the efficiency of our blockades would be much increased.  The 
fact is that the advantage which the superior Navy gained by the use of 
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steam has been counterbalanced by what it has lost through the 
introduction of mines and torpedoes.114 
The ‘weaker navy’ certainly included France and Russia, Britain’s likely opponents, 
which were the only foreign navies for which Custance prepared detailed estimates as 
part of his analysis.  Thus, in Custance’s view, the laws of naval warfare could and 
should be used to improve the Royal Navy’s position against potential enemies. 
Custance opposed every aspect of the proposals to adapt the Geneva 
Convention of 1868 to naval warfare.  He quoted extensively from various sources 
regarding the government’s position at the Brussels Conference of 1874, at which 
Britain’s delegate was instructed to ‘not entertain in any shape, directly or indirectly, 
anything relating to Maritime operations or Naval Warfare.’115  Custance thought a 
similar injunction should be imposed upon Britain’s delegates to the 1899 
Conference.  Finally, on the topic of the arbitration of international disputes, no 
response was necessary from the Admiralty.116 
Custance reduced his views to a two-page draft response to the Foreign Office.  
His draft declared that those proposals seeking to limit naval forces were ‘quite 
impracticable’.  Regarding proposals to limit improvements in weapons and 
explosives, Custance suggested the Admiralty’s position should be ‘that any such 
restrictions would favour the interests of savage nations, and be against those of the 
more highly civilized.  It would be a retrograde step.’  Which ‘savage nations’ the 
Royal Navy might face were not identified.  The draft response did not mention 
support for the proposed prohibition on submarines, mines, and torpedoes.  Regarding 
the proposal to adapt the Geneva Convention of 1864 to naval warfare, Custance 
stated the Admiralty should be ‘averse to binding this country in this manner, as such 
an arrangement would be liable to lead to mutual recriminations, they would prefer to 
leave this question to the unwritten usages of warfare, and to the humanity of the 
combatants.’  He further recommended that any discussion of naval or maritime 
operations in the context of an international agreement should be precluded, as had 
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occurred with the 1874 Brussels Conference.  Finally, Custance averred that the 
proposal regarding international arbitration did not merit any response by the 
Admiralty.117 
The day after Custance submitted his analysis and draft response, Goschen 
again sought guidance from Salisbury regarding the latter’s intentions for the 
upcoming conference.  Goschen asked Salisbury if he intended to provide any 
instructions to the delegation, ‘& if so, are they to bring disarm [sic] up?’  Goschen 
also asked if there should be a meeting regarding any instructions.  Finally, he 
surmised, ‘Of course, the primary instruction will be:  Initiate nothing, & let the other 
Powers make the first move.  I should in any case like to leave Pauncefote as to some 
of the questions outside of reduction of armaments which are sure to arise.’118  
Goschen did not receive a satisfactory answer from Salisbury because he 
prepared a lengthy handwritten minute on Custance’s analysis.  While Richards had 
quickly approved Custance’s memorandum and proposed response, 119  Goschen 
carefully reviewed it.  He agreed ‘with most of the remarks but not with all.’  
Goschen thought there should be several modifications.  The impracticalities 
associated with limiting new weapons and explosives should be a recurring theme in 
the response to the Foreign Office.  Goschen noted the draft response dealt with men 
and ships but not budgets.  He was concerned some agreement regarding naval 
expenditures, especially compared with Russia and France, might be suggested.  
However, a strong argument against any reduction in naval budgets could be made 
because of the difficulties in monitoring any such agreement.  He suggested adding a 
paragraph on budgets to the draft response.  Finally, he thought Custance’s next-to-
last paragraph, dealing with proposed application of the laws of war to naval warfare 
needed strengthening.  He recognized that ‘acceptance of the [Tsar’s] programme by 
the British Govt implies that this country is prepared to consider questions affecting 
the Navy which were excluded by the British Govt in 1874.’  But he hoped the 
delegation at least would be instructed not to enter into any binding agreements 
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without first gaining approval from the government.120  Goschen’s experience in 
March with the secret proposal to Russia likely influenced his views regarding any 
possible agreement on naval expenditures, as well as his concern of agreements being 
reached without government approval. 
Custance and Goschen to discuss the First Lord’s comments, after which 
Custance presented a second draft response to the Foreign Office.121  This draft 
recognized that issues and topics which the Admiralty preferred not to have raised at 
the conference would in fact be discussed.  It therefore sought to present practical 
barriers to any possible agreements.  An explanation of the need for safeguards if any 
reduction in naval budgets was agreed was inserted.  Another new paragraph 
expressed the view that any limitations on new explosives would require disclosure of 
current formulations, secrets that the Admiralty assumed the Great Powers would not 
willingly share.  The second draft continued to assert that any restriction on new 
weapons ‘would favour the interests of savage nations, and be against those of the 
more highly civilized.’  Once again, no mention was made of banning submarines, 
mines, and torpedoes.  The Admiralty opposed any adaptation of the 1864 Geneva 
Convention to naval warfare, contending, ‘such an arrangement would be almost 
certain to lead to mutual recriminations.’  The Admiralty now recognized ‘it would 
appear that the acceptance of the programme of the Russian Government implies that 
H.M. Government is prepared to consider’ questions relating to maritime operations 
and naval warfare.  However, the Admiralty ‘assumed’ the delegation would be 
instructed not to enter into to any agreements without asking the government first.122  
Goschen added a sentence to Custance’s second draft, stating that the delegation 
should pay attention to any effect an agreement on international mediation and 
arbitration of disputes might have on ‘permissible and prohibited naval and military 
movements during the period of mediation.’123  The Admiralty finally sent its formal 
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response to the Foreign Office’s demand for ‘observations’ on the Tsar’s proposed 
topics for the conference on 16 May, nearly five months after it was requested.124 
The Instructions to the Delegations 
While Custance was preparing responses to the petitions from chambers of 
commerce relating to the immunity of private property at sea, Secretary of State Hay 
asked Assistant Secretary of State David Jayne Hill to draft the instructions for the US 
delegation.  By 7 April, Hill had essentially completed the instructions.125  There is no 
evidence Hay or President McKinley changed Hill’s draft instructions.126  No record 
exists that the instructions to the delegation were vetted with Secretary of the Navy 
Long or any uniformed or former member of the Navy (or any person from the 
Army).  Indeed, other than perhaps verbal discussions within the Department of State, 
the instructions were, as predicted by Hill, adopted essentially unaltered.   
The formal instructions represent an effort by the US to walk a fine line 
between maintaining the country’s traditional position against involvement in 
European affairs while also proposing a far-reaching plan for an international tribunal 
for the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations.127  In effect, the US wanted to 
become more involved in international affairs on certain issues but otherwise maintain 
its relative isolation.  The instructions were clear and generally favourable toward the 
navy concerning the proposals directed toward disarmament and arms limitations.  
Regarding the proposal to reduce military forces and budgets, Hay instructed the 
delegates that the United States’ military expenditures were ‘at present so far below 
the normal quota that the question of limitation could not be profitably discussed.’  
                                                
124 MacGregor to Sanderson, 16 May 1899, FO 83/1700; Admiralty to Foreign Office, 
16 May 1899, FO 412/65, 69. 
125 Hill to White, 7 Apr. 1899, box 86, reel 77, White Papers. 
126 See also Parkman, David Jayne Hill, 74. 
127 See generally, Letter of Instruction and Annex B, 18 Apr. 1899, box 1, call number 
A/+N543, Stanford Newel Papers, Minnesota Historical Society Manuscript 
Collection, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN; Hay to White, et al., 18 Apr. 
1899, FRUS 1899, 511-513; James Brown Scott, ed., Instructions to the American 
Delegates to the Hague Peace Conferences and their Official Reports (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1916), 6-16. 
 102 
The delegates thus were to leave any discussions on that topic to ‘the representatives 
of those Powers to which it may properly belong.’128  
Regarding the topics to outlaw certain weapons in land or naval warfare – the 
second, third, and fourth articles in the Russian circular – Hay ‘enjoined [the 
delegates] not to give the weight of their influence to the promotion of projects the 
realization of which is so uncertain.’  However, Russia’s fifth, sixth, and seventh 
agenda points relating to revising the laws of war and extending them to naval 
warfare were to be backed by the American delegates, ‘and any practicable 
propositions based upon them should receive [the delegation’s] earnest support.’  Hay 
directed the delegation to promote the eighth article, relating to mediation and 
arbitration of international disputes.  Indeed, the instructions included a draft proposal 
for an international court of arbitration.129     
Finally, Hay told the delegates that because  
the Conference has its chief reason of existence in the heavy burdens 
and cruel waste of war, which nowhere affect innocent private persons 
more severely or unjustly than in the damage done to peaceable trade 
and commerce, especially at sea, the question of exempting private 
property from destruction or capture on the high seas would seem to be 
a timely one for consideration.130 
In light of the United States’ long-standing position in favour of the principle, the 
delegates were to ‘propose to the Conference the principle of extending to strictly 
private property at sea the immunity from destruction or capture by belligerent 
Powers which such property already enjoys on land as worthy of being incorporated 
in the permanent law of civilized nations.’131  This position, which Pauncefote may 
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have warned Hay against asserting before leaving Washington for London,132 would 
bedevil relations between the two countries at both the 1899 and 1907 conferences. 
Neither McKinley nor Hay nor Hill held any meetings with the US delegates 
as a whole regarding these instructions or their import.  The omnipresent Holls may 
have spoken with Hay and Hill regarding the instructions on 17 April.133  No record 
exists that any of the delegates asked any questions regarding the instructions or the 
positions they were to take.  Certainly no evidence exists of any consideration of the 
impact of the instructions on naval strategy.  Indeed, ten days after the instructions 
were issued, Mahan said he did not know what the government wanted him to do at 
The Hague.134  Still, the delegation had received specific instructions regarding the 
positions it was to take. 
In contrast, Salisbury’s instructions were delivered on 16 May 1899, the day 
Pauncefote, Fisher, and Ardagh left for The Hague.135  No preliminary drafts of the 
instructions have been identified, and no evidence exists they were vetted in advance 
with the Admiralty or War Office.  Unlike Hay’s instructions, which were directed to 
all members of the American delegation, Salisbury’s instructions were only addressed 
to Pauncefote.  In general, the instructions expressed no definite views regarding 
seven of the eight topics.  Salisbury noted the British government had ‘willingly 
accepted’ the proviso in Muraviev’s note of 11 January, that ‘all questions not directly 
included in the Programme of the Conference should be excluded from its 
deliberations’.  The instructions then pointed out that Britain had agreed to the two 
general objects for the conference as described by Muraviev.  Salisbury informed 
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Pauncefote the government had abstained from expressing any definite opinion on the 
eight points set forth in the 11 January note, other than support for the mediation and 
arbitration of international disputes.136   
The actual instructions provided to Pauncefote then diverge from the 
instructions as later published and presented to the House of Commons.  The 
published instructions next state:  ‘Until the Conference has met and the order of 
discussion has been in some degree settled, it seems scarcely possible to give you and 
Sir H. Howard any detailed instructions on those points of the Programme which 
concern the question of disarmament.’ 137   However, in the actual instructions, 
Salisbury first told Pauncefote he had provided him with a copy of his earlier 
correspondence to Sir Charles Scott, in which Salisbury had made some preliminary 
observations regarding disarmament.  In that correspondence, Salisbury had expressed 
the need for clear definitions of which armaments or military actions were to be 
prohibited, the viability and enforceability of any agreements limiting or restricting 
military expenditures or particular weapons of warfare, and the need for agreement on 
some oversight organization to monitor and enforce any such agreements before any 
specifics were considered.138  Salisbury had no way of knowing if the various topics 
relating to disarmament or arms limitations ‘will retain at the Conference the position 
of primary importance which at first seemed to be assigned to it.’  ‘Until, therefore, 
the Conference has met and the order of discussion has been in some degree settled, it 
seems scarcely possible to give you and Sir H. Howard any more detailed 
instructions.’  Salisbury also provided Pauncefote copies of memoranda from the War 
Office and the Admiralty ‘containing information and suggestions on these topics, 
which will be of assistance to you and to the Military and Naval Delegates on whom 
the task of debating them will largely rest.’139  The published and confidential 
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instructions then return to the one topic on which the delegation was given definite 
instructions:  the mediation and arbitration of international disputes for the prevention 
of war.  Regarding that topic, the delegation was told ‘it was a matter to which Her 
Majesty’s Government attach the highest importance, and which they are desirous of 
furthering by every means in their power.’140  The instructions concluded by telling 
Pauncefote to keep the government constantly informed as to the proceedings of the 
conference.141  The Admiralty was not provided with copies of the instructions or any 
of the documents supplied to the British delegation.  It had to request copies from the 
Foreign Office a week after the conference convened, after reading about the 
documents in an article in The Times.142 
Why were Britain’s instructions redacted when published in October 1899 for 
the House of Commons?  As is now known, Salisbury had previously made a secret 
proposal to reduce naval expenditures directly to Russia.  Removing any discussion 
regarding disarmament or arms limitations in the instructions preserved that secrecy.  
Moreover, by withholding any reference to his and the Admiralty’s views on seven of 
the eight topics, Salisbury ensured that any divergence between his views and those of 
the Admiralty compared with the actual results of the conference could not be readily 
ascertained.  Indeed, the 1899 Conference resulted in more future implications for 
naval warfare than either Salisbury or the Admiralty anticipated. 
Conclusion 
The United States and Great Britain took seriously their preparations for the 
1899 Conference.  The US Navy played no role in the selection of the American 
delegation or the preparation of the instructions.  Two politically motivated 
individuals directed the selection of the US delegation’s civilian members, which 
paralleled the composition of Britain’s.  The selection of Mahan, which neither 
McKinley nor Hay adequately considered, would have significant implications once 
the 1899 Conference convened.  Despite the lack of involvement of the Navy, the 
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instructions to the delegation were generally favourable with one exception:  the 
insistence on international recognition of the principle of the immunity of private 
property at sea. 
For the Admiralty and Royal Navy, Britain’s preparations for the 1899 
Conference must have verged on a nightmare.  The divergent views between the 
government and the Admiralty show increasing tensions.  After ridiculing the Tsar’s 
proposed topics for the conference in January 1899 and assuming the government 
would not seriously consider them, Goschen participated in a secret proposal to 
reduce naval expenditures to Russia.  Salisbury’s decision to make such a proposal 
not only reveals the financial pressures caused by the naval arms race, but also the 
seriousness with which the proposed conference was viewed.  The traditional story 
that Salisbury picked Fisher as Britain’s naval delegate without the involvement of 
Goschen is wrong.  Fisher was identified as the best man for the job, and his 
inducement to accept was the reward of the Royal Navy’s most important command.  
He was not selected as someone who would ‘fight at the Peace Conference … though 
it was not for Peace’.143  Indeed, his positions at the conference would be fair less 
radical than those of Mahan. 
The Admiralty was forced to consider the ramifications of the topics for 
consideration at the conference.  Again, the Admiralty’s actions undercut suggestions 
that the laws of naval warfare were something it believed could be ignored or 
disregarded.  Once adopted, any limitations or restrictions would have to be followed 
unless the enemy violated them first, and that could not be guaranteed.  Certainly, in 
planning for war, the Royal Navy could not assume that any rules would not apply or 
that the government would allow, for example, the development of banned weapon 
systems.  Fortunately, the Admiralty’s views regarding the immunity of private 
property coincided with Salisbury’s.  The Admiralty recognized that by agreeing to 
attend, Britain had agreed to consider limitations and restrictions on naval warfare.  
While it argued against almost all of the proposed topics, the Royal Navy supported 
an international agreement banning submarines, mines, and torpedoes.  If it could 
frame the rules to suit and protect its position as the world’s leading naval power, it 
would do so.  In the end, the instructions to the British delegation generally allowed 
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maximum freedom of action.  Throughout the 1899 Conference, the Admiralty would 
closely monitor the proceedings and defend its pro-belligerent positions regarding the 







The 1899 Conference began with no one expecting anything of consequence 
to come out of it.  A newspaper correspondent described the atmosphere as ‘one of 
frigid reserve, not to say mutual mistrust.’1  Andrew White, head of the US delegation 
later wrote, ‘[S]ince the world began, never has so large a body come together in a 
spirit of more hopeless skepticism as to any good result.’  Some senior European 
delegates despaired of the adverse impact of the conference on their otherwise 
unblemished careers.2  For naval warfare, however, the 1899 Conference was hardly a 
failure.  It set the stage for discussions regarding the laws naval of warfare for the 
following ten years.  
This chapter first discusses plans for cooperation between Great Britain and 
the United States.  It then studies the debates and discussions at the conference on the 
various topics of the Tsar’s agenda related to naval warfare, focusing on the positions 
of Britain and the US.  The aftermath of the conference is then reviewed, including an 
unprecedented solicitation from Mahan to the British government to cooperate in 
opposing the US and its traditional support for the immunity of private property at 
sea.  Finally, this chapter re-evaluates the traditional assessments of the roles of Fisher 
and Mahan at the conference and the impact on their views of the laws of naval 
warfare. 
Plans for Cooperation 
Mahan, Seth Low, and Frederick Holls had arrived in England on the evening 
of 10 May after a weeklong voyage.  Crozier had preceded them by two weeks; 
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Newel and White were still at their embassies in The Hague and Berlin, respectively.  
Pauncefote was already in England, having left his post in the US earlier.3  The day 
after his arrival, Holls met with Balfour at the latter’s offices on Downing Street.  At 
the meeting, Holls talked about his plan, approved by President McKinley, to have 
Great Britain, Germany, and the US act jointly at the upcoming conference.  Balfour 
arranged for Holls to meet with Lord Salisbury the next day.  After meeting with 
Balfour, Holls met with Pauncefote and also discussed cooperation at the conference.4 
Holls then travelled to Berlin and met with Ambassador White and Bernhard 
von Bülow, the secretary of state for foreign affairs of the German Empire.  They 
discussed cooperation at the conference between England, the US, and Germany.5  
Before White and Holls left for The Hague, Bülow promised that Germany’s 
delegation would cooperate fully with the US.6  After Holls’ meetings in Berlin, it 
seemed as though the three nations would cooperate on all subjects for the 
conference.   
Mahan was not idle during his time in London.  He met with First Lord 
Goschen at the Admiralty.  Goschen told Mahan of the secret proposal for naval 
disarmament that had been made to Russia.  Mahan wrote weeks after the conference, 
‘The one [nation] most generally abused, Great Britain, did offer to stop two battle 
ships, if Russia would do the same; but the latter took no notice of the proposal.  This 
I was told by the first Lord of the Admiralty himself.’7  No evidence has been found 
that Fisher was present at the meeting between Goschen and Mahan.  It seems 
unlikely he was there because Fisher never mentioned the specific terms of the secret 
naval disarmament proposal made to Russia.  However, given Mahan’s subsequent 
conduct and cooperation with Fisher on various positions at the conference, the two 
likely discussed some degree of collaboration at some time.  Certainly, Mahan’s 
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construction of two British battleships was not disclosed in Goschen’s speech to the 
House of Commons.  That fact therefore could indeed only have come from Goschen. 
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positions at the conference did not align with the instructions he had received from 
the US government.  Fisher undoubtedly met with Goschen and discussed the 
Admiralty’s positions as expressed in its ‘observations’ of 16 May given the nearly 
identical language Fisher later used during the conference.8  Thus, while the civilian 
delegates of Great Britain and the US planned one form of cooperation for particular 
purposes, the naval delegates of the two nations may have planned cooperation with 
other goals in mind. 
The Conference and Naval Warfare:  Successes, Failures, and Postponements 
On 18 May 1899, the delegates from 26 countries convened the conference.9  
The conference divided its work into three ‘commissions’.  The First Commission 
was devoted to the items on the Russian agenda relating to limiting armaments and 
certain types of weapons, the Second Commission to revising the laws of land war 
and extending them to naval warfare, and the Third Commission to devising a 
peaceful means for the resolution of international disputes.  Mahan was a member of 
the First and Second Commissions, including the sub-commission of the First 
Commission relating to naval affairs.10  Fisher served on the same bodies.11  Unlike 
Mahan, who was a ‘plenipotentiary’ and therefore could cast votes on behalf of the 
                                                
8 Compare Admiralty to Foreign Office, 16 May 1899, FO 412/65, 69 with à Court, 
Memorandum, 26 May 1899, FO 83/104. 
Salisbury added Lt. Col. Charles à Court (later à Court Repington) to the 
British delegation as an assistant military delegate after the conference started, and 
informed à Court of his appointment on 23 May.  See Salisbury to à Court, 23 May 
1899, ibid. (list of communications and subjects at end of the file).  Why Salisbury 
made this late addition to the delegation is not clear.  However, à Court provided 
detailed handwritten memoranda regarding the proceedings to the Foreign Office 
throughout the conference.  See, for example, ‘Memoranda by Lieut. Colonel C. À 
Court, Military Attaché’, ibid.  Other handwritten memoranda from à Court are in FO 
83/1700.  Salisbury may have intended à Court to be his ‘eyes and ears’ at the 
conference.   
9 See James Brown Scott, ed., The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences:  
The Conference of 1899 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1920), 9. 
10 James Brown Scott, ed., Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague 
Peace Conferences and their Official Reports (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1916), 18; Scott, ed., 1899 Conference, 9, 23, 24. 
11  See Inclosure, Pauncefote to Salisbury, 25 May 1899, in Foreign Office, 
Correspondence Respecting the Peace Conference Held at The Hague in 1899 
(Miscellaneous No. 1 (1899)) (London:  HMSO, 1899), 16-17; Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, 17 June 1899, FO 412/65, 165. 
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US, Fisher was a ‘technical delegate’ and could only advise Britain’s two 
plenipotentiaries, Pauncefote and Howard.12  Relatively soon, Fisher reported, ‘It’s 
very hard work here.  It’s a case of Britannia contra mundum!  But we are more than 
holding our own.’13  A few weeks later, Crozier expressed a similar view, saying ‘the 
work has been continuous and exacting without being awfully interesting.  Mahan and 
I have had little or no constructive work….  Sentinel duty is fatiguing.’14  
In the First Commission, Fisher argued in favour of banning submarine boats 
and the construction of new ships equipped with rams if all nations agreed.  He 
obtained the support of a majority of delegates, including Germany and Russia.15  The 
Admiralty entirely approved of this effort.16  Mahan quickly ignored his government’s 
instructions ‘not to give the weight of their influence’ on issues relating to limitations 
or restrictions on various weapons and armaments.  He wanted to ‘preserve full 
liberty for his Government to use submarine torpedo boats or not’.17  With the US and 
France leading the opposition, the proposals failed for want of unanimity.18  On 
efforts to limit the on-going arms race, Mahan announced (consistent with his 
instructions) that this issue was purely a European one on which the US would 
express no opinion.19  Nevertheless, Mahan argued against any efforts to outlaw new 
types of cannon or limit improvements in armour plate.20  Fisher asserted that any 
limitations on the development or type of weapons that might be used in war ‘would 
place civilized peoples in a dangerous situation in case of war with less civilized 
                                                
12  See James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 
(Baltimore, MD:  The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), I:  113; Scott, ed., 1899 
Conference, 2, 3. 
13 Fisher to Fawkes, 4 June 1899, FGDN I, 141. 
14 Crozier to Corbin, 19 July 1899, reel 11, vol. 18, Hay Papers. 
15  Scott, ed., 1899 Conference, 367-368; Fisher Memorandum, Inclosure 1 to 
Pauncefote to Salisbury, 31 May 1899, FO 412/65, 120.   
16 Custance, Minute, 2 June 1899, ADM 116/98. 
17 Scott, ed., 1899 Conference, 367 
18 Ibid., 367-369; Fisher, Memorandum, Inclosure 1 to Pauncefote to Salisbury, 31 
May 1899, FO 412/65, 120. 
19 Scott, ed., 1899 Conference, 327.   
20 Ibid., 292-295, 367-368. 
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nations or savage tribes.’21  He did not explain more precisely how that danger might 
arise.  Fisher noted that if new weapons and explosives were prohibited, nations 
would have to disclose their present designs and compositions, which no country 
would do.22  Mahan even crossed over to an issue being debated by the subcommittee 
devoted to land warfare issues, and convinced Crozier to successfully propose 
outlawing the dropping of explosives from balloons for a period of five years instead 
of the unlimited period originally adopted.23 
Mahan became notorious for his opposition to banning the use of projectiles 
whose sole purpose was to spread asphyxiating or deleterious gases.  On behalf of the 
US, he cast the only negative vote before the sub-commission considering the 
declaration.  He asserted that any such ban was premature, because no such shells 
presently existed.  He argued that, ‘from a humane standpoint it is no more cruel to 
asphyxiate one’s enemies by means of deleterious gases than with water, that is to 
say, by drowning them, as happens when a vessel is sunk by the torpedo of a torpedo-
boat.’24  He adamantly refused to reconsider his position throughout the debates on 
the proposed prohibition, saying it was ‘a question of principle’.25  
                                                
21 Ibid., 360. 
22 Ibid., 360-361. 
23 Ibid., 280-281, 353-355. 
24 Ibid., 283, 366. 
25 Ibid., 328.  See also ibid., 283-284, 296, 366-367.  
Mahan’s first two biographers reached radically different conclusions 
regarding his opposition to banning poison gas shells.  His first biographer, writing 
two years after the end of the First World War said, ‘in light of the information which 
has come to us of the inhuman character of these gases and of the horrible sufferings 
which the use of them entails, [Mahan] would have been the last man to advocate 
their employment.’  Charles Carlisle Taylor, The Life of Admiral Mahan (London:  
John Murray, 1920), 96.  Mahan’s second biographer, writing on the eve of the 
Second World War, took a different tack.  He concluded, ‘Later studies and careful 
analyses have shown that gas measured by the degree of suffering inflicted … by the 
permanent after effects on the wounded, and the percentage of deaths to the total 
number of injured, is a comparatively merciful weapon, thus justifying Mahan’s 
opinion that gas was not “unnecessarily cruel.”’  W.D. Puleston, Mahan:  The Life 
and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 
1939), 208. 
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In contrast, Fisher originally voted to ban poison gas projectiles in the sub-
commission.  He thought it unlikely such a weapon would ever be developed.26  
However, he soon learned diplomacy often involves a quid pro quo.  Another sub-
commission had proposed and passed a declaration banning bullets that flatten or 
expand inside the human body.  This proposal was directed against Britain’s use of 
the ‘dum-dum’ bullet.  Only Britain had opposed the declaration before the sub-
commission.27  When the proposed ban on poison gas shells came before the full 
conference committee, Fisher voted against it in order to gain America’s support and 
vote against the declaration to ban ‘dum-dum’ bullets.28  The press understood a deal 
had been struck between the American and British delegates.  One Russian stated, 
‘[T]he English and American do good business.  The English to-day pay the debt in 
asphyxiating shells which they incurred to the Americans for their support of the Dum 
Dum bullet.’29   
On 5 June, Fisher was prepared to agree to the revised rules of naval warfare, 
because ‘they give greater freedom to belligerents than the Articles of 1868 and are 
generally of a more satisfactory character to Great Britain.’ 30   However, the 
Admiralty was not so certain.  While the Admiralty was ruminating, the text of the 
new convention was finalized.  Both Fisher and Pauncefote recommended approval.31  
While DNI Custance found the new rules to be an improvement over the 1868 
Geneva Convention, he rejected the idea of embodying them in the form of an 
international convention.  Instead, he proposed that the laws ‘should be accepted on 
the understanding that they are not rules having the binding force of an International 
Treaty, but permissive and in the nature of instructions to be issued by Y[our] 
L[ordships] to the naval forces.’32  The Admiralty agreed and indicated its opposition 
                                                
26 Scott, ed., 1899 Conference, 367. 
27 Ibid., 332, 343-344. 
28  Ibid., 79, 87; Pauncefote to Salisbury, 20 July 1899, FO 412/65, 331-332; 
Pauncefote to Salisbury, 21 July 1899, ibid., 334-336. 
29  ‘The Peace Conference:  Asphyxiating Shells and Expansive Bullets’, The 
Manchester Guardian, 22 July 1899, p. 7. 
30 Fisher and Ardagh, Memorandum, 5 June 1899, Inclosure 1 to Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, 5 June 1899, FO 412/65, 127-128. 
31 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 17 June 1899, ibid., 165-66. 
32 Custance, Minute, 15 June 1899, ADM 116/98. 
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to adoption of the new laws of naval warfare as a binding convention.33  Lord 
Salisbury agreed with the Admiralty’s views.34 
However, Pauncefote and Fisher did not simply accept these directions.  
Pauncefote appealed to Salisbury and the Admiralty to reconsider their position.  
Pauncefote stated on behalf of the delegation: 
The revised Articles in question having been unanimously 
accepted by all Powers represented at the Conference, there would 
seem to be no valid reason for the refusal of H. M. Govt. to sign the 
proposed Convention, and having regard to their humanitarian object 
we fear that such a refusal would expose H.M. Govt. to unfavourable 
comment.35  
While the Admiralty still thought it would be disadvantageous to accept the new laws 
of naval warfare as an international convention, it reluctantly agreed ‘as a matter of 
policy to withdraw their objections’ based on an amendment that had been made to 
one proposed article since they had initially reviewed the proposed convention.36   
In contrast, Mahan generally opposed the adaptation of the laws of war to 
naval warfare.  After the proposed convention had been adopted by the committee’s 
delegates, Mahan suggested three additional articles to provide that a belligerent’s 
sailors rescued by neutral vessels following a sea battle should be considered 
‘incapable of serving again during the war, unless recaptured or until duly 
exchanged.’37  Mahan’s new articles were intended to preclude any repetition of the 
Deerhound affair that occurred during the American Civil War, in which a British 
yacht had rescued Confederate sailors from the CSS Alabama and refused to turn 
them over to the US as prisoners of war.38  The Admiralty recommended rejection of 
                                                
33 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 June 1899, FO 412/65, 200. 
34 Salisbury to Pauncefote, 21 June 1899, ibid., 201. 
35 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 22 June 1899, ibid., 210. 
36 Custance, Minute, 26 June 1899, ADM 116/98; Admiralty to Foreign Office, 27 
June 1899, FO 412/65, 240. 
37 Scott, ed., 1899 Conference, 391-392.  
38 Mahan to Fisher, 18 July 1899, LP/ATM,II:  643-644. 
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the additional articles as ‘contrary to the well established principle of international 
law that a neutral flag protects the passengers on board a neutral ship.’39  Mahan 
refused to be moved from his position and his intransigence led the American 
delegation finally to instruct him to withdraw his proposed changes ‘to facilitate the 
conclusion of the work of the Conference’.40  
Another proposed article concerned the treatment of the shore-ends of 
telegraph cables in time of war.  The British delegation, including Fisher, supported 
requiring such cables to be treated the same as telegraph lines on land.41  However, 
the Admiralty successfully opposed consideration of this issue because ‘the question 
of submarine cables in time of war is at present unsettled, and that it is to the 
advantage of Great Britain that it should remain so, because control of them at such a 
time will really rest with the Power which holds the command of the sea.’42  The 
British delegation then changed its position and succeeded in having all questions 
relating to submarine cables deferred to another conference.43  Similarly, consistent 
with the Admiralty’s views, the conference did not consider the question of 
bombardment of undefended harbours and coastal towns by naval forces.  That issue 
was likewise deferred to a future conference.44  
The growing dissension within the American delegation was especially 
apparent on one of the delegation’s key goals:  an international agreement on the 
immunity of private property, not contraband, at sea during war.  White’s early 
diplomacy led him to believe he might succeed.  Germany and Austria indicated they 
would support the US on the issue.45  But Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy, and 
other countries soon advised they would oppose any attempt to even present the 
                                                
39 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 7 July 1899, FO 412/65, 307.  
40 Mahan to Fisher, 18 July 1899, LP/ATM,II:  643 (first letter).  See also Scott, ed., 
Instructions, 39-42. 
41 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 21 June 1899, FO 412/65, 202. 
42 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 6 July 1899, ibid., 306-307. 
43 Fisher, Memorandum, 22 July 1899, Inclosure 1 to Pauncefote to Salisbury, 26 July 
1899, ibid., 367-368. 
44 Pauncefote to Salisbury, 7 July 1899, ibid., 307. 
45 Holls, ‘Reminiscenses’, container 364, 7-8, Holls/Harvard Papers. 
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proposal as not falling within the scope of the Tsar’s agenda.46  Pauncefote proposed 
to object to any discussion of the topic, and Salisbury agreed with this approach.47  
Britain need not have worried about the issue.  Mahan exercised his influence 
contrary to the delegation’s instructions.  In order to achieve unanimity within the 
American delegation, Mahan forced White to tone down his presentation on the 
proposal, and to leave ‘out much that in [White’s] judgment the documents emanating 
from us on the subject ought to contain.’48  Mahan’s opposition, as well as that of 
others within the delegation, was well known at the conference.49   
When the topic arose in the Second Commission, Britain led other nations in 
arguing the subject was not within the scope of the topics for the conference.  All 
White could achieve was agreement allowing him to raise the matter at a plenary 
session.  The Russian delegate presiding then suggested the question be referred to a 
subsequent conference.  That proposal was unanimously approved with France, 
Britain, and Russia abstaining.50  At the plenary session later the same day, White 
made an impassioned, if watered down, speech in support of the immunity principle.  
He recognized ‘contraband’ needed to be defined as part of the effort to agree on 
immunity but that should not deter the conference from discussing the immunity 
principle now.51  Fisher later reported White admitted ‘contraband’ was ‘an elastic 
term’ and the definition ‘would depend on the relative strength of the belligerents and 
                                                
46 White, Autobiography, II:  260, 262-263, 265-268.  Before he left Washington, 
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the neutrals.’52  In the end, the US did achieve a unanimous view – with Britain again 
abstaining – that the issue would be considered at a subsequent conference.53  
Both countries were keen on cooperating toward an agreement on arbitration 
of international disputes.54  Consistent with the Admiralty’s concerns expressed in its 
‘observations’ on the conference topics, Fisher told White when they first met that 
while ‘[h]e favored arbitration’ he ‘feared it as detrimental to England.’55  The 
readiness for action of the Royal Navy gave it an advantage over other powers that it 
would not want to give up by agreeing to such a plan.  However, Fisher was inclined 
to try arbitration at least to some extent.56  Fisher’s views were reported to Salisbury 
by one of the British delegation’s secretaries.  The secretary thought Britain would 
have lost half of the advantage it possessed against France during the Fashoda Crisis 
in Africa the year before if mediation had been required.57  Salisbury quickly 
dismissed the issue.  He concluded, ‘Our preparedness is excellent against attack – but 
is there any even remote probability of our suddenly attacking one of the Great 
Military Powers without giving an opportunity for mediation?’58  Britain could not 
conceive of not providing a formal declaration of war as expected under existing 
international law or allowing for mediation if it entered into an international 
agreement for arbitration of disputes. 
Britain and the US worked together to achieve an agreement on international 
arbitration of disputes.  Despite various issues along the way, as the end of the 
conference approached, agreement on an international convention had been 
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achieved.59  However, Mahan created the most lasting rancour and conflict within the 
US delegation because on 22 July, he ‘threw in a bomb’ regarding that convention.60  
He had chanced upon a newspaper editorial ‘rejoicing over the extreme results 
insured’ by Article 27 of the proposed arbitration treaty.  The editorial asserted that if 
Article 27 had been in effect, it ‘would have prevented the last war’ between the US 
and Spain.61  Article 27 imposed a ‘duty’ on the signatory powers, in the case of a 
‘serious dispute’ between two or more of them, to remind the disputing parties that 
the permanent court of arbitration was available to them.62  Mahan was convinced 
Article 27 would compromise the Monroe Doctrine.  Holls defended the article.  
Indeed, the US Department of State had already approved the proposed arbitration 
convention, including Article 27. 63   Mahan attacked Holls for supporting the 
provision and demanded that Article 27 be dropped.  The other members of the 
delegation came around to Mahan’s view.  The solution initially proposed was to 
insist upon an amendment, inserting the qualifying words ‘so far as circumstances 
permit’ after the word ‘duty’.64 
News of the internal conflict became public.65  The US delegation was ‘greatly 
perplexed’ how to resolve the issue.66  The delegation hosted a meeting for key 
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delegates from England, France, Russia, and others.  France refused any suggestion to 
limit the scope of Article 27, even if that meant the US might not ratify the arbitration 
treaty.  White then proposed a declaration to be made by the US upon signing the 
convention, restating America’s traditional policy of staying out of the affairs of 
foreign states.  Not only did the key foreign delegates agree not to oppose such a 
declaration, they agreed to support it if necessary.  At the evening’s meeting of the US 
delegation, Low proposed an amendment to the draft declaration relating to the 
Monroe Doctrine, which was accepted by the delegation’s members, including 
Mahan.67  When the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
was presented for final approval on 25 July, the declaration of the US was read.68  
Objections or comments were solicited, but silence reigned.69  Despite his silence, 
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Pauncefote tried to convince the US to remove the reservation.  He told White, ‘It will 
be charged against you that you propose to evade your duties while using the treaty to 
promote your interests.’70  However, the reservation set at ease the concerns of others 
‘that the United States, elated with their victory over Spain, are eager to mix up in 
European affairs.’71 
The US refused to sign the two conventions relating to the laws of war on land 
and adapting the 1864 Geneva Convention to maritime warfare at the closing of the 
conference.  It signed the declaration prohibiting the dropping of explosives from 
balloons for a period of five years, but not the declarations relating to gas shells and 
expanding bullets.  Britain did not sign any of the conventions or declarations at the 
conference.  Nations in attendance were allowed until the end of the year to sign.72  
Historians have ignored the single resolution and six vœux (‘wishes’) unanimously 
adopted at the conference.  (The US voted in favour of each; Britain abstained on all 
of them.)  The six wishes recommended topics for the next conference.  
Six of the seven statements (one resolution plus six wishes) either entirely or 
partially related to naval warfare.  The resolution called for a general reduction in 
arms expenditures.  The views urged that the next international conference should 
include discussion of the rights and duties of neutrals; reduction and limitation of new 
types and sizes of naval armaments; limitations on the size of naval forces and their 
budgets; a declaration of the inviolability of private property at sea; and restrictions 
on the bombardment of ports and towns by naval forces. 73   Thus, the next 
international conference would include a full range of subjects related to the laws of 
naval warfare. 
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Aftermath 
After the signing ceremony, the delegations dispersed.  Great Britain viewed 
the conference as a ‘considerable success’, particularly because of the convention on 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes.74  Fisher had left on 26 July to return 
to England before assuming command of the Mediterranean Fleet.75  Before his 
departure, he wrote two memoranda for the information of Lord Salisbury and the 
Admiralty.  The first was a general discussion of the naval subjects at the conference 
that followed his previous reports and the decisions in each commission and sub-
commission on which he served.  Fisher reiterated that Article IV of the convention 
adapting the 1864 Geneva Convention to maritime warfare ‘should not permit any 
embarrassment to the belligerents if they make free use of their powers.’  He noted 
that Pauncefote had successfully prevented consideration of rules for the 
bombardment of unfortified locales by naval forces and treatment of the shore ends of 
submarine cables, as well as the United States’ proposal for the immunity of private 
property at sea.  In conclusion, Fisher stated, ‘all the Naval Delegates have worked 
together most cordially and harmoniously.’76  
His second memorandum, marked ‘Secret’, was far more revealing and 
expansive.  Fisher provided summaries of his conversations with various delegates – 
all of which ‘took place under the pledge of secrecy’ – as well as his analyses of those 
conversations.  There was not ‘the slightest inclination’ on the part of any of the naval 
delegates to agree to any international inspection or controls to ensure compliance 
with any limitations of armaments or budgets.  According to Fisher, ‘Not one of the 
Delegates ever made any allusion to Mr. Goschen’s offer in the House of Commons 
that he was prepared to diminish the English programme of ship-building if other 
Great Powers would do the same.’  Fisher’s analysis of the focus of foreign navies 
showed the necessity for Britain to remain vigilant and promoted the importance of 
the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean fleet, his new command.  Russia’s naval forces 
would be kept in harbour in case of a war only against England.  Of course, naval 
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operations in a war of France and Russia against England would be quite different.  
Russia’s naval delegate said its naval construction program was directed solely 
toward Japan and Germany, not England.  The distribution of the French Navy 
showed France thought a war with England was more likely than against Germany, 
while Italy feared French bombardment of unfortified locations in the Mediterranean.  
France’s naval commander ‘is said to be an advocate for an instant offensive against 
the English Mediterranean fleet.’  The expansion of other powers’ navies also had to 
be watched.  The United States’ naval expansion ‘must influence that of Great Britain 
if of no other Power.’  The German Emperor intended to build a large navy, with the 
Germans closely monitoring French naval strategy.77   
Fisher surmised that the United States’ delegates were instructed not to 
participate in discussions on restricting budgets in contrast to the ‘active part’ they 
had taken regarding specific armaments.  He expressed some surprise Russia made no 
effort to support the proposal to ban submarines, even though that subject was 
explicitly mentioned in the Tsar’s list of subjects for consideration.  Restating and 
paraphrasing Mahan’s vehement opposition to the declaration to ban the use of poison 
gas shells, Fisher concluded, ‘No doubt an American invention will shortly appear on 
these lines, and chloroform has already been suggested as the base.’  Fisher declared 
the new convention on maritime warfare was ‘in favour of England, as being the 
strongest belligerent.’  Regarding America’s attempt to introduce discussion of the 
immunity of private property at sea at the conference, Fisher noted that in addition to 
opposing the topic, Mahan also favoured privateering and opposed the Declaration of 
Paris’s principle that a neutral’s flag protects an enemy’s goods on board.  Fisher 
referenced the US Supreme Court’s decision in The Olinde Rodrigues, which 
established ‘a principle very much to the advantage of Great Britain, that for a 
military blockade the presence of one man-of-war is sufficient’.  France and Germany 
had suggested raising the decision for discussion at the conference, but that had not 
occurred.78  Finally, Fisher reported that foreign naval delegates had been impressed 
                                                
77  Fisher, Memorandum (Secret), 22 July 1899, Inclosure 2 to Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, 26 July 1899, FO 412/65, 368-370. 
78 Ibid., 369-371; Tower to Salisbury, 25 May 1899, FO 83/1702. 
The Olinde Rodriques involved the seizure of a Spanish ship during the 
Spanish-American War.  The critical issue was whether one warship outside an 
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with the Royal Navy’s readiness for war during the Fashoda crisis.  He understood the 
arbitration convention allowed ‘absolute freedom of action’ during any period of 
arbitration and that how well prepared a nation was for war would influence any 
arbitration.79 
Charles á Court, who had been providing memoranda to Salisbury throughout 
the conference, reported separately on naval topics.  The US presented a new concern.  
Despite statements that the US stood apart from Europe, á Court viewed its proposal 
for the inviolability of private property at sea as insincere.   Moreover, Mahan had 
told á Court the US would never discuss any limitation of naval armaments.  Mahan 
asserted the ‘vital interests’ of the US ‘now lie East and West, and no longer North 
and South; that the great question of the immediate future is China, … and this will 
entail a very considerable increase in her naval forces in the Pacific, which again must 
influence the naval arrangements of at least five Powers.’ 80 
                                                                                                                                      
enemy harbor could constitute an ‘effective’ blockade.  The US Supreme Court held 
‘an effective blockade is a blockade so effective as to make it dangerous in fact for 
vessels to attempt to enter the blockaded port, … the question of effectiveness is not 
controlled by the number of the blockading force.’  The Olinde Rodriques, 174 U.S. 
510 (1899), reprinted in Charles H. Stockton, ed., Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
and Other Opinions and Precedents (Washington, DC:  GPO, 1904), 40-58.  France 
realized that under this decision, ‘Great Britain could readily in time of war maintain 
a blockade, effective for war purposes, of all the coasts of Europe simultaneously.’  
Tower to Salisbury, 25 May 1899, FO 83/1702.  The British Foreign Office’s legal 
advisor questioned the reasoning of the decision, but recognized it was favorable, 
concluding ‘although we may in the abstract disagree with [the reasoning], we should 
rather gain than lose practically were it established.’  Davidson, Memorandum, 6 June 
1899, ibid.  
79  Fisher, Memorandum (Secret), 22 July 1899, Inclosure 2 to Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, 26 July 1899, FO 412/65, 371. 
80 á Court, ‘Note on the Limitation of Armaments’, 29 July 1899, Inclosure to 
Pauncefote to Salisbury, 31 July 1899, FO 412/65, 415-416.  Mahan was referring to 
France, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia obtaining concessions and areas of 
commercial influence in China following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.  
Japan also desired a piece of the Chinese markets.  With the acquisition of the 
Philippines, the US now joined fully in the competition.  See Robert Seager II, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan:  The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 
1977), 410-411, 459-460. 
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Fisher received formal accolades for his work,81 as well as more personal 
thanks.  After receiving Fisher’s memoranda, Salisbury thanked him for his 
‘important services’ and invited him to the Foreign Office before departing to his new 
command.82  Pauncefote told him ‘there were many enquiries about you & pleasant 
things said’ at the concluding dinner he had missed at The Hague.83  Sir Henry 
Howard had become friends with Fisher, and thanked him for speaking to Salisbury 
about Howard’s desire to be appointed Britain’s representative in Vienna.84 
The US delegation’s post-conference actions contrast starkly with Britain’s, 
especially the views expressed concerning its naval delegate, Mahan.  Any 
appearance of solidarity and cordiality within the delegation began to disappear.  Like 
Fisher, Mahan wrote two memoranda regarding naval matters.  Unlike Fisher’s 
reports, Mahan’s were defensive.  His first report related to discussions on 
disarmament and proposed limitations on naval weapons.  According to Mahan, 
because it proved impossible to describe limitations in detail, ‘insurmountable 
obstacles were encountered’.  He spent a considerable portion of his first report 
defending his vote against banning asphyxiating gases, because ‘a certain disposition 
has been observed to attach odium to the view adopted’.  He summarized the reasons 
for his vote.  He noted that while the American delegates freely joined in the 
discussions regarding particular armaments, they refrained from discussions relating 
to disarmament and budgets.85   
In his second report, Mahan defended his positions on adaptation of the 1864 
Geneva Convention to naval warfare and protection of neutral vessels engaged in 
saving seaman of sunk or destroyed ships following battle.  The ten articles in the 
proposed convention allowed for a repeat of the Deerhound affair during the 
                                                
81  See Pauncefote and Howard to Salisbury, 31 July 1899, Correspondence 
Respecting 1899 Conference, 354; Foreign Office to Admiralty, 9 Aug. 1899, ibid., 
355; Neale to Fisher, 14 Aug. 1899, FISR 1/1, f. 73. 
82 Sanderson (on behalf of Salisbury) to Fisher, 28 July 1899, FISR 1/1, f. 71. 
83 Pauncefote to Fisher, 30 July 1899, FISR 1/1, f. 72. 
84 Howard to Fisher, 1 Aug. 1899, FISR 3/1, f. 10.  Howard was not appointed to the 
post. 
85  Mahan, ‘Report … with Reference to Navies’, 31 July 1899, in Scott, ed., 
Instructions, 35-38.  Mahan’s undated mostly handwritten draft of this report is in 
container 214, Holls/Harvard Papers. 
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American Civil War.  He decried the failure of the proposed convention to explicitly 
address neutral hospital ships at the scene of a naval battle.  He was forced by the 
American delegation to withdraw his three additional articles to remedy these 
deficiencies.  Still, his ‘personal opinion’ was that Articles 3 and 6 of the proposed 
convention should not be accepted by the US.86 
White drafted the delegation’s official report to Secretary Hay.  He ‘was 
especially embarrassed by the fact that the wording of it must be suited to the scruples 
of my colleague, Captain Mahan.’  Mahan ‘had very little, if any, sympathy with the 
main purposes of the conference, and has not hesitated to declare his disbelief in some 
of the measures which we were especially instructed to press.’87  The delegation’s 
refusal to sign the second and third conventions was based on the positions of Mahan 
and Crozier.  Although the conference had refused to provide a full hearing and 
discussion of the immunity of private property at sea, it had approved referring the 
topic to a future conference and so the delegation ‘was able at least to keep the subject 
before the world.’88  After receiving the draft report, Mahan opposed pages that 
described the advantages of arbitration as adopted at the conference.  Worn down by 
Mahan and doubts expressed by Low, White ‘did not care to the contest the matter’, 
and so the final report eliminated ‘several pages’ of the original draft.89 
However, White advised Hay of his personal views regarding the delegation’s 
positions, telling him the second and third conventions should be signed.  He thought 
Crozier in fact would agree.90  He asserted that a ‘larger view’ than Mahan’s should 
be adopted with regard to the convention adapting the laws of war to naval conflict.  
White found the delegation’s positions regarding the declarations on expanding 
bullets and asphyxiating gases ‘embarrassing’.  He described Mahan’s arguments 
                                                
86  Mahan, ‘Report … Regarding the Work of the Second Committee of the 
Conference’, 31 July 1899, ibid., 38-43. 
87 White, Autobiography, II:  347. 
88 White, ‘Report to the Secretary of State’, 31 July 1899, in Scott, ed., Instructions, 
20-21, 24-25. 
89 White, Autobiography, II:  348. 
90 Indeed, Crozier had told his superior he did not think the revised articles of the laws 
of war on land contained anything the Army would find objectionable.  Crozier to 
Corbin, 19 July 1899, reel 11, vol. 18, Hay Papers. 
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against the declaration on asphyxiating gases as ‘fatally defective’ and illogical.  He 
concluded:  ‘While there were evident differences of opinion between the Captain 
[Mahan] and some others of us relating to various important questions, … I write this 
from a feeling of duty to the country and to the administration in order to show you 
how the whole matter, in the large, on a calm and cool review looks to me.’91 
When Mahan learned Low had told President McKinley the convention on the 
laws of naval warfare should be signed, he immediately wrote Secretary of the Navy 
Long to explain the grounds for his opposition.  Mahan’s letter suggested that his 
concerns regarding the proposed convention on the laws of naval warfare were more 
academic than real.92  When Low questioned his opposition to the convention, Mahan 
responded, ‘present political expediency … is [not] a sufficient cause for entailing 
upon the future grave international complications.’  Low asserted it was ‘better that 
we should join in a general movement along the lines that have commanded such 
wide adherence, rather than stand aside altogether.’93  Meanwhile, overweening 
political activist Holls met with Assistant Secretary of State Hill and told him of the 
events at the conference.  Holls also met with President McKinley and gave him a full 
report, including the issues regarding Article 27.94 
Three months later, Mahan published an article belittling the convention on 
international arbitration.  He believed that nations should retain the right to resort to 
war as opposed to submitting disputes to arbitration.95  Low and Holls countered with 
articles extolling the conference’s accomplishments.  Holls asserted that by 
consenting to the delegation’s reservation on Article 27, the Monroe Doctrine had 
                                                
91 White to Hay, 8 Aug. 1899, box 86, reel 78, White Papers. 
92 Mahan to Long, 27 Sept. 1899, LP/ATM,II:  659-60. 
93 Low to Mahan, 28 Sept. 1899, box 14, Low Papers. 
94 Holls to White, 21 Sept. 1899, box 20, vol. 19, Holls/Columbia Papers. 
95 A.T. Mahan, ‘The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of War’, The North 
American Review 169, no. 515 (Oct. 1899):  433-447. 
Although he did not write at the time, Crozier likely opposed the arbitration 
convention as much as Mahan.  See William Crozier, ‘International Settlements’, The 
North American Review 199, no.703 (June 1914):  857-865. 
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been officially recognized by the international community for the first time.96  Low 
defended the delegation’s positions and generally applauded the conference’s 
outcome.97  He sent a copy of his article to President McKinley and urged ratification 
of the arbitration convention.98  All pretenses of civility and collegiality disappeared 
after Holls published a book claiming credit for saving the Monroe Doctrine.99  
Publication unleashed a virtual firestorm of controversy within the delegation.  While 
the primary antagonists were Holls and Mahan, the entire delegation became 
entangled in the correspondence.  Threats and colorful insults were made.  Newel, for 
example, described Holls’ conduct as ‘one of the coolest manifestations of 
unadulterated cheek I have ever known, & I graduated from Yale College and have 
lived in the wild west [Minnesota] for 46 years.’100  When the controversy threatened 
to explode into litigation, White wrote separately to Holls and Mahan suggesting that 
a way be found to close the matter.101  Several months later, White withdrew his most 
serious charges, ending the matter.102   
Mahan then made an unprecedented direct approach to the British government 
for assistance in changing America’s support for the immunity of private property 
principle.  On 26 November, Mahan wrote to Balfour.103  Balfour sent Mahan’s letter 
to Goschen and asked for observations.104  Goschen had ‘never read a more obscure & 
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97 Seth Low, ‘The International Conference of Peace’, The North American Review 
169, no. 516 (Nov. 1899):  625-639. 
98 Low to McKinley, 22 Nov. 1899, box 14, Low Papers. 
99 Frederick W. Holls, The Peace Conference at The Hague (New York:  Macmillan, 
1900), 269-275. 
100 Newel to White, 20 Feb. 1901, box 92, reel 83, White Papers. 
101 White to Mahan, 17 Jan. 1902, box 10, folder 4, RSDM/NWC; White to Holls, 6 
Jan. 1902, container 245, Holls/Harvard Papers. 
102 Mahan to Holls, 12 Mar. 1902, LP/ATM,III:  13-14; Holls to Mahan 14 Mar. 1902, 
Mahan Papers.  Although Holls said he would change the language in the next edition 
of his book (see Crozier to Mahan, 16 Apr. 1901, Mahan Papers), he died suddenly in 
July 1903 without ever publishing a second edition. 
103 See Balfour to Mahan, 20 Dec. 1899, Add MSS 49742, ff. 249-258, AJB/BL 
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badly written letter than Mahan’s.  What on earth does he mean?’105  Balfour thought 
Mahan’s points were that the United States’ traditional support for the immunity of 
private property at sea was a mistake, especially for Britain and the US – both sea 
powers – who might find themselves at war in the Far East as allies against Russia.  
Mahan, therefore, hoped the US would change its position for the benefit of the two 
nations’ joint interests with Britain’s support.106  Goschen responded that Balfour 
should only indicate agreement with Mahan’s view and that the Admiralty deprecated 
any change in Britain’s long-standing opposition to the principle.107  When he finally 
responded, Balfour told Mahan naval opinion in Britain supported Mahan’s position 
and the Admiralty ‘would be unanimous in deprecating any change.’  However, ‘In 
my own mind I am not absolutely sure that they are right’.108  Balfour still harboured 
reservations concerning Britain’s traditional position on the issue, as expressed almost 
exactly a year earlier to Salisbury. 
The decision to accede to any of the conventions or declarations adopted at the 
conference proceeded differently in the US and Great Britain.  In Britain, the 
proposed conventions and declarations received a full ventilation and analysis.  The 
Admiralty opposed signing the convention on maritime warfare unless Article X was 
excluded.  It was agreeable to prohibiting launching high explosives from balloons for 
five years, but not the other declarations.109  The Law Officers approved signing the 
arbitration convention without reservation. 110   Pauncefote thought the maritime 
warfare convention should be signed without any reservation.  He spoke with DNI 
Custance and wrote a memorandum arguing that Article X did not implicate the 
Deerhound situation and only appropriate legislation was required to give effect to the 
Article.  He suggested asking the Law Officers for their opinion.111  After considering 
the issue, the Law Officers agreed with the Admiralty that the convention on the laws 
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of naval warfare could be signed except for Article X, which could not be agreed to 
because it would ‘require legislation of a kind very difficult to frame or carry through’ 
and was not ‘sound in principle’.112  Salisbury then decided that all three conventions 
should be signed, but with a reservation that Britain did not accept Article X of the 
convention on maritime warfare.  The government would not sign any of the three 
declarations.113  After all the other signatories agreed to its reservation, Great Britain 
signed the three conventions, excluding Article X of the maritime convention.114 
In contrast, the US approached the conventions with some indifference.  
Despite the reports from Holls (or perhaps because of them) McKinley and Hay 
showed little interest in the conference’s outcome.115  Assistant Secretary Hill thought 
it would be useful to ‘have a few Senators sufficiently interested to see that [the 
treaty] not be allowed to fail because of lack of interest.’116  In his annual message to 
Congress, McKinley expressed support for the arbitration convention and the new 
maritime warfare convention.117  The Senate approved the arbitration convention and 
the five-year prohibition against the use of balloons to deliver explosives on 5 
February 1900.  In April, McKinley sent the maritime warfare convention to the 
Senate, which quickly approved a month later.118 
Re-evaluation:  Fisher and Mahan at the Conference 
The participation of Fisher and Mahan at the 1899 Conference has not been 
carefully analysed.  What little examination that has occurred regarding Fisher is 
based on uncertain evidence resulting in questionable conclusions.  For example, 
Ruddock MacKay overstates Fisher’s actions regarding the proposed convention on 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes.  He claims ‘that Fisher, who knew 
that Goschen was a “determined opponent” of the proposal, worked in the lobbies 
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against it.’ Mackay bases his assertion on a partial English translation of a report by 
Count Hatzfeldt to German Chancellor von Hohenlohe.119  But that report is based on 
White’s autobiography, which does not support Mackay’s broader assertion. 120   
Avner Offer has summed up the traditional view as, ‘“Jacky” Fisher was no respecter 
of the laws of war.’121  However, Fisher was not the wild-eyed fanatic of unrestrained 
warfare as traditionally portrayed.   
In contrast, Mahan was an obstinate opponent of any potential limitations that 
might touch upon any naval matter.  He was an embarrassment to his American 
colleagues and caused significant friction within the delegation.  Even Fisher thought 
some of Mahan’s proposals were outlandish.  Overall, Mahan’s role has been more 
accurately portrayed, but the reasons for his actions inaccurately described.   
Three pieces of evidence are consistently relied upon regarding Fisher’s views 
on the laws of naval warfare and his conduct at The Hague.  When carefully 
examined, none are convincing or reliable.  The first is his questionable memoirs, 
written twenty years later, in which he asserted he fought against peace at the 
conference.122  The inaccuracies in these recollections regarding Fisher’s appointment 
already have been shown.   
His statements regarding fighting against peace similarly are questionable.  
Fisher and his biographers consistently rely on an article written by his close friend, 
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journalist W.T. Stead, after Fisher retired from the Admiralty in 1910.123  This 
laudatory article devoted less than two pages to Fisher’s conduct at The Hague.124  
Fisher’s first biographer described his participation at the 1899 Conference in less 
than three pages, most of which is a lengthy quotation from Stead’s article.125  
Ruddock Mackay devoted less than seven pages of his biography of Fisher to the 
1899 Conference.  Most of his account of Fisher’s conduct is based on Stead’s article 
or a report prepared by Germany’s naval delegate, the latter of which forms the third 
piece of evidence.126 
Stead’s article is the basis for an alleged statement Fisher made at the 
Conference that ‘was considered totally unfit for publication’, responding to another 
delegate’s speech about ‘the humanising of war’.127  If Fisher had uttered the 
statement, some contemporary record of it should exist, particularly in some 
newspaper article.  But none has been found.  As Mackay noted, the alleged 
pronouncement ‘is coloured with Fisher’s phraseology of the post-1904 period.’128  
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Stead also quotes Fisher as saying if you tell the enemy you ‘intend to be first in and 
hit your enemy in the belly and kick him when he is down, and boil your prisoners in 
oil (if you take any!), and torture his women and children, then people will keep clear 
of you.’129  As Mackay concluded, ‘The implication that Fisher declared these views 
in a formal session of the conference should be treated with considerable reserve.’130 
Siegel’s report of his conversations with Fisher also does not provide reliable 
evidence of Fisher’s actual views.  Fisher spoke to Siegel in the greatest confidence 
and more than once asked that his conversations be treated as confidential and not 
disclosed to Pauncefote or other delegates.131  Fisher claimed that after arriving in 
London from the West Indies, he told Goschen that only ‘might makes right’, and if 
Goschen did not agree with his views, he could appoint someone else to command the 
Mediterranean fleet.132  Given Fisher’s joy at receiving the ‘tip-top’ command in the 
Royal Navy, it is unlikely he said anything of this nature to Goschen.  Moreover, 
Siegel’s complete report in German reveals that most of Fisher’s conversation 
consisted of arguments why Germany should not support America’s position on the 
immunity of private property at sea and why French plans for a guerre de course 
against Britain would fail.133 
Importantly, as Stead recognized, ‘Fisher was fond of saying things in a way 
to make them stick without much caring whether his hearers would take him seriously 
or not.’134  Fisher’s fondness has created difficulties for historians to discern whether 
he really meant what he was writing or purportedly saying at a particular time.  
Fisher’s statements often have been accepted without carefully considering their 
context or his actual intentions.  In fact, he made many of his pronouncements for 
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effect.135  Fisher believed in deterrence as a means to avoid war.  His statements were 
calculated to convince his listeners that here was someone (and a navy and nation) 
that would do anything in war, regardless of legality.136  One scholar has argued 
recently that Fisher engaged in a deterrence policy against Germany between 1904 
and 1908 by making outrageous utterances intended to provoke German reaction.137  
Fisher did the same at the 1899 Conference.138  He likely made some outlandish 
declarations privately during the conference for effect.  But that does not mean Fisher 
actually intended to act in such a manner in war or that such statements reveal his true 
intentions or views regarding the laws of naval warfare.   
Fisher was a combat veteran and had lost men under his command.  When he 
met Ambassador White early in the conference, Fisher said ‘that he was thoroughly 
for peace, and had every reason to be so, since he knew something of the horrors of 
war.’139  Avowed peace activist Baroness Bertha von Suttner regretted Fisher’s 
absence from a party more than half way through the conference, because ‘he is one 
of the jolliest of the dancers’.140  Holls grew fonder of Fisher every time he saw 
him.141  Holls and Suttner’s favourable views of Fisher are unlikely if he was the 
rabid advocate of unbridled war as he later portrayed himself and as characterized by 
others. 
Furthermore, the conference records do not show Fisher as the proponent of 
unrestricted warfare that he, and others, later described him to be.  Fisher’s alleged 
war against peace is belied by his conduct as a negotiator and go-between with the 
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Admiralty and the government.  Certainly, Fisher followed the Admiralty’s views on 
most issues that were raised in the commissions and sub-commissions to which he 
was assigned.  However, the Admiralty did not always follow Fisher’s 
recommendations and on occasion criticized his views.  Concerning discussions on 
limitations on the calibre of naval guns, for example, DNI Custance said, ‘Fisher has 
clearly mixed up with it the question of armour.’142  When it came to consideration of 
adaptation of the laws of land war to naval warfare, the Admiralty held a much harder 
stance than Fisher.  Fisher surely knew the Royal Navy was constrained by its civilian 
masters.  Neither he nor the Admiralty could ignore an international treaty or 
limitations on naval warfare simply because it might suit them in time of war.  His 
conduct and experiences at the 1899 Conference, therefore, do not support the 
traditional view that Fisher was ‘no respecter of the laws of war’.  Rather, Fisher’s 
actions at the conference – and thereafter – show him as understanding the potential 
implications of the laws of naval warfare for naval planning. 
In contrast, Mahan’s conduct at the 1899 Conference has been accurately 
described as ‘a conscience operating not in behalf of peace but in behalf of the 
unfettered exercise of belligerent power.’143  ‘Mahan used his ten weeks of leisure at 
The Hague to … sabotage as best he could American adherence to any decision the 
conference threatened to reach that tended to ameliorate the harshness of war.’144  
However, it is not accurate to conclude, ‘What Mahan did at The Hague, therefore, 
and did most effectively, was to prevent the other members of the American 
delegation from making fools of themselves with the politicians, statesmen, and 
businessmen back home.’145  Mahan cared little about preventing anyone from 
making fools of themselves.  He cared only about his navy and its future.  Mahan’s 
actions at the conference are better understood in light of his views regarding the role 
he wanted the US Navy to play on the world stage. 
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Mahan was just not any naval delegate.  He was the prophet of American sea 
power.146  Mahan was a ‘Neo-Hamiltonian’, a member of a school of thought that 
arose from the sudden American involvement in world politics at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Neo-Hamiltonians ‘saw international politics as basically a 
struggle among independent nations with interests which not infrequently brought 
them into conflict with each other.’  Mahan attempted to bridge the gap between the 
military and civilian worlds.  He was a prophet of military expansion and tried to 
build a nexus between the US Navy and the general community.147  Mahan wanted 
the US to have a first-rate, blue-water navy.  His opposition to rules to make war 
more humane, to arbitration, and to the immunity of private property at sea was 
consistent with his view that the US needed a large navy.148  As he later told President 
Theodore Roosevelt, ‘[W]hat was expedient to our weakness of a century ago is not 
expedient to our strength today.  Rather should we seek to withdraw from our old 
position of the flag covering the goods.  We need to fasten our grip on the sea.’149  
Accordingly, Mahan took it upon himself to ensure that nothing occurred at 
the conference that might hamper or restrict the US Navy.  Mahan knew what he 
wanted the Navy to become and the role he wanted it to play.  Indeed, Mahan justified 
his positions regarding arms limitations to Fisher writing, ‘the conditions which 
constitute the necessity for a navy, and control its development, have within the past 
year changed for the United States, so markedly, that it is impossible yet to foresee, 
with certainty, what degree of naval strength may be needed to meet them.’150  
Granting immunity to private property at sea was a proposal Mahan would never 
support, because it was a ‘small navy’ policy.  Similarly, that an editorial in a foreign 
newspaper caused Mahan to suddenly realize the alleged risk to the Monroe Doctrine 
arising from the word ‘duty’ in Article 27 is difficult to believe.  Rather, he more 
likely had been searching for some basis to prevent the US from signing the 
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arbitration convention, for two reasons.  First, Mahan was an opponent of 
international arbitration of disputes between nations as a general proposition.151  Such 
a requirement would adversely influence the need for a large navy and its ability to 
plan for immediate operations should war loom on the horizon.  Second, enforcement 
of the Monroe Doctrine required a larger navy and effective planning to ensure the 
US could exclude any European power from unwanted expansion into the North 
American region.152  By coercing the US delegation to insert the reservation regarding 
the Monroe Doctrine, Mahan furthered the need for a navy beyond the small defence-
oriented force that had been the US Navy’s traditional role.  In acting as he did, 
Mahan ensured that the laws of naval warfare would have as minimal impact as 
possible on the development of the US Navy and on its strategic planning for the 
future, regardless of where and what that future might be.    
Conclusion 
The traditional retrospective view of the 1899 Conference has been that it was 
a waste of time.153  Marder encapsulated it simply as a ‘fiasco’.154  Although the 
tangible accomplishments of the 1899 Conference seem limited, ‘the precedents it 
established … paved the way for further advances in international law’.155  This was 
especially true regarding the laws of naval warfare.  Great Britain agreed to discuss 
issues of international law for the first time in nearly fifty years.  The delegates 
reached agreement adapting the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, the first 
international treaty affecting naval warfare since the Declaration of Paris.  More 
importantly, the countries present discussed international agreements on a variety of 
aspects of naval warfare, including reduction of expenditures, naval weapon systems, 
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and permitted acts during war.  While few of these discussions ended in agreement, 
nearly all were referred to the next international conference, which was expected to 
take place in a few years.156  The 1899 Conference, therefore, set the stage for much 
study and analysis, and opened the door for future discussion and consideration.  By 
ignoring the 1899 Conference, naval historians have ignored its foundational aspects. 
A few weeks after the conference, Mahan wrote, ‘The Conference itself was 
very well for a time, and interesting in a way; but ten weeks of it was rather too 
much.’157  His low-key description belied the important and controversial role he had 
played and would continue to play.  Mahan acted as one man’s navy – his vision of 
what the US Navy should become.  In doing so, he ignored his instructions and did 
not allow any opposition or lack of approbation from within the US delegation or 
other nations deter his efforts.  He worked to ensure that nothing in the laws of naval 
warfare or any other international declaration or convention adopted would impinge 
upon the US Navy’s freedom of action or ability to grow into a blue-water navy.  
Mahan made sure the 1899 Conference closed no doors for the US Navy – his navy.  
In this undertaking, he generally succeeded. 
For the Royal Navy, the conference was a mixed outcome.  The Admiralty 
reluctantly accepted adaptation of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare.  It 
appeared to have successfully defended its positions favouring belligerent rights and 
unfettered naval action in time of war, but many important topics had simply been 
deferred to a future conference.  As a delegate, Fisher had gained insights into civilian 
and military views of international law and had experienced the give and take of 
diplomacy.  But the greater significance for the Royal Navy was that it had been 
forced to participate for the first time in an international conference discussing the 
conduct of naval warfare.  It no longer possessed the relative aloofness it had enjoyed 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Over the next ten years, Fisher, the 
Admiralty, and the British government would devote enormous time and resources 
considering international law and naval warfare.  The 1899 Conference was just the 
first period of a long match. 
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Neither Great Britain nor the United States were idle regarding the laws of 
naval warfare during the years that preceded the call for the 1907 Hague Conference.  
Both nations and their navies engaged in theoretical planning and analysis about the 
laws of naval warfare during this period.  Each also experienced the practical 
application of the laws of naval warfare as a belligerent and as a neutral during war.  
These theoretical and practical experiences informed the positions the two nations and 
their navies would take regarding the laws of naval warfare in succeeding years. 
This chapter considers four overlapping examples of theory and practice of the 
laws of naval warfare between late 1899 and 1905.  The first case study is one of 
practical application.  Soon after the 1899 Conference ended, Great Britain found 
itself at war in South Africa.  As a result of its assertion of the belligerent right to 
search and seize neutral ships suspected of carrying contraband, England faced 
objections from neutrals and learned the limitations of belligerent rights.  The second 
example is the preparation of a naval war code by the United States.  The US Naval 
War Code of 1900 generated much international interest, but ultimately was rescinded 
after it failed to gain acceptance by other nations.  As the war in South Africa wound 
down, Britain studied protection of its merchant fleet and the vulnerability of its food 
supplies during war under existing international law.  These theoretical studies form 
the third example and reveal Britain’s expectation that nations would generally adhere 
to international law during war.  The final case study, one of practical application, is 
the Russo-Japanese War, in which Britain and the US were neutrals.  Both countries 
successfully insisted that Russia adhere to established principles of international law.  
Practice:  The South African War 
Great Britain became a belligerent in a major conflict for the first time since 
the Crimean War after the South African Boers declared war in October 1899.  
Having defended belligerent rights at the 1899 Conference, England now had an 
opportunity to exercise them.  But the Boers had no navy to engage and defeat on the 
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high seas.  They had no ports for the Royal Navy to blockade.  They possessed no 
merchant ships for the Royal Navy to seize.  The Boers’ source of sea-borne 
commerce only was through the neutral port of Lorenço Marques on Delagoa Bay in 
Portuguese East Africa.  At best, Britain could seize contraband on neutral ships 
bound for Lorenço Marques that would be then shipped on land to the Boers.   
Thus, the war hardly seemed one in which important issues of the laws of 
naval warfare might arise.  Indeed, Prime Minister Salisbury initially took the position 
that neutral ships should not be searched.  Miscommunications, however, led the 
Royal Navy commander in South Africa to exercise belligerent rights aggressively.  
The high commissioner in South Africa compounded the problem by believing 
provisions had been declared contraband, thereby authorizing the seizure of neutral 
ships headed for Lorenço Marques with cargoes of food.  The Law Officers quickly 
opined that food could only be considered contraband if proof existed it was bound 
for the use of enemy forces.  Salisbury then changed his mind and decided the right of 
search and seizure should be exercised if there was a reasonable basis for believing 
that contraband was on board a ship destined for the Boers, including food that could 
be used by enemy troops.  When a shipment of munitions and provisions was 
rumoured en route to Delagoa Bay, Salisbury directed that all neutral ships in South 
African waters be stopped and searched and any contraband believed destined for the 
Boers seized.  The Law Officers then declared that food could be seized only if 
absolute proof existed it was to be used by the enemy.  Although reluctant to 
withdraw his directive, Salisbury relented in the face of opposition from within the 
cabinet, including Goschen, who was concerned about setting dangerous precedents 
that would antagonize neutrals.1 
Thus matters sat from late October until early December 1899.  The Law 
Officers then provided comments on a previously issued proclamation prohibiting any 
British subject from trading with the enemy.  They responded that ‘trade between 
British subjects whether as shipowners or shippers, and the enemy’ was prohibited 
‘whether the ship carrying the goods sails from a port of departure in the United 
Kingdom or abroad.’  However, neutrals could trade with the Boers.  The government 
had decided that ‘the destination of the ship is not conclusive for purposes of Prize 
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Law as to the destination of the goods.’2  However, British prize law provided, ‘The 
destination of the Vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the Goods on board.’  
The Naval Prize Manual also stated that if the ‘ostensible’ destination of a neutral 
ship was a neutral port, but the vessel ‘in reality intended … to proceed with the same 
cargo to an Enemy port’, then the voyage would be ‘held to be “Continuous,” and the 
destination is held to be Hostile throughout.’3  Britain was expanding its application 
of the continuous voyage doctrine to align more closely with the positions of the US 
during the American Civil War.  The Law Officers warned that the country had ‘far 
more to lose than to gain’ and ‘the immediate gain is quite disproportionate to the 
ultimate and prospective loss’ from expanding the doctrine of continuous voyage.  
The doctrine had ‘not hitherto been accepted law’ and was contrary to the Admiralty’s 
instructions to its ships’ captains.  Because of the size of Britain’s merchant navy, the 
doctrine would limit Britain’s sea borne commerce when it was a neutral in war.  The 
report urged a conference between the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Admiralty 
to consider this issue and decide the appropriate course of action.4  Unfortunately, the 
warning and suggestion came one day too late. 
 On the same day the Cabinet received the Law Officers’ report, HMS 
Partridge seized the British merchant ship Mashona and the Dutch vessel Maria.  
American companies owned most of the cargo on both ships, including substantial 
quantities of foodstuffs, at least some of which was destined for one of the Boer 
republics.  Despite being bound from one neutral port to another, the ships and all 
their cargo were sent to a prize court for violating British law against trading with the 
enemy.  The Royal Navy also intercepted and off-loaded cargo – mainly food – on 
board the British steamer Beatrice consigned to a Portuguese firm in Lorenço 
Marques.  Again, this cargo was owned and shipped by an American company.  The 
companies whose cargo had been seized promptly complained to the US and 
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demanded an explanation and compensation.5  After confirming that the companies 
were American entities and none of the seized cargo was contraband, Secretary of 
State Hay instructed Ambassador Joseph Choate in England ‘to bring the matter to the 
attention of the British Government, and to inquire as to the circumstances and 
legality of the seizure.  If it was illegal, you will request prompt action and restitution 
in the case.’6 
Salisbury’s government did not immediately respond to the United States’ 
queries.  The lack of a clear and coherent policy regarding search and seizure of 
neutral ships was causing more issues.  The Admiralty telegraphed that the German 
mail steamer Bundesrath had sailed through Aden for Delagoa Bay reportedly 
carrying ammunition and suspected combatants.  Concerns existed over a supply 
route bringing trained military personnel and weapons through the Suez Canal and 
past Aden.7  For the Admiralty, it may have been an intelligent use of naval power to 
disrupt any such possibility, regardless of the diplomatic consequences.  The high 
commissioner and military commander in South Africa clamoured for a blockade of 
Delagoa Bay, the illegality of which Salisbury recognized.8  Arthur Balfour, Leader of 
the House of Commons, instead proposed that the country ‘should ask Germany’s 
consent’ to ‘leas[e] Delagoa Bay by the week for a period, not in any case longer than 
the war, and as much shorter as we choose to make it.’9  Salisbury denigrated the 
proposal, because it had little chance of being approved by Germany or the House of 
Commons and might expand the war to European nations.10  Balfour then withdrew 
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his suggestion, but stated his ‘personal view is that we are more likely to get into 
trouble by doing too little than by doing too much.’  He urged that some ‘scheme for 
dealing promptly and effectually’ with Lorenço Marques be prepared.11 
At the same time, the Law Officers warned the Admiralty of the substantial 
difficulties of searching and seizing neutral ships, including where and how such a 
search could occur and what evidence of ownership of cargo might be presented.12  
These warnings came either too late or were ignored, because a Royal Navy cruiser 
seized the Bundesrath and delivered it to a prize court.13  Germany’s foreign minister 
promptly summoned England’s ambassador, told him of the seizure, assured him the 
ship carried no contraband, and asked that the vessel be released.14  Britain now had 
seized cargo on three vessels owned by neutrals from the US and an entire ship from 
neutral Germany.  Balfour changed his previously aggressive stance and told his uncle 
on New Year’s Day that he was ‘extremely indignant with the Admty for their want of 
foresight in connection with the detention of neutral vessels.  …  In short, if a search 
at sea is impossible & a search in port is illegal, we may as well apologize to the 
Germans and withdraw our cruisers altogether from the neighborhood of Delagoa 
Bay.’15  The next day, Balfour met with Goschen and First Naval Lord Admiral Kerr, 
among others, and ‘cleared up [his] ideas on the law of search on the high seas and 
procedure before Prize Courts.’  He reported that based on what he had learned, ‘the 
“thorough search” of vessels going to Delagoa Bay, for which [he had] been pressing, 
cannot be carried out.’  Balfour concluded that the laws ‘seem ingeniously contrived 
to inflict the maximum inconvenience on Neutrals and to afford the minimum security 
to Belligerents.’16  
Britain still had not responded substantively to either the US or Germany.  The 
Foreign Office told the United States the ‘only information’ it had was that the cargo 
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on the Mashona was seized because it was flour destined for the Boers.17  The US did 
not consider the response adequate, and in three communications dated 2 January 
1900, Hay instructed Choate to ‘bring the matter promptly to the attention’ of the 
British government and to state that the goods seized from all three ships ‘could not 
be considered contraband of war, and therefore not subject to capture.’  Choate was 
‘to request prompt restitution of the goods.’18  Salisbury told Choate he had no 
knowledge of the Beatrice, although the Admiralty likely had information, and that 
the Mashona and Maria were both seized as British ships trading with the enemy in 
violation of British law.  He also suggested it would be difficult to release the cargo 
because they were subject to the ruling of the prize court.  Choate responded that the 
American goods certainly could be released upon order from the prime minister.  
Salisbury had no established view whether the food on the ships could be seized as 
contraband.  However, ‘in the event of a war between Great Britain and any 
continental power it would be a serious detriment both to England and America to 
have had food declared contraband of war.’  Choate told Hay, ‘In view of the serious 
aspect of these seizures as calculated to cause irritation in the United States and 
Germany I think they must come to a prompt decision.’19  Britain was struggling with 
whether to treat food as absolute or conditional contraband.  The Naval Prize Manual 
instructed officers to treat it as conditional contraband, unless a neutral ship’s papers 
revealed that the destination of the vessel, either intermediate or ultimate, was ‘a 
hostile Port used exclusively or mainly for Naval or Military Equipment.’20 
Similarly, Germany demanded the release of the Bundesrath.21  Salisbury 
disingenuously told Germany’s ambassador he ‘had no information on the subject’ 
beyond suspicions the ship was carrying ammunition.22  The Bundesrath presented a 
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particular problem because it also was carrying mail on behalf of the German postal 
system.  The issue was whether the mail could be searched for communications 
intended for the enemy, which might reveal the intended destination for any 
conditional contraband on board.  Diplomatic communications between a neutral and 
enemy government normally could not be searched.23  Salisbury therefore directed 
that the naval officer present should confer with the German consul to facilitate the 
‘speedy dispatch’ of the ship’s mails.24   
Matters soon went from bad to worse.  The Royal Navy detained the German 
mail steamer General on ‘strong suspicion’ of carrying contraband.25  Germany 
reacted quickly to this further affront as well as the continuing failure to release the 
Bundesrath.  Count Hatzfeldt, Germany’s ambassador in London, told Salisbury that 
because the Bundesrath was travelling between two neutral ports it therefore could 
not be carrying contraband ‘according to recognized principles of international law.’  
Salisbury previously had rejected Germany’s position.26  Hatzfeldt now pointed out 
that Britain had rejected the American concept of ‘continuous voyage’ in 1863 and 
quoted from the Admiralty’s 1866 ‘Manual of Naval Prize Law’.  He therefore 
demanded the immediate release of the Bundesrath.27  Indeed, Great Britain’s Naval 
Prize Manual of 1888 did not authorize the seizure of neutral ships bound for a neutral 
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port unless an intermediate or ultimate destination was an enemy port.28  When 
Germany learned of the seizure of the General, Hatzfeldt demanded that ship’s 
immediate release.  He also asked Salisbury to instruct British warships ‘to respect the 
rules of international law, and to place no further impediments in the way of the trade 
between neutrals.’29  Britain’s ambassador was summoned in Berlin and reminded 
that even if contraband was on board, Great Britain had no authority to seize a neutral 
ship travelling between two neutral ports, citing the seizure of the Springbok during 
the American Civil War.30 
Although the Admiralty had sent the Foreign Office a draft order directing that 
no further neutral ships bound for South African waters be searched,31 on 6 January 
the Royal Navy seized another German mail steamer, the Herzog.32  The German 
Empress had sponsored a Red Cross Society group on board the ship.  Germany’s 
Foreign Minister von Bülow demanded its prompt release, the payment of 
compensation for losses incurred as a result of the unlawful seizures, and assurances 
such events would not happen again.33  Meanwhile, no contraband was found on the 
General and its cargo was re-stowed so that the ship could continue.34 
Still, tensions – and tempers – were increasing.  The note Salisbury received 
regarding seizure of the General was ‘of a tone very unusual in diplomatic 
correspondence’.35  The note was ‘worded in so abrupt a manner, and couched in 
language which imputed to Her Majesty’s Naval Commanders that they had shown a 
disrespect to international law, and placed unnecessary impediments in the way of 
neutral commerce.’ 36   Although Salisbury advised that the prize court would 
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adjudicate the fate of the Herzog, the Admiralty was directed on the same date to 
order the ship’s peremptory release.37  
Only the Bundesrath now remained in British hands.  Salisbury rejected 
Hatzfeldt’s contention that the seizure was contrary to the position the government 
had taken regarding the Springbok.  Salisbury asserted the British government had 
never objected to the decision of the prize court seizing the ship.  In addition, the 
Admiralty’s 1866 ‘Manual of Naval Prize Law’ was not an ‘exhaustive or 
authoritative statement’, and while it may have applied in past wars, it was ‘quite 
inapplicable to the case which has now arisen of war with an inland State’.  
Nevertheless, instructions had been sent repeatedly for the speedy completion of the 
necessary inspection of the ship’s cargo.38  Salisbury ‘would do everything in [his] 
power to avoid, if possible, the recurrence of such incidents as those of the German 
ships recently seized.’39  Salisbury also ordered that no more mail steamers be 
stopped. 40   On 17 January, Salisbury tepidly defended the Royal Navy from 
Germany’s suggestion it had violated international law, saying the government 
‘cannot decide’ whether British naval officers ‘exceeded the right of search accorded 
by international practice to belligerents.’  However, Salisbury also stated the 
government ‘regret the inconvenience which has been caused on the occasion.’41  The 
Bundesrath was released on 18 January, and while Germany disagreed that no 
violation of international law had occurred, the dispute subsided.42  In a speech 
announcing release of the ships and Britain’s expression of regret, Bülow pointed out 
that an unsuccessful attempt had been made at the 1899 Conference to regulate 
maritime warfare.  As a result, ‘in the domain of maritime law, the standard of might 
has yet been by no means superseded by the standard of right.’  Germany would 
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42 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 18 Jan. 1900, ibid., 22; Lascelles to Salisbury, 19 
Jan. 1900, ibid., 23. 
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support an effort at an international conference ‘to regulate, on the one hand, the 
rights and duties of neutrals, and, on the other, the question of private property at sea’ 
and suggested six provisions to govern seizure and inspection of neutral ships by 
belligerents.  Bülow’s proposed provisions suggested acceptance of the doctrine of 
continuous voyage regarding contraband ‘suited for war, and at the same time are 
destined for one of the belligerents’ in return for definite rules on determining the 
ship’s destination.  Improper seizures were to result in compensation from the 
belligerent.  He also demanded compensation from Britain for the seizures of the 
Bundesrath, Herzog, and General.43  The provisions Bülow proposed closely mirror 
the articles eventually agreed in the Declaration of London nine years later.44  The 
failure to reach an agreement on the laws of naval warfare at the 1899 Conference had 
contributed to the uncertainties and diplomatic disagreements.  
Salisbury also faced pressure regarding the seizure of American-owned 
cargoes on British or neutral vessels.  Britain’s position was that foodstuffs bound for 
a belligerent could only be contraband if they were destined for use by the enemy’s 
forces; the fact they were capable of being so utilized was insufficient.  Choate told 
Salisbury claims likely would be made against Great Britain for damages.  Salisbury 
suggested Britain might purchase the goods from the American owners.45  Still, he 
provided little information regarding the status of the seizures.  Choate complained 
about the lack of progress.46  Salisbury continued to delay and said that while he had 
received additional information regarding the Maria and Beatrice, he could not 
remember it.47  When Hay suggested the seizure of the Beatrice’s cargo conflicted 
with Salisbury’s statement that foodstuffs were not contraband unless intended for the 
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enemy’s forces, Salisbury quickly demurred and said he did not intend any departure 
from his prior statement.48 
While Salisbury was mulling over the demand for damages,49 the Royal Navy 
seized the British steamship Sabine, carrying American cargo allegedly destined for 
the Boers, even though it was to be landed at British ports.50  Britain quickly released 
the ship after the US complained.  In informing Choate that the ship had been 
released, Salisbury said the shipment could viewed as ‘one continuous voyage’ and 
therefore subject to seizure, but ‘his Government did not feel disposed to press that 
point in this instance.’51  In early March, Britain offered to purchase the cargo seized 
from the Beatrice, Maria, and Mashona.52  
By mid-August, Britain had paid for the seized goods.53  President McKinley 
later reported to Congress, ‘Vexatious questions arose through Great Britain’s action 
in respect to neutral cargoes, not contraband in their own nature, shipped to 
Portuguese South Africa, on the score of probable or suspected ultimate destination to 
the Boer States.’  While the incidents had been resolved, the resolution was 
‘unfortunately, without a broad settlement of the question of a neutral’s right to send 
goods not contraband per se to a neutral port adjacent to a belligerent area.’54  
Britain’s assertion of the belligerent right of search and seizure against neutral vessels 
and property, expanding the doctrine of continuous voyage and including food as 
contraband, had failed in the face of opposition from Germany and the US.  Questions 
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of the scope of continuous voyage and the status of food as contraband would 
continue through the 1909 London Conference and have important significance in the 
First World War. 
Theory:  The US Naval War Code of 1900 
While Britain wrestled with the exercise of belligerent rights against neutrals, 
the United States prepared a comprehensive code of laws for naval warfare.  In 
October 1899, Lieutenant Commander William Wirt Kimball made ‘an unofficial 
suggestion … respecting the desirability of the promulgation by the Navy Department 
in some authoritative mode of a body of rules to cover cases of international law of 
probable occurrence in the experience of a naval officer afloat.’  Kimball’s suggestion 
garnered the attention of Secretary of the Navy Long, who referred it to Captain 
Charles H. Stockton, then president of the US Naval War College.  Stockton 
suggested preparation of a comprehensive naval war code ‘substantially upon the 
lines followed in the case of the’ ‘Lieber Code’ of 1863.  Long decided Stockton was 
‘the man to whom the task of drafting such a document should be assigned.’55  
Stockton’s request for assistants was rejected (even Kimball was not interested) and 
he was left to his own devices to obtain any desired background information for the 
project.56  
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By February 1900, word had gotten out that Stockton was preparing a code of 
law for naval warfare.57  Stockton completed his first draft by March 1900.  The draft 
hewed to the United States’ traditional positions regarding privateering, capture of 
enemy merchant ships, and the immunity of private property at sea in time of war.  It 
leaned toward the point of view of a neutral, thereby restricting the freedom of action 
of the Navy as a belligerent.  Article 10 recognized privateers and the crew of vessels 
sailing under letters of marque as members of the armed forces entitled to treatment 
as prisoners of war if captured.  The draft incorporated the American Civil War 
concept of ‘continuous voyage’.58  An effective blockade was one ‘maintained by a 
force sufficient to render hazardous the ingress and egress from the port.’59  This was 
a more lenient standard than generally recognized, and enabled a ‘cruising blockade’ 
consistent with US prize law decisions arising from the Spanish-American War.60  
Stockton also addressed a subject the 1899 Conference had deferred:  his draft code 
limited the right of a belligerent to interrupt submarine telegraph cables to those 
between belligerents or within the territorial waters of a belligerent.  Cables between 
neutrals or within the territorial waters of neutrals were ‘inviolable and free from 
interruption.’61 
Stockton solicited comments from Alfred Thayer Mahan and international law 
professors George G. Wilson, Thomas S. Woolsey, Edward H. Strobel, and John 
Bassett More.62  Mahan’s comments were surprisingly few and rather mild.  On draft 
Article 20, which embodied the principle of the immunity of private property at sea, 
Mahan only drew two lines and a large question mark.  Regarding neutral vessels 
carrying mail, Mahan proposed narrowing the scope of the immunity granted and 
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thought there should be a broader right of search.  Consistent with his failed attempt 
at the 1899 Conference, Mahan thought that draft Article 26, addressing neutral 
vessels at sites of sea battles, should be revised to prevent any recurrence of the 
Deerhound controversy.  He also questioned draft Article 31, which exempted neutral 
vessels in convoys guarded by neutral warships.  He noted, ‘This is a very dangerous 
concession & in my judgment inopportune.’  Mahan’s final comment was on the 
definition of ‘conditional contraband’.  There he noted, ‘In my judgment it is 
inadvisable to lay down antecedent rules about doubtful contraband.’63 
The comments and suggestions from the four university professors were far 
more extensive, although all thought Stockton’s work excellent.  Like Mahan, 
Professor Woolsey objected to immunizing neutral ships in convoy from searches, 
unless provided by a treaty.64  Professor Wilson wrote a five-page response and 
agreed with the need for a separate article dealing with submarine telegraph cables.65  
Professor Strobel pointed out that Article 36, which embraced an expanded doctrine 
of ‘continuous voyage’, was based on court decisions that had been ‘universally 
condemned’.66  Professor Moore suggested that any problems regarding the explicit 
recognition of privateers as members of the armed forces be glossed over by changing 
draft Article 10 to state, ‘The officers and men of all other armed vessels cruising 
under lawful authority.’  Article 12, which allowed crews of captured merchant ships 
to be treated as prisoners of war, was contrary to the position taken by the US during 
the Spanish-American War and was based ‘chiefly on British authority, and seems to 
have no admissibility in principle.’  He also questioned Article 17, which prohibited a 
merchant ship from transferring its flag to that of a neutral after leaving port 
following the commencement of hostilities.  This provision was contrary to both 
English and American precedents dating from the Crimean War.  Formal adoption of 
the expanded concept of ‘continuous voyage’ in draft Article 36 raised an 
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‘exceedingly delicate’ question, so Moore suggested dropping the explicit recognition 
of the concept, saying it was implicit in the clause stating the general rule that ships 
were subject to seizure ‘anywhere’ if carrying contraband ‘destined for the enemy.’67 
Stockton defended treating the crew of merchant ships as prisoners of war 
because such individuals ‘in these modern days … are valuable naval resources to a 
maritime power.’  He sent a second draft at least to Moore.  Moore now disagreed 
only with the articles allowing for merchant crews to be treated as prisoners of war 
and declaring a belligerent merchant ship that transferred its ownership to a neutral as 
subject to capture. 68 
By 19 May, Stockton had completed revisions in light of the comments he had 
received, including from Admiral of the Navy George Dewey.69  Stockton adopted 
most of the suggestions.  Stockton told Secretary Long the proposed code included 
articles consistent with the United States’ positions and laws regarding privateers, the 
capture of enemy merchant vessels, and the capture and destruction of private 
property at sea.  However, ‘[i]f the code should be presented to other countries as an 
international projet, it is presumed that those articles would be omitted or modified, in 
view of our adherence to the Declaration of Paris during the late war and of the stand 
as to the capture of private property at sea’.  The draft code embodied Mahan’s 
positions taken at The Hague regarding the rescue of belligerent seamen by neutral 
vessels, so ‘that the danger of a repetition of the Deerhound affair … would be 
avoided in the future.’  The ‘formulation and crystallization’ of laws of naval war had 
‘manifest advantages’, and would ‘tend toward the amelioration of the hardships of 
naval warfare in general.’  Stockton identified twelve advantages arising from the 
proposed code.70   
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Long sent the draft to Secretary Hay for comment.  Hay further narrowed the 
ability of a belligerent to disrupt a submarine telegraph cable between a belligerent 
and a neutral; limited the right to seize and destroy neutral vessels (subject to the 
payment of indemnity); and limited the types of repairs a US warship could make 
after taking shelter in a neutral port during a war.  Regarding conditional contraband, 
Hay added language that only ‘provisions when actually destined for the enemy’s 
military or naval forces’ would be classified as conditional contraband and therefore 
subject to seizure.71  The Navy Department told Stockton it was preparing the final 
draft incorporating the Department of State’s suggestions unless he promptly 
objected.72  Stockton apparently did not because President McKinley approved, and 
Long issued General Order No. 551 on 27 June 1900, promulgating a naval war code 
for the US Navy.73  The final version did not substantively vary from Stockton’s first 
draft.74 
Although the Navy Judge Advocate General stated that the prohibition against 
the use of false colours in war contradicted several articles of the existing naval 
regulations,75 the Code received general acclaim.  One American newspaper said the 
‘general effect of the code is to place [the US] in the position of signatories to the 
Treaty of Paris.’  It concluded, ‘Certain rules of the code may appear to restrict our 
actions unduly, to be more altruistic than rules of war should be; but it must be 
remembered that if a belligerent declines to treat us as we treat him, we can suspend 
such rules forthwith.’76  In an article comparing provisions to existing international 
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understandings, Woolsey concluded the Code was ‘modern, clear, enlightened and 
rational’.77 
The British ambassador to the US initially requested eight copies, and later 
asked for three more.78  The Times (London) concluded an article praising the Code, 
saying, ‘This little code of laws deserves to be noted as another product of the US 
Naval War College, to which we owe Captain Mahan’s work on sea power; while in 
comparison Great Britain is content to spend £200 per annum on a naval strategy 
course, which includes a lecture on naval history, fee of £5 a lecture.’79  Oxford 
international law professor Thomas Erskine Holland identified many areas of 
agreement between the Code and British positions on naval warfare.  He also pointed 
out that the provisions on continuous voyage agreed with the position Salisbury had 
recently taken with regard to the seizure of German ships bound for Lourenço 
Marques.  Holland suggested the Code would be a useful template for a similar code 
for the Royal Navy, which should ‘resemble it in clearness of expression, in brevity, 
and, above all things, in frank acceptance of responsibility.’80  The Admiralty’s 
parliamentary secretary told Lord Selborne, the new First Lord, that he had ‘been 
much struck by the value of’ the US Naval War Code.81  
If the genesis and birth of the US Naval War Code was fast, its demise was 
almost as quick.  Despite hope it might prove the basis for discussions on an 
international agreement on maritime warfare, nothing of that nature occurred.82  
Favourable expressions by commentators did not translate into actions on the part of 
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foreign governments or their navies.  Efforts in Britain to enact a revised Naval Prize 
Code failed in 1903.83  In 1903, the president of the US Naval War College asked the 
Naval Intelligence Department to query the naval attachés in five countries regarding 
their views on the Code.84  The American naval attaché in London believed that Rear 
Admiral H.J. May at the Royal Naval College was studying the Code.  The attaché 
told the Admiralty there ‘are possibilities of mutual benefits’ to the countries’ navies 
from ‘an interchange of opinions which, though merely academic and carrying no 
responsibility, may lead to a definite understanding and to official recognition.’85  
Rear Admiral May had indeed been studying the US Naval War Code.  However, 
neither his views nor those of the Admiralty survive.86  The responses received were 
non-committal.  Neither France nor Germany expressed any criticisms, but they also 
did not embrace it as a basis for an international agreement.  Britain indicated the 
Code was ‘under consideration’ and could express no opinion.  Only Austria took the 
position that the Code could serve as the basis for an international naval war code.87 
In light of the lack of support to use the Code as a basis for an international 
agreement, the US Naval War College undertook a review of the implications of it to 
the Navy.  Professor Wilson led the 1903 summer international law conferences in 
assessing the Code.  ‘The aim of the Conferences was to consider the Naval War 
Code of 1900 from all points of view, seriously and frankly with reference to its 
adaptability to the purpose for which it was drawn and its probable effect in case of 
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war to which the United States might be a party.’88  Because the Code was binding 
only on the US Navy and contained provisions that were not part of any international 
agreement or sanctioned by accepted international law, the participants concluded that 
in a war the Navy would be placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its enemy.89  The 
summer study recommended that some articles be dropped and most others be 
amended.  The general direction of the recommended changes was to make the Code 
more ‘belligerent friendly’ and less ‘pro-neutral’.90  The ‘unanimous opinion’ of the 
conference was that:  (1) a conference should be called to formulate an international 
agreement on the conduct of naval warfare; (2) the US Naval War Code should be 
offered ‘as a tentative formulation of the rules which should be considered’; and (3) 
pending the calling of such an international conference, the Code should be 
withdrawn as binding on the Navy.91 
 The General Board of the Navy endorsed the recommendations and 
forwarded them to the secretary of the navy.92  In January 1904, the General Board 
reminded the secretary of its previous recommendations.93  The navy secretary then 
recommended to President Theodore Roosevelt that the Code be withdrawn.  In 
addition to the points previously made, Secretary of the Navy Moody noted that the 
article dealing with submarine cables was not part of any international convention and 
‘greatly favor[s] England.  …  Unofficial advices from England are to the effect that 
this tendency of the Naval War Code is well recognized in that country, which owns 
an overwhelming proportion of the entire submarine cable mileage of the world.’  
Other provisions were contrary to accepted practices or had never been generally 
adopted.  In conclusion, Moody said the ‘immediate reason’ for asking that the Code 
be withdrawn was ‘the possibility of war in the Far East.  The Naval War Code, in so 
far as it differs from the accepted usage of international law, does not so much affect 
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the duties of neutrals, as it limits the rights of belligerents.’  The Code therefore 
should be withdrawn now, before war occurred.94  President Roosevelt agreed, and on 
4 February 1904, the US Naval War Code was revoked.95  
Theory:  Protecting Merchant Ships and Food Supplies 
As the war in South Africa wound down, Britain’s attention returned to the 
protection of merchant ships and food supplies during war.96  Protecting its food 
supply was a life and death matter for Britain given its dependence on imports to feed 
its population.  Goschen’s successor as first lord of the admiralty, Lord Selborne, 
sought more money for commerce protection.97  In January 1902, the parliamentary 
and financial secretary to the Admiralty told Selborne the question of the safety of the 
food supply was of ‘vital importance’, but no real consideration of it had been 
undertaken.98  HSH Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg asserted in late March 1902 
to Fisher, who still commanded the Mediterranean fleet, ‘Commerce Protection is 
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about the most burning question for those in authority to settle.’99  Over the next 
several years, Battenberg played an important role regarding analysis of the laws of 
naval warfare and arming merchant ships for defensive purposes and protecting the 
supply of food during war. 
In January 1902, Battenberg prepared remarks on commerce protection in war 
after hearing lectures on the subject that Fisher forwarded to the Admiralty.100  DNI 
Custance thought Battenberg’s proposals too ambitious and ‘unsuited to the 
conditions’ that would exist in war.101  One of Battenberg’s suggestions raised the 
question of whether merchant ships should be armed in self-defence. 102   The 
Admiralty thought the issue important enough to ask the Law Officers for an 
opinion.103  Their succinct response was that while non-commissioned ships could be 
armed and resist capture, they should exercise caution assisting other merchant 
vessels attacked by the enemy lest the non-commissioned merchant ship become ‘a 
cruiser of a very irregular description’.  The only legal consequence might be that any 
neutral cargo on board could be forfeited.  However, from a non-legal perspective, the 
opposing ship might destroy the non-commissioned merchant vessel, take its crew as 
prisoners, or ‘proceed to more vigorous measures based on the allegation of 
unauthorized belligerency.’104  The Admiralty sent copies of the opinion to all fleet 
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commanders and to the Foreign, India, and Colonial offices, and the Board of 
Trade.105 
Fisher solicited Battenberg’s views after receiving the opinion and again 
forwarded his comments to the Admiralty.106  Battenberg recommended the decision 
about whether to arm merchant ships should be left to the ship owners, who likely 
would decide not to arm.  He thought the ‘awkward point about all questions of 
international law is that whatever one’s own interpretation may be, what finally settles 
the matter is the interpretation put upon it by the enemy.’  He believed a captured 
crew might be treated as pirates, not prisoners.107  Assistant DNI Captain Edward F. 
Inglefield disagreed and noted, ‘it has hitherto been customary to detain the Crews of 
captured Merchant Vessels as Prisoners of War whether they have resisted capture or 
not.’ 108   Thus, he believed belligerents would follow recognized principles of 
international law in wartime.  He also thought ship owners would not arm their 
vessels themselves without a ‘considerable reduction’ in war insurance, which could 
not be predicted without actual experience.109  Custance agreed with Inglefield’s 
analysis.110  Selborne and Kerr also concurred that responsibility for arming merchant 
ships rested with their owners.  Therefore, the Admiralty decided that non-
commissioned merchant ships should not be armed as a matter of naval policy.111 
Succeeding Custance as DNI in November 1902,112 Battenberg re-joined 
Fisher, who had become Second Naval Lord in June.  Fisher was pleased at 
Battenberg’s appointment and enjoyed his confidence at this time.  As DNI, 
Battenberg ‘exercised a material influence on Admiralty policy – an influence at once 
moderate and constructive.’  Fisher spent ‘[o]nly a fraction’ of his time at the 
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Admiralty on personnel and training, his area of responsibility as Second Naval 
Lord.113  Although he left the Admiralty in August 1903 to become commander-in-
chief at Portsmouth, he and Battenberg likely discussed issues relating to commerce 
protection, including issues of international law given the prominence of the topic at 
the time.114   
Battenberg’s attention soon was again focused squarely on commerce 
protection, this time regarding the supply of food during war.  In light of continuing 
discussions and concerns about Britain’s ability to protect its food supply, Balfour, 
who had succeeded his uncle as Prime Minister in July 1902, agreed to the 
appointment of a royal commission to study the issue.115  In April 1903, King Edward 
VII appointed a royal commission in part ‘to advise whether it is desirable to adopt 
any measures, in addition to the maintenance of a strong Fleet, by which such 
supplies can be better secured and violent fluctuations avoided.’116  The Royal 
Commission sought the Admiralty’s views on subjects related to its remit, including 
the implications of the laws of naval warfare on protecting the supply of food and raw 
materials during war.  The Admiralty’s answers to the questions presented, as well as 
the testimony of Battenberg and assistant DNI Inglefield, reveal not only the 
Admiralty’s views on this important subject,117 but also surely something of Fisher’s. 
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Battenberg recognized the Royal Navy had a duty to protect the nation’s 
commerce from marauding enemy cruisers.118  But how might international law affect 
the Royal Navy’s ‘duty’ to protect merchant ships, if at all?  In August 1903, the 
Royal Commission sent twelve questions on which it wanted to examine 
Battenberg.119  Question 12 asked for the Admiralty’s ‘attitude towards International 
Law in time of war’, particularly regarding provisions on contraband, privateering, 
and ‘arming fast ships for the destruction of commerce’.120 
The Admiralty’s written responses were provided on 3 November 1903.121  
The Admiralty first provided a lengthy historical review followed by a comparison 
showing Britain’s preponderance over France and Russia in cruisers.  The Admiralty 
declined to directly address question 12, saying Britain’s ‘attitude with regard to 
questions of International Law will depend on the circumstances which may then 
arise, but of which no forecast can be made beforehand.’  This response could be read 
as either the Admiralty intended to violate international law in the event of war, or it 
expected international law to apply unless the enemy violated it, in which case Britain 
would not have to adhere itself.  However, international law was a factor in the 
Admiralty’s answers, which suggests the Admiralty was planning for the latter and 
not the former scenario.  Because no guarantee existed that the enemy would violate 
international law, planning assumed its applicability.  According to the Admiralty, 
Britain needed more fast merchant ships that could be converted for commerce 
destruction.  The restrictions that neutral nations would ‘feel bound’ to impose on the 
use of their ports by belligerents would ‘by limiting the operations of hostile 
commerce-destroyers, prove an advantage to Great Britain.’  Privateering, having 
been abolished by the Declaration of Paris, was of no concern.  The law officers’ 
opinion relating to arming non-commissioned merchant ships was repeated, with the 
additional observation that unarmed merchant ships would be more inclined to run 
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than take a chance on fighting an enemy ship.  An effective blockade of England was 
deemed virtually impossible.  The critical issue was the question of what was and was 
not contraband, especially regarding food.  The Admiralty believed that ‘the question 
of contraband will be decided more by might than right, and it is doubtful if any 
belligerent Power would persist in declaring food contraband if an interested and 
strong neutral, such as the United States, protested and prepared to fight.’ 122  
Apparently the Royal Navy did not believe that Britain would have the ‘might’ to 
resist protests at least from the US. 
In his testimony before the Royal Commission, Battenberg agreed a definition 
of contraband was needed and that Salisbury’s de facto adoption of the American 
Civil War concept of continuous voyage during the South African War was consistent 
with the modern trend.  He testified the Admiralty was preparing its plans assuming 
that the laws of naval warfare would apply and be followed, saying, ‘I think one 
expects it.  It is rather difficult to see how civilized warfare can be carried on unless 
you assume that.’  The one exception was the definition of contraband of war, which 
would be ‘whatever the strongest party chooses to make it’. 123 
Professor Holland, who also was a member of the Commission, testified that 
the principle of the inviolability of private property at sea during war was the growing 
trend in international law.  He noted the US Naval War Code prohibited the search of 
neutral vessels in convoy guarded by a neutral warship, and Britain essentially stood 
alone in opposition to that rule.  He reiterated the need for an accepted definition of 
contraband and agreed with Salisbury’s adoption of the doctrine of continuous 
voyage.  Like the Admiralty, Holland placed emphasis on neutrals restraining a 
belligerent from failing to adhere to international law.  Belligerents ‘would not wish 
to incur the ill opinion of other nations, even apart from the question of a neutral 
making war upon them.’  The need to place prize crews on captured neutral ships 
according to international law would prevent a belligerent from destroying such ships, 
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because the size of modern warships limited space for prize crews and captured 
merchant crewmen.  Critically, Holland agreed, ‘that the weight of all British 
authority should be thrown in the direction of a high standard of maintaining those 
[international] rules which are agreed to’. 124  
Assistant DNI Inglefield testified as a private individual with the approval of 
the Admiralty to present his scheme of national indemnity for merchant ships during 
war.  However, he did not escape questions regarding the impact of international law.  
Inglefield adhered to the Admiralty’s position that might would make right regarding 
the definition of contraband and the more powerful nation would define contraband as 
it desired, even including food as contraband.  However, he agreed international law 
could not simply be ignored, saying, ‘I think that in the main there is no question but 
that international law is bound to hold good, and we could not get on without it.’125 
In its final report, the Royal Commission relied considerably on limitations on 
naval warfare being applied and enforced to support its conclusion that Britain’s 
supply of food during war was safe.  However, while some aspects of international 
law were so widely accepted they certainly would be followed, others were not so 
widely observed.  The Commission ‘desire[d] to see the binding force of 
[international law’s] prescriptions strengthened and not weakened’.  The primary goal 
in naval warfare of gaining command of the sea would take precedence over 
commerce destruction.  But the Admiralty could not guarantee it could successfully 
protect all of Britain’s sea-borne trade.  Even if the main strategic goal was not 
followed, international law was ‘one of the factors which will contribute in an 
important degree to the maintenance of [Britain’s] security by placing restrictions 
upon the operations of our enemies.’  The Commission also emphasized properly 
constituted international prize courts, which ‘would uphold International Law to the 
best of their ability.  The legal members of such Courts … might place an effectual 
check on breaches of International Law by cruisers.  …  International Law as the 
morality governing the relations of States, will exercise a very considerable 
restraining influence upon the acts of nations.’  Belligerents would be restrained from 
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destroying neutral ships by the requirements of safeguarding the merchant crewmen 
and the need to provide prize crews.  Neutrals would play an important role in 
limiting breaches of international law, including attempts to broadly define 
contraband to include food.  Indeed, the greater the number of neutrals supplying 
Britain during war, the safer its commerce.126  Thus, the positions of the Admiralty, 
the testimony of witnesses, and the analysis and conclusions of the Royal 
Commission, reveal the relevance and importance of the laws of naval warfare to 
strategic planning.  The Commission’s recommendation for a national indemnity 
scheme for ships captured by the enemy during war generated the most public 
comment and debate following the release of its report.  Indeed, the Admiralty was 
involved with discussions relating to such a plan or national insurance off and on up 
to the eve of the First World War.127 
Practice:  The Russo-Japanese War 
In early February 1904 Japan made a surprise attack on Russia’s naval base at 
Port Arthur in Manchuria – a violation of accepted international law.  Britain and the 
US were neutrals in the conflict, although because of its alliance with Japan since 
1902, Britain would have been compelled to enter the war on Japan’s side if another 
nation entered on Russia’s side.  Within days, Russia and Japan issued declarations 
defining contraband and stating rules for the treatment of neutral vessels and cargoes.  
Japan’s declaration stated that provisions and coal were conditional contraband and 
subject to seizure only if destined for use by the enemy’s forces.128  However, 
Russia’s declaration, while playing lip service to the Declaration of Paris and 
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accepted international law generally, declared food and coal, among other items, as 
absolute contraband.129   
Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne130 asked Ambassador Scott to confirm that 
Russia considered food and coal absolute contraband.  Russia’s foreign minister 
confirmed those items were absolute contraband subject to seizure even on board 
neutral ships.  Moreover, Russia reserved the right to expand the list of absolute 
contraband.131  The Admiralty then asked whether Russian warships should be 
allowed to re-supply with coal in British ports.  Lord Lansdowne concluded Russian 
warships could be re-supplied, unless it was decided to deny this right in retaliation 
for Russia’s declaration.132  Russia’s declaration of food as absolute contraband 
generated an historical review by the Law Officers, who pointed out that Britain and 
the US had maintained inconsistent positions on the subject since the late eighteenth 
century.133  The Law Officers told Lansdowne, ‘The enormous importance to this 
country of maintaining the rule that food is not contraband, unless the inference can 
be properly drawn that it is for the use of the enemy’s forces, or of a besieged town, 
cannot be lost sight of in considering the propriety of sending a protest’. 134  
Lansdowne decided a protest should be drafted and submitted to the prime minister 
for consideration.135 
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Secretary of State Hay declined British solicitations to join in a protest, 
preferring to act alone.136  The US issued a general declaration that food was 
contraband only if destined for enemy forces or besieged towns.137  However, 
Russia’s next announcement did generate a formal protest.  Russia declared that 
journalists who communicated war news by wireless to Japan off the coast of China 
or within the zone of Russian operations would be arrested, treated as spies, and the 
ships on which they operated seized.  The US immediately objected.138  Undeterred, 
Russia upped the ante by declaring raw cotton absolute contraband.139   
Russia’s expansion of belligerent rights had reached the point where neither 
the US nor Great Britain could remain silent.  Britain protested that Russia’s 
classification of food as absolute contraband was ‘inconsistent with the law and 
practice of nations.’  Moreover, any decisions of Russian prize courts, in order to be 
binding, ‘must be in accordance with recognized rules and principles of international 
law.’140  Russia responded there was no international agreement defining contraband 
and so it was ‘within the power of a belligerent to arbitrarily decide what articles were 
to be so considered’.141  The US objected to Russia’s identification of provisions, 
coal, and raw cotton as absolute contraband.  Russia’s declaration ‘would not appear 
to be in accord with the reasonable and lawful rights of a neutral commerce.’142 
Britain also reconsidered its decision to supply coal to Russia.  The Committee 
of Imperial Defence (CID) recognized that the country, ‘if a belligerent, would gain 
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by the recognition of coal as contraband of war.’143  The Law Officers advised that 
coal could be denied to Russian ships on their way to the war zone.144  A sub-
committee of the CID agreed, and also recommended that belligerents who laid 
floating mines on the high seas should be held responsible for any damage to neutral 
ships.145  Lansdowne asked Ambassador Choate for the United States’ view on coal 
and received a response that simply repeated its earlier position statement sent to its 
European ambassadors.146  Lansdowne’s draft response to Choate indicated Britain 
was not going to formally protest Russia’s position on coal.147  However, intervening 
events hardened the positions of both nations.  
On 24 July a Russian warship sank the British merchant ship Knight 
Commander after removing its crew, allegedly because the merchantman did not have 
sufficient coal to get to the Russian prize court at Vladivostok.  An American 
company had chartered the Knight Commander and it carried American cargo.  Russia 
also seized the German steamship Arabia off the coast of Japan, also carrying 
American cargo, and the Ardova in the Red Sea, carrying munitions bound for the US 
government in the Philippines.148  Although the US had been content to allow Britain 
to take the labouring oar vis-à-vis Russia’s assertion of broad belligerent rights,149 
Russia’s actions incensed President Theodore Roosevelt.  He asked the US Navy and 
Secretary Hay to prepare to send the Asiatic fleet to ‘bottle up the Vladivostok 
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Russian squadron’ if Russia should seize an American vessel.150  The US viewed 
‘with the gravest concern’ the sinking of the Knight Commander and the seizure of 
American-owned cargoes.  The country reserved ‘all rights of security, regular 
treatment, reparation’ for American cargo and ships.151  Like Salisbury during the 
South African War, Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff told the American 
ambassador he had no information regarding the decision of the prize court relating to 
the Arabia, although Russia had properly seized the ship.152 
Britain’s attorney general told the CID the sinking of the Knight Commander 
constituted ‘a breach of international law and custom.’153  Britain promptly decided to 
refuse coal to belligerent warships on their way to the war zone.154  Russia was 
‘unprepared’ for this decision.155  Britain also sent two strongly-worded notes, calling 
Russia’s extension of absolute contraband to include food, coal, and raw cotton 
‘unprecedented’, decrying the destruction of the Knight Commander, demanding 
Russia change its classification of absolute contraband and cease seizing neutral ships 
carrying neutral goods, and questioning the validity of the decisions of Russian prize 
courts.  Lansdowne described Russia’s actions as ‘contrary to acknowledged 
principles of international law, and so intolerable to all neutrals.’156  Russia’s foreign 
minister said the issues were complex and sought to buy time by referring them to a 
special commission for review and that Russian prize law ‘had been misinterpreted’.  
Britain’s new ambassador concluded that ‘the firm and uncompromising attitude of 
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the British and American governments on the subject of the definition of contraband 
of war have had a certain effect’ and that Russia might soon change its positions.157 
However, Russia’s positions were not changing quickly enough.  The 
Chamber of Shipping complained that British ships were being stopped and searched 
far from the war zone, including in the Bay of Biscay and the approaches to the 
western Mediterranean.158  Britain complained its ships were being stopped, searched, 
and even seized disproportionately compared with other nation’s merchant vessels far 
from the war zone.  Russian prize courts appeared to have little understanding of the 
proper relations of belligerents to neutrals.  Lamsdorff denied that any discrimination 
toward British merchant ships was occurring and again delayed any substantive reply, 
saying a special commission still was considering the various issues.159  The US then 
denounced Russia’s interpretation of contraband and criticized the procedure and 
reasoning of its prize courts.  Those decisions meant ‘the complete destruction of all 
neutral commerce’; ‘obviates the necessity of blockades;’ ‘renders meaningless the 
principle of the declaration of Paris’ that blockades must be effective; ‘obliterates all 
distinction between commerce in contraband and noncontraband goods; and is in 
effect a declaration of war against commerce of every description between the people 
of a neutral and those of a belligerent State.’160 
At the same time, the Admiralty considered the implications of these issues for 
future wars.  The primary concern was the area or zone within which a belligerent 
could search neutral vessels for contraband.  Lansdowne asserted, ‘the area of search 
must have some reference to the geographical position of the theatre of war.’  He 
asked First Lord Selborne to consider the question of geographical limits, and 
reminded him of Salisbury’s instructions following seizure of the Bundesrath that no 
merchant ship would be stopped a certain distance from Lorenço Marques.161  Prime 
Minister Balfour expressed concern that ‘We are in some danger of finding ourselves 
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in the position to which reference has so often been made in Cabinet, that, namely, of 
submitting as neutrals, to conditions more onerous to our trade than those which we 
impose on belligerents.’162  An inter-department committee of the Admiralty and 
Foreign Office concluded that Salisbury’s action was not binding precedent.  
However, the committee opposed proposing zones of search.  ‘The chief reason 
against the proposal … was the consideration that if [Britain] were at war with (say) 
France, we should want to stop coal or munitions of war from reaching France or the 
French fleet anywhere and everywhere’.163  Selborne disagreed.  If Salisbury’s action 
was not precedent, then he had erred when he conceded the point to Germany.  
However, ‘in the most conceivable cases in which [Britain] might be concerned as 
belligerents in a war with a great Maritime Power, the precedent could not be invoked 
in such a manner as to cause us any inconvenience.’  The potential wars Selborne 
considered were against Russia, France, Germany, and the United States.  The 
Admiralty had not considered the more salient question ‘that any restrictions which 
we now impose upon Russia will tie our own hands hereafter whenever we appear 
upon the scene as belligerents.’ 164   Lansdowne agreed ‘if our trade could be 
guaranteed immunity except in certain waters during this war, while we are neutrals, 
we should reap considerable immediate advantage.’  He thought further discussion 
was in order.165 
Russia had started to change its positions on contraband and the search and 
seizure of neutral ships in the face of pressure from neutrals and the analysis of 
Professor F.F. Martens, who had chaired a special commission to study the issues.  It 
now claimed its regulations on contraband had been misinterpreted, and food was 
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conditional contraband that could be seized if the captor proved the goods were 
destined for the enemy.166  However, Russia still claimed coal and raw cotton were 
absolute contraband despite continued objections from the US and Britain. 167  
Somewhat disingenuously given its actions during the South African War, Britain 
asserted, ‘that to take vessels for adjudication merely because their destination is the 
enemy’s country would be vexatious, and constitute an unwarrantable interference 
with neutral commerce.’168  Questionable seizures of British and American merchant 
ships ceased as Russia assured that ‘in the future there will be less ground of 
complaint’.  The US monitored Russian prize court decisions and told Russia the 
questionable nature of those decisions could not be considered precedents or 
consistent with the law of nations.169   
Conclusion 
For Great Britain and the Royal Navy, the practical and theoretical 
experiences between 1899 and 1905 had a far-reaching impact.  Britain withdrew 
from its pro-belligerent rights stance adopted during the early months of the South 
African War in response to pressure from the US and Germany.  Salisbury’s 
expression of ‘regret’ to Germany had to be galling.  Coogan asserts that Britain’s 
retreat on belligerent rights during the South Africa War had a generational effect that 
left the nation’s leaders with ‘unpleasant memories’ of the ‘difficulties of enforcing 
belligerent rights under modern conditions.’170  The events of the Russo-Japanese 
War strikingly parallel those of the South Africa War.  Russia’s definition of 
contraband and its seizure and destruction of neutral ships and cargoes went beyond 
accepted international maritime law and created contentious issues with neutral 
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powers.  Russia finally yielded to the protests of Britain and the US.  Thus, in two 
successive conflicts involving major sea powers, international law had prevailed over 
the actions of a belligerent.  Although both were regional wars, the principles 
enforced were applicable in any conflict regardless of its size or duration.  Britain’s 
success in forcing Russia to comply with international standards reinforced those in 
the government who viewed the country’s traditional position as shifting toward that 
of neutrals.  The presumption ‘might makes right’ or that a belligerent could 
announce whatever rules it wanted for the treatment of neutral vessels no longer 
existed as before.171   
The importance of the Admiralty’s acknowledgment that the laws of warfare 
influenced naval planning, as shown in its analysis whether to arm non-commissioned 
merchant ships for defensive purposes, its positions regarding the protection of the 
food supply in war, and its consideration of the effect of agreeing to zones of search 
during the Russo-Japanese War, has not previously been recognized.  Coogan does 
not address the Admiralty’s analysis or the Royal Commission’s conclusions.172  
Nicholas Lambert quotes a single sentence from Battenberg’s testimony without 
analysis.173  Stephen Cobb presents Battenberg’s evidence before the Commission, 
but does not address the implications of his, the Admiralty’s, or the Commission’s 
reliance on the laws of naval warfare.174  The Admiralty’s answers to the Royal 
Commission and Battenberg’s evidence establish that the Royal Navy did not believe 
it could ignore the laws of naval warfare in planning for the protection of the nation’s 
seaborne commerce.  The Admiralty was not preparing for a future conflict in which 
international law would be thrown out the window upon the commencement of 
hostilities.  It was preparing for a future war in which international law would be 
applied and followed at least initially.  The Admiralty did not have the authority to 
decide whether international rules were ignored and so could not plan for such an 
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event.  The Admiralty’s and the Royal Commission’s reliance on the laws of naval 
warfare as a restraint on belligerents’ conduct contradicts historians who have argued 
that international law was of little or no moment in naval planning and preparations 
during this period. 
For the United States, the Naval War Code of 1900 represented the US Navy 
‘getting into the game’.  The Code, intended from the beginning as a template for the 
rest of the world, vaulted the US Navy to the forefront of thinking regarding the laws 
of naval warfare.  It was referenced by Britain and the US even after it was 
withdrawn.  The US Naval War College’s studies of international law expanded and 
continued on a regular basis.175  Those studies shaped consideration of the laws of 
naval warfare in the US, Britain, and other nations, especially in the years leading up 
to the 1907 Conference.  The US delegates to the 1907 Conference and 1909 London 
Naval Conference were instructed to present the 1900 Naval War Code, with 
amendments as suggested in 1903, as the basis for discussions.176  Thus, despite its 
short life, the Code played an important role in the development of the laws of naval 
warfare.  In addition, the United States’ experiences during the South African and 
Russo-Japanese wars reinforced its traditional policies.177  Having persuaded Britain 
and Russia to respect neutral rights, the US confirmed its pro-neutral rights stance.  
Individuals and nations seeking to convince the United States to adopt a more pro-
belligerent rights attitude would face an uphill battle. 
Finally, the theoretical and practical experiences of the US and Britain 
identified areas of international law that needed to be addressed.   For example, 
absolute contraband required a generally accepted definition and a clearer 
demarcation of when conditional contraband became subject to seizure.  The US 
Naval War Code posited possible solutions.  The two wars showed the need for 
international standardization of the procedures and opinions of prize courts.  In 1902 
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and again in 1904, bills were introduced in Parliament to bring British prize law into 
the twentieth century without success.  Frustrated, Selborne thought that ‘with the 
experience of the Transvaal War and with that of the present war it was sufficient to 
convince the most stupid Unionist member that Naval Prize Law was not a subject on 
which the country can afford to trifle.’  The ‘Naval Prize Law is international to the 
backbone and over this question any number of quarrels may be picked with foreign 
countries or avoided.’178  The practical and theoretical experiences between 1899 and 
1905 confirmed the need for, and direction of, the 1907 Conference.  Many of the 
issues raised would shape the agenda for the 1907 Conference, at which Britain 
finally would discuss disputed issues of the laws of naval warfare. 
 
                                                







Unlike the Tsar’s proposal for a peace conference in 1898, the date on which 
US Secretary of State John Hay first suggested a second international conference – 21 
October 1904 – is intimately tied to naval history.  The day before Hay issued his 
circular, Admiral Sir John A. Fisher became First Naval Lord at the British 
Admiralty, changed the title of his position to First Sea Lord, and then spent the next 
two days sick in bed.1  Hay sent his communication on the 99th anniversary of the 
Battle of Trafalgar.  A few hours after Hay sent his invitation, the Russian Baltic fleet, 
on way to its destruction in the Far East, mistook a group of British fishing trawlers 
on the Dogger Bank for Japanese torpedo boats and in a blaze of erratic gunfire sank 
one vessel and killed two fishermen, while also striking their own warships and 
killing several of their own men.2 
Scholars of pre-First World War naval history, to the extent they consider the 
laws of naval warfare in their analyses, typically begin their studies at some point 
after Hay sent his suggestion for a second peace conference.  The examinations 
generally are limited to the issues relevant to their work.3  Yet as one historian has 
recognized, during the twenty-eight months between Hay’s invitation and the 
convening of the 1907 Conference on 15 June 1907, ‘the world’s great powers … 
                                                
1 Fisher to C. Fisher (his son), 23 Oct. 1904, FGDN II, 44. 
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devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to considering their positions on a 
wide range of issues relating to the laws of war as they were then understood.’4 
This chapter analyses the preparations of Great Britain and the United States 
for the 1907 Conference from a different perspective.  It first considers Hay’s 
proposal, the reactions in Britain to the invitation, and the topics suggested for the 
conference.  Next, this chapter provides a new analysis of the preparations for the 
conference focusing on the discussions between the Britain and the US on the long-
divisive topic of the immunity of private property at sea.  This key issue received the 
most attention during preparations for the conference.  Both countries had difficulty 
deciding what position to take on the subject.  This chapter reveals how Britain and 
the US nearly switched their positions on the issue before the start of the 1907 
Conference. 
Hay’s Proposal for a Second Peace Conference 
In his annual Message to Congress on 7 December 1903, President Theodore 
Roosevelt again raised an issue near and dear to the US:  the exemption of private 
property at sea from seizure during time of war.  Quoting President McKinley’s 
message to Congress in 1898, Roosevelt again recommended an international 
agreement to immunize all private property, excluding contraband, from seizure or 
destruction by belligerents.  He considered it ‘a matter of humanity and morals.  It is 
anachronistic when private property is respected on land that it should not be 
respected at sea.’5  Roosevelt’s message entered the realm of naval strategy when he 
concluded: 
while commerce destroying may cause serious loss and great 
annoyance, it can never be more than a subsidiary factor in bringing to 
terms a resolute foe.  This is now recognized by all of our naval 
experts.  The fighting ship, not the commerce destroyer, is the vessel 
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whose feats add renown to a nation’s history, and establish her place 
among the great powers of the world.6 
A few months later, Congress passed a resolution urging the President to work 
toward an international understanding immunizing private property at sea from 
capture or destruction during war, excluding contraband.7  In September 1904, the 
international Interparliamentary Union held its annual meeting in St. Louis and 
presented resolutions to Roosevelt urging the US to call a second peace conference to 
negotiate international arbitration treaties between nations.  Secretary of State Hay 
then gave the opening speech at the American Peace Society conference in Boston, 
reviewing the actions of Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt supporting peace and 
arbitration.  After receiving accolades for his speech, Hay started drafting the call for 
a second peace conference.8 
Hay’s invitation, made on behalf of President Roosevelt, did not suggest a 
formal agenda for the proposed conference.  However, he did mention three topics the 
1899 Conference had deferred:  ‘the rights and duties of neutrals, the inviolability of 
private property in naval warfare, and the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages 
by a naval force.’  Not surprisingly given the then-continuing issues with Russia, Hay 
also mentioned distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband as affecting 
the rights of neutrals.9 
Unlike initial reactions to the Tsar’s invitation in 1898, which was met with 
great caution, the world’s powers quickly responded favourably to the United States’ 
suggestion.10   When US Ambassador Joseph Choate presented Hay’s proposal, 
Foreign Secretary Lansdowne indicated the British government would support the 
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plan and said the war between Russia and Japan was a good reason for such a 
conference.11  Although it reserved comment on proposed topics for the conference, 
Britain accepted the invitation three days after it was formally presented.12  Russia 
and Japan also responded favourably to the invitation, but Russia suggested its 
participation would not be practicable due to the on-going war in the Far East.  In 
light of Russia’s position, Hay notified the nations that had accepted the proposal that 
a second peace conference would be postponed until Russia and Japan ended their 
war.  However, he suggested that until a definite agreement for a meeting occurred, ‘it 
seems desirable that a comparison of views should be had among the participants as 
to the scope and matter of the subjects to be brought before the Second Conference.’  
Hay again mentioned the inviolability of private property at sea as a subject for 
consideration.13 
The Foreign Office forwarded a copy of Hay’s circular to the Admiralty.  The 
Admiralty’s response made clear that two of the topics mentioned – the rights of 
neutrals and the immunity of private property at sea – raised significant issues.  
Harkening back to the wars with France a century earlier, the Admiralty warned in 
intense language: 
Great Britain’s enormous commerce compels her to insist upon 
the rights of neutrals within legitimate limits; but to place restrictions 
upon the right of seizure of an enemy’s goods at sea would deprive her 
of the principal, and in some cases the only, means of exerting pressure 
upon an enemy.  It would logically entail the abolition of commercial 
blockade – the weapon with which we overthrew Napoleon’s 
combination against us, and one on which we should still have to rely 
to a great extent.  
It may be urged that the inviolability of private property in war 
would confer great benefits upon our mercantile marine, and this 
would no doubt be the case, if the inviolability could be adequately 
                                                
11 Choate to Hay, 5 Nov. 1904, box 19, Choate Papers. 
12 Lansdowne to Choate, 7 Nov. 1904, FO 412/79, 3-4. 
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guaranteed.  But so long as the fleet has command of the sea, the 
danger to our commerce will be small, as history proves; while if the 
command of the sea is lost, it is doubtful if the victorious enemy would 
refrain from seizing a prize so easily won and of such immense value, 
in spite of all Treaties to the contrary. 
[The Board of Admiralty] are strongly of the opinion that, as a 
general principle, the incidence of sea command should be as far 
reaching in its effects as is possible within reason, and that anything 
which tends to reduce the influence exerted by it is detrimental to the 
interests of this country.14 
The Admiralty’s assertion that the immunity of private property at sea ‘would 
logically entail the abolition of commercial blockade’ was somewhat exaggerated.  
The immunity principle did not abrogate the ability of a belligerent to seize a ship or 
its cargo for violating a blockade or change the definition of ‘contraband’.  It said 
nothing about either situation.  However, immunity of private property, along with the 
scope of contraband and blockade are all ‘forms of war on commerce between the 
enemy and neutrals’ and ‘hang together’.  ‘They must all be abandoned or maintained 
together.’15 
Before responding to the Admiralty’s concerns or replying to the US, Foreign 
Secretary Lansdowne reported to Prime Minister Balfour that he had spoken with 
Britain’s ambassador to the US, Cecil Spring Rice.  Lansdowne told Spring Rice that 
he personally ‘felt no doubt that whenever the question [of contraband] came up for 
international discussion we should be found on the side of the neutral rather than 
belligerent interests.’16  Thus, Lansdowne had preconceived biases that were contrary 
to the Admiralty’s views, likely based on Britain’s recent experiences in dealing with 
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Russia.  Nevertheless, the Foreign Office told the Admiralty not to worry, saying ‘the 
considerations urged … in regard to the questions to be brought before the 
Conference will be carefully borne in mind’.17  On the same date, Lansdowne told 
Ambassador Choate that while Britain had no objection to preliminary discussion of 
the scope and topics for the conference, it preferred to wait until a date was set before 
engaging in such communications.18  
Soon after the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War, Russia 
advised President Roosevelt and other foreign ambassadors that it was prepared to 
participate in a second peace conference and would present a ‘detailed program’ to 
serve as the starting point for the conference’s deliberations.19  Secretary of State 
Elihu Root20 accepted Russia’s proposal for a second international conference, and 
referred to Hay’s circular of a year earlier as indicating some of the topics for the 
conference.21  Britain also quickly accepted Russia’s invitation.22   
Before Russia proposed any topics, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour identified 
one subject for consideration as well as the position Great Britain should take on it at 
the conference.  Balfour previously had  
expressed his opinion to Admiral Sir John Fisher that the question of 
the use of floating mines in war and their danger to neutral shipping 
should be referred to the Second Peace Conference, and that the 
influence of [Great Britain] should be employed to limit their use, or 
still better, to exclude them altogether from the category of weapons 
permissible in civilized warfare.23 
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Balfour had first raised the issue of floating mines as ‘in favour of the weaker 
belligerent, and therefore, on the balance, detrimental’ to Britain in January 1905.24  
Lansdowne recorded Balfour’s note on floating mines thinking ‘the subject was one 
of those mentioned by the U.S. gov. as appropriate for discussion.’25  However, the 
US had not suggested that topic. 
Less than two months after Lansdowne recorded Balfour’s note, the 
Conservative government resigned and the Liberal Party took office.  Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman became Prime Minister.  Even before assuming power, 
Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Party had championed reduction of armaments 
and arms limitation, especially for the Royal Navy.26  Sir Edward Grey, who was not 
Campbell-Bannerman’s first choice for the post, replaced Lord Lansdowne as Foreign 
Secretary.  Relatively young at the time of his appointment, Grey did not possess 
much first-hand experience with European affairs or politicians.27  However, he soon 
showed his diplomatic skills in handling the latter part of the First Moroccan Crisis in 
1906.  Indeed, Grey ‘emphasised the underlying continuity in British diplomacy.’28  
In addition, Edward Marjoribanks, the second Baron Tweedmouth, became First Lord 
of the Admiralty in the new Liberal government.29  These changes would influence 
Britain’s preparations for, and conduct at, the 1907 Conference and beyond. 
It was not until early April 1906 that Russia proposed subjects for the 
conference, which it said should begin in July.  Unlike the 1899 Conference, Russia 
suggested excluding issues relating to limitation of military or naval forces or 
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disarmament.  However, similar to the 1899 Conference, most of Russia’s proposed 
topics related to maritime warfare.  Indeed, the list of naval warfare topics was breath-
taking in its scope.  Specifically, points three and four of Russia’s communiqué 
suggested that the international conference consider: 
3. Framing of a convention relative to the laws and 
customs of maritime warfare concerning –  
The special operations of maritime warfare, such as the 
bombardment of ports, cities, and villages by a naval force; the 
laying of torpedoes, etc.; 
The transformation of merchant vessels into war-ships; 
The private property of belligerents at sea; 
The length of time to be granted to merchant ships for 
their departure from ports of neutrals or the enemy after the 
opening of hostilities; 
The rights and duties of neutrals at sea, among others, 
the questions of contraband, the rules applicable to belligerent 
vessels in neutral ports; destruction in case of vis major, of 
neutral merchant vessels captured as prizes; 
In said convention to be drafted, there would be 
introduced the provisions relative to war on land that would be 
also applicable to maritime warfare. 
4. Additions to be made to the Convention of 1899 for the 
adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva 
Convention of 1864.30 
The US quickly responded, indicating that July would not be a convenient 
time at which to convene the conference. 31   In a subsequent communication 
expanding on its proposed list of topics, Russia added:  ‘As for maritime warfare, in 
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regard to which the laws and customs of the several countries differ on certain points, 
it is necessary to establish fixed rules in keeping with the exigencies of the rights of 
belligerents and the interests of neutrals.’32  Russia also agreed to postpone the 
conference until a mutually agreeable time.33  In early June, the US assented to the 
topics proposed by Russia, but reserved ‘for itself the liberty to propose to the Second 
Peace Conference, as one of the subjects of consideration, the reduction or limitation 
of armaments’.34  Foreign Secretary Grey confided to France and the US that Britain 
would reduce its military expenditures, including on the Royal Navy in 1907.35  He 
further told the American ambassador that Britain did not intend to initiate 
disarmament discussions at the conference, but would support an American initiative 
on the subject.  Regarding the other proposed topics, including the immunity of 
private property at sea, the rights of neutrals, and contraband, Grey advised that the 
British government would decide its positions later in autumn, and would let America 
know its views in the ‘hope we might find ourselves in agreement.’36  Grey then told 
Russia that Britain wanted the conference to discuss arms reduction.37  With the 
proposed subjects for the international conference touching on so many issues of 
maritime warfare, much preparation had to be done in Britain and the US.  Indeed, the 
planning in both countries, including by their navies, was considerable.  The issue of 
the immunity of private property at sea was at the forefront of those discussions from 
the very beginning.  
Two Ships Passing in the Night:  The Immunity of Private Property at Sea 
The explicit inclusion of the question of the immunity of private property at 
sea in Hay’s original circular invitation elicited immediate reactions on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, although long retired from the Navy, took up the 
case and began efforts to get the US to reconsider and change its traditional support 
for the principle.  Mahan took his appeal straight to the top – to the President – likely 
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believing he would find a sympathetic ear.  President Theodore Roosevelt was 
recognized as a naval historian for his work on the War of 1812, and had served as 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy under John D. Long prior to the Spanish-American 
War.  As President, Roosevelt understood the usefulness of the Navy as an instrument 
of diplomacy and projector of power, as well as its limitations.38  Indeed, he desired a 
stop in the ever-increasing size of navies worldwide.39   
In a letter to Roosevelt dated 27 December 1904, Mahan stated that he had 
‘seen with concern’ that the country had placed the issue of immunity of private 
property ‘in the foreground of subjects for consideration’.40   Mahan urged the 
President in harsh terms to reconsider the United States’ traditional support for the 
principle.  Recognizing that the issue was inextricably tied to the size of the navy, 
Mahan told the President: 
That measures which tend to exempt commerce, finance, and, 
so far, the general community, from the sufferings of war, will not 
make for peace seems to me a proposition scarcely worth arguing.  The 
furor of war needs all the chastening it can receive in the human heart, 
to still the mad impulses towards conflict. 
… 
There is no more moral wrong in taking ‘private’ property than in 
taking private lives; and I think my point incontestable, that property 
employed in commerce is no more private, in uses, than lives 
employed on the firing line are private.  … 
The question is one of expediency; and what was expedient to 
our weakness a century ago is not expedient to our strength today.  
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Rather should we seek to withdraw from our old position of the flag 
covering the goods.  We need to fasten our grip on the sea.41 
Roosevelt’s response was at best equivocal, questioning Mahan’s analogy to 
taking lives on land but indicating he would discuss the matter with the Secretary of 
State and think it over.42  Secretary Hay did not equivocate in his response.  He told 
the President he was not impressed and said Mahan’s arguments were ‘the 
professional sailor’s view of the question.  I do not think the considerations he brings 
to bear are weighty enough to cause us to reverse our traditional policy for the last 
century’.43  With that, Mahan’s first attempt to change the position of the US on the 
issue failed. 
Britain also reviewed its traditional policy opposing the immunity of private 
property at sea in late 1904.  Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, who in late 1898 and late 
1899 had questioned Britain’s traditional opposition to the immunity of private 
property at sea, requested a study of the issue in late 1904.  Sir George Clarke, the 
secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) authored the response.  Clarke 
had served in the Royal Engineers and became the first secretary to the CID in May 
1904.  He possessed a technical education and training and significant administrative 
experience.  Clarke had worked closely with Balfour but was considered by senior 
officers as a ‘naval officer manqué’.44  Clarke’s memorandum began by restating 
Britain’s traditional view that, ‘The belligerent right of search and of capture of 
neutral vessels containing contraband of war is generally believed to be of special 
value to this country by reason of her preponderant navy.’  However, that view had 
not been re-examined ‘in the light of modern conditions.’  Clarke recognized that this 
right hurt Britain when it was a neutral, as evidenced by events during the on-going 
Russo-Japanese War.  Whether opposition to the principle of immunity ‘would confer 
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any compensating advantages … when [Britain] was in position of a belligerent 
remains to be decided.’  He framed the question as whether the amount of injury 
Britain could inflict on an enemy would ‘be sufficiently important to counterbalance 
the resentment we should arouse amongst neutrals, to compensate us for the 
inconvenience and loss which might be inflicted upon us as neutrals’.45   
Clarke noted that in answering the question, the scope of ‘contraband’ had to 
be decided.  He believed that as a belligerent, Britain likely would assert a narrower 
definition of ‘contraband’ than Russia recently had done.  Because Britain likely 
would not include items such as food and raw materials within the scope of absolute 
contraband, the value of the broad right of search and seizure inherent in opposition to 
the immunity principle had to be discounted.  However, for purposes of his analysis, 
Clarke adopted the broader Russian definition of contraband, including food and raw 
cotton, because that assumption would indicate the maximum potential value of the 
right.  He then examined the issue based on information specially prepared by the 
Board of Trade showing the value of imports by sea-borne trade of such goods to 
Germany, France, Russia, other minor countries, and the US.  Again, his approach 
favoured adherence to opposition to the immunity principle.46   
Despite tilting his methodology in favour of Britain’s traditional position, 
Clarke determined that for each country analysed, including Germany, ‘not only 
would no real advantage accrue to Great Britain from the exercise of the right of 
search and seizure of neutral shipping carrying contraband as defined in the extreme 
form, but grave danger of incurring the active hostility of’ neutrals, such as the US, 
would occur.  He concluded that the value of the right was not has great as commonly 
assumed; would involve risks from neutrals if asserted, and would ‘seriously 
inconvenience’ British trade if Britain were a neutral.  ‘The sea pressure that can be 
brought to bear on a Continental Power appears, therefore, to be far less effective now 
than formerly.’  He also recognized that the related doctrine of continuous voyage 
‘must seem to be illusory.’  He summed up his conclusions writing: 
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An international arrangement under which neutral bottoms 
covered contraband would be to our advantage, and such a policy 
would probably find strong support from the United States.  The right 
of search, in order to establish the nationality of a vessel, and of 
capture in the case of neutral vessels attempting to run a proclaimed 
and an effective blockade would still be required; but neither need 
create any serious disturbance of neutral trade. 
…  Only a distinct advantage to us as belligerents could 
compensate for the restriction of our rights as neutrals.  Such an 
advantage does not appear to arise from the right of capture of neutral 
vessels.47 
Clarke thus excluded exercise of Britain’s traditional and most powerful naval 
weapon, blockade, from possible limitation. 
Nicholas Lambert has minimized Clarke’s analysis, saying he ‘was no more 
than voicing his opinion, unsupported by evidence or research, and viewing the 
subject from a narrowly mercantilist perspective, analyzing the problem in terms of 
monetary cost as opposed to strategic opportunity cost.’48  Lambert’s criticism is 
entirely misplaced.  Clarke’s memorandum was supported by careful analysis of 
economic information prepared by the Board of Trade.  He did not analyse the 
problem simply in terms of money, but rather considered the non-monetary 
implications of adherence to Britain’s traditional policy.  Finally, blockade was not 
implicated should Britain change its traditional position.  Clarke clearly indicated that 
neutral vessels attempting to violate a blockade still would be subject to seizure.  
Clarke’s memorandum presented an analysis based on a methodology that favoured 
Britain’s continued opposition to the immunity of private property at sea, yet found 
that continued opposition questionable.  
As indicated previously, the Admiralty restated its traditional view opposing 
the immunity of private property at sea at the end of 1904 in response to Hay’s 
circular, not in response to Clarke’s memorandum.  However, the Admiralty’s 
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position against reconsideration was not universally held.  On 9 June 1905, Captain 
Edmond Slade, then serving as commander of the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, 
told the assistant naval secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence that, ‘I quite 
agree with the arguments set out in the memorandum on the right of search.  It seems 
to me having signed the Treaty of Paris, and agreed to the proposition that the Flag 
covers the cargoes, we ought to go the whole hog and allow it in the case of all 
cargoes, except of course in the case of blockade.  It is however so obviously to our 
advantage that I think it will be a difficult point to carry.’  Slade noted that the 
memorandum did not convincingly deal with the issue of the risk of driving British 
merchant trade to neutral ships during war.  However, he concluded: 
The amount of damage we could inflict on an enemy by 
interfering with his Trade carried on in neutral ships would probably 
be insignificant, while we should most likely raise an outcry all over 
the world against our so-called high-handed proceedings.  If we are 
game to take the whole world on, then, by all means, retain the right to 
exercise it freely; but if we wish to remain good friends with neutrals, 
we must either waive it for the time, or abandon it altogether.  …  We 
must either insist on the full exercise of belligerent rights of search as 
the now exist, or abolish them altogether, and I think the latter is the 
better policy.  Now is the time to move, when the whole question of 
maritime warfare comes up for discussion at the next Hague 
Conference.  We must however be prepared with a definite policy, well 
thought out and put in such a form that there is the possibility of 
carrying at least the essential points of it.49   
Politicians also disagreed with Britain’s traditional opposition to the principle 
of the immunity of private property at sea.  In a letter to The Times (London), Sir 
Robert Reid, at the time a Liberal Member of Parliament,50 argued Britain should 
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exempt private property at sea from capture unless it was contraband of war or 
intended to violate a blockade.  He based his view on the fact that ‘conditions have 
completely changed since the Napoleonic times, and that, whatever it may have been 
then, it is now the true interest of Great Britain and also of other nations … to exempt 
private property at sea from capture unless really contraband or its place of 
destination be a beleaguered fortress.’  He concluded by referencing Roosevelt’s 
expressed views in support of the principle, and said Britain should follow the US and 
other leading powers.51  Reid’s letter to the editor quickly was followed by a rebuttal 
from an unnamed Royal Navy admiral.  While agreeing that times had changed, that 
writer questioned whether exemption of private property at sea would actually be 
followed in time of war.  He concluded that the only means to ensure exemption of 
British private property at sea during war ‘is to have a Navy so strong and so 
distributed that the would-be depredator will be too much occupied in avoiding 
capture himself to have much opportunity of seizing the property belonging to our 
countrymen.’52 
The US Navy, or at least its Naval War College, was not ignoring the issue in 
1905 either.  Captain Charles S. Sperry had served as president of the US Naval War 
College since 1903, knew Alfred Thayer Mahan, and generally agreed with Mahan’s 
views on the laws of naval warfare.53  As president, Sperry had maintained the 
College’s summer studies on international law, led by Professor George C. Wilson, 
which were published annually.  The 1903 and 1904 summer sessions had considered 
a variety of maritime law topics, including blockade, neutral and belligerent rights, 
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conversion of merchant ships into warships, and the use of neutral ports by belligerent 
vessels.54  Sperry ensured that the discussions at the 1905 international law studies 
‘were directed to those topics which would probably come before the conference at 
The Hague and w[ould] be a further contribution in the same direction.’55  Indeed, the 
1905 studies analysed the inviolability of private property at sea, contraband, 
destruction of neutral prizes, continuous voyage, the use of mines, unneutral service, 
and the 1856 Declaration of Paris.56  The importance of these studies, including to 
Britain, was confirmed at the 1907 Conference.  Sperry, who served as a member of 
the American delegation, later wrote his son during the conference:  
The day after their arrival the English naval delegate came in to 
see me with the familiar blue bound book of our War College 
discussions, which he was using as a basis for propositions to put 
forward, just as I planned nearly four years ago when I had no idea of 
ever coming here.  The war college books facilitate my work, and that 
of others, immensely – and I never did anything cleverer in my 
brilliant life.57 
The immunity of private property at sea was the first topic considered in the 
War College’s 1905 analysis.  It noted that in Britain, which traditionally had opposed 
the principle, there ‘now seems to be a tendency … to recognize that in modern 
warfare the capture of private property may be open to question, the opinion … being 
that there is little reason for continuance of the practice.’  ‘Modern policy seems to 
show that the capture or private property at sea does not necessarily bring any great 
military advantage.’  After a full historical review, including recent experiences, the 
War College concluded that a proper, limited regulation exempting private property at 
sea from capture should be formulated.  ‘Of course such exemption does not cover 
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property of contraband nature, property involved in violation of blockade, property 
involved in unneutral service, or otherwise concerned directly in the war.  The 
regulation of exemption should apply therefore only to innocent property and ships.’58 
In late October 1905, the CID suggested that Britain’s positions on the 
subjects likely to be discussed at the next peace conference should be considered ‘to 
arrive at clear ideas of British interests in regard to them.’  The immunity of private 
property at sea was the fourteenth topic identified.  The CID noted that the Admiralty 
disagreed with the conclusions in Clarke’s memorandum of December 1904, but the 
Board of Trade thought, ‘they “appear to be sound.”’  Further consideration of the 
issue was in order.  ‘Whatever view may be adopted, some restriction of the sea area 
within which the right of search and capture could be exercised would apparently suit 
[Britain’s] interests as neutrals, and would cause us no disadvantages as belligerents.’  
Anticipating a subject that would arise at the 1907 Conference and the 1909 London 
Conference, the CID stated, ‘The adoption of a fixed radius from the territory of a 
belligerent, thus localizing the sphere in which neutral vessels would be liable to 
interference, seems desirable.’59 
Pressures were building in Britain to address the issue.  After the two letters 
appeared in The Times (London), British shipping interests petitioned the Board of 
Trade for appointment of a committee to consider adoption of an international 
agreement on the immunity of private property at sea.60  The Foreign Office thought 
the government should decide what its policy would be on the issue in conjunction 
with the Admiralty and the Board of Trade.61  It further opined that on ‘all matters 
involving the rights at sea of belligerents and neutrals it is of the greatest importance 
that Great Britain and the United States of America … should present a united front, 
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and by previous informal and confidential exchange of views arrive at as complete an 
understanding as possible.’62   
The issue was one of the first faced by new Foreign Secretary Sir Edward 
Grey following the resignation of Balfour’s government.  His initial view was that the 
government should appoint a committee to ‘decide whether it is to our advantage or 
not that private property of belligerents should be exempt from capture.’  However, he 
was concerned how any such agreement would be enforced in war.63  By January 
1906, the Foreign Office had concluded it was inevitable that immunity of private 
property at sea would be deliberated at the next international conference.  Although 
the Admiralty ‘do not wish the matter to be discussed’, the Foreign Office thought it 
would be better ‘to direct and control the discussion in order to serve the interests of 
Great Britain’.  That outcome could best be achieved by ‘endeavouring, with the 
cooperation of the American delegates as far as possible, to keep the discussion 
moving along lines favourable to our own interests.’64  Foreign Secretary Grey agreed 
that the views of the Admiralty and Board of Trade had to be considered.65  The 
Board of Trade told Grey they agreed with the creation of an inter-departmental 
committee to study the issue.66  In March, the Board of Trade told Grey that ‘on 
considerations of naval policy and on the question of British naval predominance … 
great weight must therefore attach to the views expressed by the Admiralty.’67  The 
Foreign Office decided that the Admiralty should be informed.  Moreover, the 
Foreign Office was more interested in the reasons for whatever positions the 
Admiralty ultimately expressed as opposed to the views themselves.68  The Foreign 
Office finally advised the Admiralty of the exchanges with the Board of Trade on the 
subject on 16 March 1906.69  After Russia submitted its list of proposed topics for the 
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conference, Grey decided an expert committee should be appointed to determine 
whether or not Britain should drop its traditional opposition to the immunity of 
private property at sea, among other issues likely to arise at the conference.70 
Shortly after Russia announced its list of topics, Alfred Thayer Mahan showed 
he did not lack persistence as a virtue.  Mahan interrupted a holiday in Germany to 
write to Hay’s successor as Secretary of State, Elihu Root.  In a lengthy letter, Mahan 
argued that adherence to the immunity of private property at sea, ‘derived from the 
expediencies of our early weakness, has been too easily continued by successive 
Administrations to the present day, and to very different conditions.’71  Mahan asked 
for a re-examination of the subject, and suggested that the issue be submitted to a 
panel of experts, such as the General Board of the Navy.72 
This time, Mahan’s plea found somewhat more fertile ground.  Root told 
Mahan that while he personally had ‘serious doubts’ about the policy, ‘The United 
States has advocated the immunity of private property at sea so long and so positively 
that I cannot see how it is possible to make a volte face at the [sic] Hague.’73  
Nevertheless, Root forwarded Mahan’s letter to the Secretary of the Navy, raising the 
point that ‘the liability of private property to seizure in time of war insures a strong 
and powerful class in every commercial country deeply interested in the preservation 
of peace.’  However, Root also noted ‘the necessity for protecting a merchant marine 
is undoubtedly an important consideration, leading to the enormous increase of naval 
armament now in progress.’  He asked for the views of the General Board of the 
Navy, headed by Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, on the subject.74   
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Less than a month after receiving the assignment, the General Board 
responded.75  It stated the policy should be viewed from both the moral and military 
standpoints, and that continuation of the America’s traditional policy had recently 
been advocated ‘from moral considerations’.  However, ‘the military or practical 
considerations have not received the attention in framing the United States policy 
which they deserve.’  Dewey and the Board recognized that American support for the 
policy had stemmed from the historical weakness of the Navy, especially vis-à-vis the 
size of the country’s maritime commerce.  The Board proceeded to review the moral, 
legal, and military aspects of the immunity principle, analysing the impact on war 
with various powers, including France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan.76  
Specifically addressing the possibility of war with Britain, the General Board 
concluded:   
The British Navy so far surpasses the American Navy in strength that 
the chances of the United States obtaining command of the sea in time 
of war are practically nil.  …  Practically the only injury which 
America could inflict upon England upon the sea in time of war would 
be such as she could inflict upon her seaborne commerce.77  
Based on its analysis, the Board concluded that because a relatively small 
amount of American commerce was carried in US ships in contrast to potential 
enemies, thereby permitting greater injury to be done to enemy commerce, the US 
should not give up the military advantage it possessed by continuing to argue for the 
immunity of private property at sea.  Oddly, the Board recommended the adoption of 
regulations almost identical to the provisions in the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting 
Maritime Law.78  The Board did not recommend complete renunciation of the 
principle of immunity of private property.   
The General Board had rushed its response and was not of one mind regarding 
its recommendations.  A month after the initial report, Board member Rear Admiral 
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W.J. Barnette told Mahan in a confidential letter, because it was ‘important that you 
should be informed regarding every phase’, that the Board’s analysis ‘was not entirely 
satisfactory to the majority of the board, but there were circumstances in connection 
with its preparation … which made it impossible for us to make a decided point of its 
revision’.  Barnette told Mahan that the immunity of private property issue would 
‘undoubtedly receive further consideration’, and invited further input from Mahan.79 
Three months later, in a supplemental memorandum, the General Board 
argued that the US should tie itself to Britain and   
exert our diplomatic efforts to dissuade Great Britain from giving up 
the great advantage she now holds over Germany, due to her great 
Navy and her excellent strategical position in regard to Germany’s 
commerce.  This great advantage would be lost to Great Britain should 
she join with the United States in its previous mistaken policy of 
urging an international agreement to exempt private property from 
seizure in time of war.80 
Not satisfied with the General Board’s failure to recommend wholesale 
rejection of the immunity principle, Mahan again directly raised the issue in late July 
1906 during a meeting with President Roosevelt.  Roosevelt remained unimpressed 
with Mahan’s arguments.81  Afterwards, Mahan wrote Roosevelt, again laying out his 
arguments but this time asking permission to take his case to the court of public 
opinion.82  Roosevelt consented, saying, ‘[I]t is important for you to write just what 
you think of the matter.’83  Mahan proceeded to embark on a concerted writing 
campaign, authoring articles and eventually combining some of them along with 
works by others into a book focused in part on the immunity of private property at sea 
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issue.84  He clearly hoped his efforts would result in the US dropping its traditional 
position.85 
Meanwhile, the Admiralty were fighting against any change in Britain’s 
traditional policy opposing immunity.  Soon after Russia announced the proposed 
topics, First Sea Lord Fisher wrote a friend expressing his concern:  ‘We have a 
disquieting subject ahead in a new Hague Conference.  All the world will be banded 
against us.  Our great special anti-German weapon of smashing an enemy’s commerce 
will be wrested from us.  …  These Hague Conferences want trade and commerce … 
all to go on just as usual, only just the Fleet to fight!  ROT!!!’86  This is a critical point 
at issue between Fisher and his ‘syndicate of discontent’ critics, notably Custance, 
who believed that battle would settle everything.  However, Fisher did not disregard 
preparations for the 1907 Conference as if any agreements reached simply could later 
be ignored.  Rather, he strenuously promoted his, and the Admiralty’s, view on the 
issue of the immunity of private property. 
The committee Grey appointed to consider Britain’s positions on the topics for 
the international conference was known as the Walton Committee after the last name 
of its chair, Attorney General John L. Walton.  Captain Charles L. Ottley, the Director 
of Naval Intelligence, represented the Admiralty.87  Ottley was an expert on sea mines 
and wore the distinctive ‘torpedo cut’ beard of the torpedo branch.88  Fisher thought 
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very highly of him because of his superior intellect and organising power.89  Selborne, 
the previous First Lord, recommended Ottley’s appointment as DNI to succeed Prince 
Louis of Battenberg in May 1904.  Ottley was keen on the appointment in part 
because he suffered from seasickness so badly he could no longer serve at sea.  He 
finally assumed his new appointment in February 1905.90 
Even before his formal appointment to the committee, action was occurring on 
the issue of the immunity of private property at sea.    On 12 May 1906, the Admiralty 
provided comments on the list of likely subjects for the conference prepared by 
Clarke in October 1905.  On the right of capture of neutral ships, the Admiralty noted 
that neutral ships were immune from capture, unless carrying contraband, under the 
Declaration of Paris.  The Admiralty disagreed with Clarke’s suggestion for a limited 
area over which the right of search could be exercised.  It also addressed specifically 
the right of capture of private property at sea, stating unequivocally, ‘British interests 
require that our ancient right to capture private property at sea should be maintained.’  
Considering particularly a possible war with Germany, it disagreed that any 
limitations should be placed on the right, using language likely influenced by Fisher.91 
 Two days later, Clarke submitted another memorandum prepared at the 
direction of the Prime Minister.  Clarke’s new analysis focused on the question ‘of the 
immunity of the private property of a belligerent under his flag’.  Thus, the subject of 
his new memorandum, while linked to his December 1904 study on the immunity of 
neutral ships in time of war, was different.  Indeed, Clarke stated that the question 
addressed in his earlier memorandum was ‘absolutely distinct from that of the 
immunity of the private property under his flag, with which it has often been most 
inconveniently confused’.92  Nicholas Lambert therefore is wrong when he asserts 
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Clarke’s May 1906 memorandum ‘amounted to a near total reversal of his previous 
position.’93  The memoranda addressed two distinct, albeit related, subjects.  Clarke 
concluded that exercising the right to seize belligerent private property would cause 
economic stress on an enemy, especially Germany, and therefore tend to shorten any 
war.  Moreover, he viewed this right as more valuable to Britain than the right of 
blockade.  Britain therefore, had ‘nothing to gain and much to lose by abandoning the 
right in question [capture of belligerent’s private property at sea], and that of the two 
rights – capture and blockade – the latter is the less valuable to us as belligerents and 
the most injurious to us as neutrals.’  However, Clarke thought Britain could bargain 
away the right of capture, ‘If there were any reason to suppose that by abandoning an 
immemorial right [Britain] could secure a general reduction of naval armaments and 
check the naval competition which is heavily pressing upon the nations, a valid 
argument for change of British policy might be established.’94  Britain’s traditional 
policy was now a bargaining chip to be used at The Hague.  Britain’s willingness to 
use its traditional policy as a basis for negotiation reflects the economic pressure of 
steadily increasing naval expenditures on the government.95 
The Admiralty submitted an analysis by Ottley on the right of capture of 
neutral ships.  Ottley’s memorandum recognized that neutral ships, unless carrying 
contraband, were immune from seizure.  The key issue, therefore, was the scope of 
what was or was not contraband.  Britain’s interests as a neutral were that contraband 
should be strictly limited.  As a belligerent, Ottley concluded that because of land 
shipment such as by rail, ‘the belligerent right of interrupting contraband traffic by 
neutrals does not possess its former value for this country.’96   Thus, regarding neutral 
shipping, the Admiralty essentially agreed with Clarke’s December 1904 analysis. 
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Assistant CID Secretary Nicholson asked Captain Slade for his thoughts on 
the Admiralty’s comments on the list of likely subjects for the 1907 Conference.  
Slade was unable to complete his analysis because he had not received some 
communications between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office.  However, on the 
right of capture of neutral ships, he noted the question hinged on how ‘contraband’ 
was defined.  Slade thought Britain had ‘always dealt with this right of capture from 
the point of view of political expediency’.  Regarding Germany, he thought the right 
had little value.  Abandoning the right would settle a number of related issues, 
including contraband and sinking prizes.  He concluded, ‘Whatever we do we must 
remember that we possess a valuable asset and if we part with it we must do so at the 
highest price.’97  The concept of obtaining the most value in return for relinquishing a 
maritime right would factor significantly at the 1909 London Conference. 
In July, Clarke approached the American military attaché in London and 
Judge Advocate General Davis, who had already been selected as one of the 
American delegates to the 1907 Conference, and asked for the United States’ view on 
the immunity of private property at sea.  He also offered to share the extensive data he 
had collected on the issue.  Informed of the approach, Secretary of State Root 
responded through the American ambassador, saying he would be glad to review the 
data on a confidential basis.  Nothing further was heard at the time.98  Root remained 
anxious to learn what Britain’s position on the issue would be at the Conference.  In 
October, he wrote Whitelaw Reid, the ambassador in Britain, to ask Foreign Secretary 
Grey what his views were on the immunity of private property.  Root stated he now 
harboured ‘grave doubts’ about the United States’ traditional policy.  He also told 
Reid he thought the two countries were in agreement on the issue of the limitation of 
naval armaments and desired the two nations to work together on that issue.99 
At this point, the views of the US and Britain on the issue of the immunity of 
private property at sea seemed to be converging.  In early December 1906, Davis 
learned from the US military attaché in London that the British government was 
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divided, with some members favouring immunity and others opposing it.  Clarke had 
informally suggested a compromise, that an ‘enemy’s property in an enemy’s ships 
should continue to be liable to capture in accordance with the existing rule, but to 
couple that with a proposition abolishing contraband altogether, but leaving the 
belligerent a right to blockade and to capture and confiscate ships and their cargoes, 
which were engaged in violating the blockade.’   The US wanted a definite proposal, 
but none was forthcoming.  Secretary of State Root was inclined to allow the capture 
of private property at sea, although ‘he sees how strong an argument in favor of 
immunity … has been.’100   
After learning of the British government’s divided views and the proposed 
compromise, now-Admiral Charles Sperry, who had already been designated the 
naval representative for the 1907 Conference, wrote to General Davis to make clear 
that he was ‘in entire accord’ with Mahan’s more stringent views and those of the 
General Board of the Navy, although he thought the General Board’s proposed 
regulations ‘vague and unnecessary’.101  In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of State, 
Sperry added his voice to those urging the US change its traditional position.  He 
reiterated his agreement with Mahan and the General Board.  Sperry also stated that 
the United States’ traditional support for the immunity principle ‘is due to a 
misunderstanding.  …  There is no analogy between the condition of the private 
property on land … and private property in transit on the high seas.  …  The latter is 
not in the hands of the consumer; it is mobile, and its destination may be changed at 
any instant.’102  
While the US Secretary of State was being encouraged to drop support for the 
immunity of private property at sea, Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman was being 
pressured to adopt the immunity principle.  In December 1906, he was presented with 
a petition, signed by 168 members of the House of Commons, urging the government 
to adopt the exemption of private property at sea in time of war.103  Clarke responded 
with a note to the Prime Minister, providing ammunition to use against the petitioners.  
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He rejected the bases for every one of the points asserted.  In particular, responding to 
the petitioners’ assertion that the US would support the principle at the upcoming 
conference, Clarke stated, ‘We know that the view of the United States is changing on 
this point, and this was certain as soon as their Navy became more formidable.’104    
He concluded: 
The maintenance of the right of capture is the greatest existing 
deterrent to War between Powers largely dependent on commerce.  If 
it were removed the risks of war would be immensely increased, and in 
this and other countries it might confidently be expected that an 
aggressive spirit would be engendered.105  
Mahan would have entirely agreed with Clarke’s position. 
In February 1907, the Admiralty made a further submission to the Walton 
Committee, reiterating its unyielding opposition to any change in British policy.  
However, now the basis for its position was ‘that there is no reason to doubt the 
power of the [Royal Navy] to obtain command of the sea in any war which may be 
regarded as reasonably probable.’  Command of the sea would ‘guarantee’ the safety 
of British merchant shipping against any belligerent attacks, and ‘should cause the 
practically complete disappearance of the enemy’s mercantile flag from the high 
seas.’106  Thus, no reason existed to provide for the immunity of private property at 
sea; the Royal Navy would provide all the protection needed.   
The Admiralty’s arguments supporting Britain’s traditional position on the 
immunity of private property at sea likely had shifted to command of the sea and 
maintenance of the size of the Royal Navy due to the government’s desire to reduce 
naval expenditures and to discuss disarmament at the 1907 Conference.  In addition, 
the US wanted to discuss arms reductions, especially naval expenditures.  After 
initially opposing introduction of the topic, Germany ultimately permitted its 
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discussion.107  By shifting the bases for the defence of Britain’s traditional position, 
the Admiralty also countered the government’s push for reducing naval expenditures.  
Indeed, in January 1907, Fisher prepared a memorandum for Sir Edward Grey 
arguing against limiting naval armaments and the size of battleships.  Fisher opposed 
limiting the size of battleships.  On limiting naval expenditures, such an agreement 
was palatable only if the status quo of the Royal Navy’s size relative to other nation’s 
navies was maintained and somehow ensured, which was thought unlikely.108 
The Walton Committee then issued a separate report addressing only the right 
of capture of private property at sea.  The committee unanimously agreed no change 
should be made in Britain’s traditional opposition to the immunity of private property 
at sea.  It concluded that the belligerent right of capture was a ‘strongly deterrent 
influence’ against any other country with a large merchant fleet initiating war with 
Britain.  In addition, the ‘coercive pressure of economic and industrial stress’ 
resulting from exercising the right of capture ‘would operate strongly in shortening 
the war.’109  The Walton Committee’s final report appeared to decide the issue for 
Britain, concluding that the country should not abandon its traditional opposition to 
the immunity of private property at sea in time of war, even if other nations adopted 
the principle of immunity.110  Despite some slight wavering since Hay’s original 
invitation, Britain seemed to have come full circle, back to its starting point – or had 
it? 
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Commercial interests again petitioned the government to adopt the immunity 
principle.111  Sir Robert Reid, now Lord Loreburn and Lord Chancellor, wrote a well-
argued memorandum to the Cabinet urging that the country drop its opposition to the 
immunity of private property at sea.112  The result was indecision by the government.  
On 26 April, the Cabinet met and was unable to reach any decision.113  On 2 May, the 
US ambassador to Britain learned from Foreign Secretary Grey that the Cabinet had 
decided on the instructions for the British delegation to The Hague on every issue 
except the question of immunity of private property at sea.114  Three days later, a 
decision still had not been reached.  The Prime Minister told one of the British 
delegates that ‘he had read both sides of the controversy, and at the end of each paper 
perused he found himself agreeing with the writer.’115  On 16 May, Mahan re-entered 
the debate, asking if Eyre Crowe would give the British delegates a copy of his 
forthcoming article against the immunity of private property at sea, to be published in 
the National Review.116  In his article, Mahan attacked the view that private property 
at sea should be treated the same as private property at land during time of war.  He 
responded to Lord Loreburn’s arguments published in October 1905, showing 
Loreburn’s failure to adequately consider the offensive benefits to Britain from 
capturing commerce at sea.117  On 3 June, Grey circulated draft instructions on the 
issue, which after summarizing the arguments on both sides, concluded, ‘His 
Majesty’s Government cannot authorize … any Resolution which would diminish the 
effective means which the navy has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy.’118  
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However, if some agreement on the diminution of military and naval armaments 
became dependent on adoption of the principle of immunity, the government might 
change its position.119  Grey’s willingness to trade an asset for savings in military 
expenditures is similar to Lord Salisbury’s secret proposal to Russia before the 1899 
Conference.  The final instructions to the British delegation were identical.120 
At the same time that Britain was reaching its final position on the issue of the 
immunity of private property at sea, the US was struggling to reach a final decision as 
well.  At a day-long meeting held at the State Department on 20 April 1907, Secretary 
of State Root initially stated he ‘was not wholly clear as to the position the 
Government should take on this important question’, but that a different view was 
precluded by the position taken by the US at the 1899 Conference.  Admiral Sperry 
and General Porter, the Navy and Army delegates, spoke extensively against the 
principle, arguing that its rejection would be a significant restraint on war, because 
‘An empty stomach does not fight, and if people fear starvation in advance they are 
less likely to rush to arms knowing that starvation may result from it.’  Joseph Choate, 
the designated head of the delegation, spoke in favour of immunity, arguing that the 
government ‘should examine the question from the humanitarian and international 
standpoint rather than weigh the doctrine solely in the scale of self-interest.’  The 
discussion ended when Secretary Root concluded that, ‘although he had great doubt 
on the question, he felt it his duty to instruct the delegation in favor of the 
immunity.’ 121   The final instructions of 31 May unequivocally instructed the 
American delegation to ‘maintain the traditional policy of the United States regarding 
the immunity of private property of belligerents at sea.’122  The US as well had come 
full circle. 
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Nicholas Lambert and Christopher Martin argue that during these final months 
of debate, Fisher used a copy of the preface to the 1907 Naval War Plans, written by 
Julian Corbett, to try to influence the British and American governments’ positions.123  
Martin argues, ‘The purpose of the Plans was to explain the fundamental problem that 
an extension of immunity would bring to the Royal Navy.’124  Lambert relies on 
Martin’s argument and concludes, ‘That Fisher handed a copy of this supposedly 
secret preface to current war plans to Augustus Choate, the chief US delegate to the 
Hague Conference, strongly supports this [Martin’s] interpretation.’125  Both Martin 
and Lambert are wrong.  First, Julian Corbett certainly authored the preface to the 
1907 War Plans.  However, Martin’s assertion that Fisher distributed the plans before 
the 1907 Conference to Foreign Secretary Grey and First Lord Tweedmouth relies on 
communications in January 1908, after the conference concluded.126  His argument 
thus is not supported by his references.  Lambert’s ‘strong support’ fails even more.  
The document Fisher provided to Joseph Choate, the head of the US delegation, was a 
copy of Corbett’s recent article on the immunity of private property at sea, which 
Corbett published earlier in June 1907.127  Furthermore, Shawn Grimes and Matthew 
Seligmann have demonstrated that the 1907 War Plans were not simply an attempt at 
propaganda.128  The ‘major aim’ of the 1907 plans was ‘the destruction of the German 
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merchant marine and the stoppage of German seaborne trade in neutral bottoms.’129  
The first alternative plan recognized the need to conduct interdiction of enemy 
commerce ‘beyond the ordinary radius of action of the enemy’s torpedo craft, and 
without entering the waters where hostile mines may’ exist.130  The 1907 Plans thus 
recognized the problems with traditional close blockade in light of modern naval 
weapons. 
Conclusion 
In anticipation of the 1907 Hague Conference, the United States and Great 
Britain undertook extensive review and reconsideration of their respective positions 
vis-à-vis the immunity of private property at sea in time of war.  The US started from 
its traditional support of this principle.  The Navy, led by Alfred Thayer Mahan and 
the Navy’s General Board, nearly brought about a reversal of the country’s long-
standing adherence to the inviolability of private property.  In the end, an inability to 
change from the status quo caused the US to enter the 1907 Conference with its 
position unchanged.  In Britain, the country’s civilian leadership led the arguments 
that the country should drop its opposition to the immunity of private property at sea.  
The Royal Navy successfully led the defence of Britain’s traditional policy.   
The fluidity in the two countries’ positions was due to the changes each navy 
and nation was experiencing.  Britain faced increasing challenges to its naval power 
from other nations.  It could no longer act virtually unilaterally on the seas.  Neutral 
rights, as learned during the South African and Russo-Japanese wars, played a greater 
role in limiting the exercise of sea power.  Britain’s merchant trade interests were 
greater than in the past.  A new equilibrium had to be found, balancing Britain’s 
essential belligerent rights with neutral interests and the risks presented by the rest of 
the world.  At the same time, the US Navy was well on its way to becoming a global 
player.  The country’s new naval power no longer justified the United States’ 
traditional support for the immunity of private property at sea.  While the US Navy’s 
leaders understood this change, its civilian leadership had not yet grasped the new 
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role.  In late 1906 and early 1907, the two countries came tantalizingly close to 
realizing how close their positions were.  Indeed, for a time, they each nearly adopted 
the other’s view.  Instead, the convergence of the two nation’s positions diverged, as 
each returned to their original, traditional views at the last moment.  The impact of 







The 1907 Conference opened on 15 June 1907 with representatives of forty-
four nations present.  The conference assigned its primary deliberations to four 
subsidiary commissions.  Given the predominance of maritime issues on the list of 
subject to be considered, two of the commissions, the third and fourth, were devoted 
to naval issues.1  Attendance at commission meetings, including sub-commissions, 
often far exceeded the number of official members and on occasion numbered nearly 
one hundred.2  The presidents of the third and fourth commissions on maritime 
subjects set lofty goals from the beginning.  The Italian delegate presiding over the 
Third Commission reminded the delegates on the first day of that commission’s 
meeting that, ‘“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.”’3 
The 1907 Convention’s achievements regarding naval issues generally were 
hard-fought.  For example, Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry, the US naval delegate, 
stated after the conference ended that the ‘Convention Relative to the Laying of 
Automatic Submarine Contact Mines’, ‘was the bitterest fight of the Conference and 
lasted in Committee from June 15th to September 26th, coming down at last to the very 
proposition put forward by the officers at our War College in the summer of 1905 
when I was president.’4  One exception to the difficult negotiations was the creation 
of an International Prize Court, which was seen as a reaction to decisions of Russian 
prize courts during its recent war with Japan.  Both Great Britain and Germany 
proposed the establishment of such a court, although Foreign Secretary Grey did not 
like the way in which Germany tried to steal Britain’s thunder in first making the 
                                                
1 James Brown Scott, ed., The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences:  The 
Conference of 1907 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1920), I:  54-55. 
2 Davis (1975), 220. 
3 Scott, ed., 1907 Conference, III:  289. 
4 Sperry to son, 6 Oct. 1907, box 5, folder 2, Sperry Papers. 
 209 
proposition.5  Despite some bumps along the road, agreement eventually was reached 
creating an International Prize Court.  Although desirous of signing that convention, 
Britain did not do so because of outstanding questions regarding the law the new 
court was to apply.6  The importance of that issue to Britain ultimately led to the 1909 
London Conference.   
This chapter focuses on the contentious issue of the immunity of private 
property at sea and its impact on relations between the United States and Great Britain 
at the conference.  It first briefly introduces the British and American delegations and 
their instructions insofar as they related to immunity and contraband.  This chapter 
then analyses the debates on the immunity principle and shows how that issue 
influenced Britain’s bold proposal to abolish the concept of contraband.  Finally, the 
views of the US and Britain regarding the outcome of the conference are considered 
as a prelude to the London Naval Conference of 1909. 
Delegations and Directions 
Unlike the 1899 Conference, when the American delegation was selected 
shortly before the conference began and with little forethought, President Roosevelt 
acted quickly and decisively.  Within weeks of Russia reinvigorating his previous call 
for an international conference, Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root determined that 
Joseph H. Choate, the retired ambassador to Great Britain, would chair the 
delegation.7  By January 1906, Roosevelt and Root had selected the other members of 
the delegation.8  Retired General Horace Porter, who had previously served as the 
American ambassador to France and had been considered a possible delegate to the 
1899 Conference, would join Choate.  Porter had achieved renown when he located 
and returned the remains of US Navy hero John Paul Jones to the US in June 1905.  
He had become president of the Navy League, and his interest in naval matters may 
have factored in his selection.  Roosevelt and Root selected retired judge Uriah Rose 
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as the third delegate.9  As army and navy delegates, Root initially asked now-General 
William Crozier, who had served on the 1899 delegation.  However, Crozier declined 
and suggested Judge Advocate General George B. Davis, an international law scholar, 
whom Root selected.10  Root asked Naval War College President Sperry to be the 
naval delegate.  Sperry was surprised by his selection, but hoped if he performed his 
duties well, he might gain a suitable sea command.11   
Preparations for the conference began almost immediately.  Root hosted the 
entire delegation plus Assistant Secretary of State Bacon at dinner on 28 February 
1906.  President Roosevelt had the same group for dinner at the White House the next 
day.12  Sperry sent copies of the War College’s international law studies for 1903 and 
1904 to each of the other American delegates, along with ‘a list of subjects said to 
have been prepared by the British government for discussion preliminary to 
presentation to the conference, which was received confidentially and which I 
suppose to be the same as that alluded to in the Secretary of State’s conversation with 
the delegates on the 28th ultimo at his house.’13  President Roosevelt also appointed 
Sperry and Davis as plenipotentiaries to the Geneva Convention of 1906, which was 
called for the limited purpose of revising the rules for the treatment of the sick and 
wounded during war, not more general laws relating to the conduct of war.  
Attendance at the 1906 Geneva Conference was a valuable experience for the 1907 
Conference, because many of the issues touching on maritime matters were deferred 
to the later conference.14  Indeed, Sperry and Davis were told ‘the chief purpose of the 
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meeting at Geneva will be to gather information for presentation to the later 
Conference at The Hague’. 15   Thus, before the delegation’s instructions were 
finalized, the US delegates were well educated and prepared on international naval 
issues.  Each had the diplomatic status of plenipotentiaries at the conference.16 
The final instructions covered a variety of topics that were expected to come 
before the conference, including arbitration of disputes, the use of force to collect 
debts, and limitation of armaments.  On maritime matters the delegation was told to 
advocate an agreement declaring private property, except contraband or on board 
ships attempting to violate a blockade, immune from capture or seizure at sea.  The 
US Naval War Code of 1900, with amendments proposed in 1903, was to be used as 
the basis for a code of rules for maritime warfare.  Regarding the rights and duties of 
neutrals, Secretary Root instructed, ‘No rules should be adopted for the purpose of 
mitigating the evils of war to belligerents which will tend to strongly destroy the right 
of neutrals, and no rules should be adopted regarding the rights of neutrals which will 
tend to strongly bring about war.’  Neutral rights should be ‘most clearly and 
distinctly defined and understood’ to avoid any misunderstandings.  Specific attention 
was drawn to contraband.  Root warned that the recent actions of belligerents (Russia) 
to expand the scope of contraband, when used in conjunction with the doctrine of 
continuous voyage, essentially destroyed the concepts that a free ship makes free 
goods and that a blockade must be effective to be lawful.  Root’s warning anticipated 
the scenario that developed in 1914, when Britain expanded the list of contraband, 
much to the consternation of the US.  Accordingly, the delegation was to ‘do all in 
your power to bring about an agreement upon what is to constitute contraband; and it 
is very desirable that the list should be limited as narrowly as possible.’17 
Octogenarian Sir Edward Fry led Britain’s delegation.  Although he had no 
diplomatic experience and had to re-learn French, the language of diplomacy, in 
preparation for the conference, he was an experienced international jurist and a 
member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  Sir Ernest Satow and Lord Reay were 
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both experienced diplomats, the former having been appointed to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in November 1906, and the latter having served in the Dutch 
diplomatic service before becoming a British subject.  Sir Henry Howard, who served 
on the delegation to the 1899 Conference, joined Fry, Satow, and Reay as the only 
members with plenipotentiary powers. Major General Edmond Elles and DNI Captain 
Charles Ottley were appointed the military and naval delegates, respectively, although 
without plenipotentiary status.18  Foreign Secretary Grey appointed career Foreign 
Office clerk Eyre Crowe as secretary to the plenipotentiaries.19  Crowe’s appointment 
began his involvement in issues involving contraband and the rights of neutrals and 
belligerents in war that would continue through the Declaration of London in 1908-
1909.  As delegation secretary in 1907, Crowe exercised considerable influence over 
Fry and eventually induced Fry to promote him to technical delegate so that he could 
participate in conference meetings.20   
Ottley’s selection was not without some controversy, at least in the mind of 
CID Secretary George Clarke.  When the Foreign Office asked for Ottley to serve on 
the delegation, Clarke told Viscount Esher, ‘Ottley is quite unfit, physically, mentally, 
to represent H.M.’s Navy at a great international gathering.  He is intellectually much 
of a fibertijibit & personally he looks too much like a Portuguese Eurasian.’  Clarke 
suggested Admiral of the Fleet Edward Seymour as an alternative appointment.21  
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Clarke further complained when he learned Ottley had asked to bring a young 
commander, ‘who knows nothing about these matters’ as his servant to The Hague.  
‘This representation of the Navy by a man like Ottley … is seriously improper & 
undignified.  It also is most unfair to the Br[itish] Navy as a whole.’22  After Ottley’s 
appointment was announced, Clarke told Esher, ‘Naturally, the Navy has no opinion 
of Ottley, who is not a sailor & has no practical experience of commanding ships.  Is 
it too late to add Wilson?’23  Ottley, however, was Fisher’s man and so remained a 
delegate.   
Grey’s final instructions, addressed to Fry, covered most topics that had been 
considered by the Walton Committee.  On immunity of private property, Grey noted 
that adoption of such a principle would entail the abolition of the right of blockade.  
‘Unless commercial blockade is discontinued there will be constant interference with 
an enemy’s ships, and constant disputes as to what constitutes an effective blockade.’  
Because the ‘British Navy is the only offensive weapon which Great Britain has 
against Continental Powers’, Britain could not support immunity of private property.  
Regarding contraband, ‘His Majesty’s Government recognize to the full the 
desirability of freeing neutral commerce to the utmost extent possible from 
interference by belligerent Powers’, and would propose the abolition of contraband 
entirely instead of trying to create better rules for determining what was and was not 
contraband.  Britain wanted to immunize neutral trade during war from interference 
by belligerents, subject to the limitation of blockade.  Such immunization would 
benefit Britain whether it was a neutral or belligerent.  If such a proposal failed, the 
delegation was to endeavour to achieve a definite list of items considered to be 
contraband that was as narrow as possible.24  Grey also sent a confidential letter to 
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Fry with several additional observations.  He told Fry to maintain good relations with 
other delegations, especially the US.  Regarding the ‘novel proposition’ for the 
abolition of contraband, he suggested having another nation initiate it.25  
Nicholas Lambert contends that First Sea Lord Fisher likewise provided 
additional instructions to Ottley.26  He relies on a letter Fisher wrote near the end of 
the conference to his friend Viscount Esher, in which he stated:  ‘the orders given to 
the Admiralty delegates are so stringent that they would leave by the next train if our 
fighting interests are tampered with’.27  Lambert assumes such orders existed, admits 
no copy remains, and then engages in wholesale speculation as to their precise 
terms.28  According to Lambert, Fisher did not care about the proceedings because he 
spent the summer away from London and the Second Sea Lord, William May, to 
whom matters were delegated, was not ‘an intellectual heavyweight’.  Ottley, 
therefore, ‘was entrusted with safeguarding the Admiralty’s interests as best he could, 
and with keeping them informed of developments.’29  
Ottley did more than simply keep the Admiralty advised of the proceedings.  
He regularly sought and received advice on what positions to take from the Admiralty 
and Foreign Office, as Lambert admits.30  However, Fisher was not aloof and 
unconcerned with what was occurring at The Hague.  Before the conference started, 
he vigorously lobbied the chief US delegate on the immunity of private property 
issue, mines, and other topics.31  Foreign Office records suggest Fisher was consulted 
on the position to take on an issue regarding prize money that arose during the 
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conference.32  Ottley telegraphed Fisher at least once for directions on a proposed 
provision to the convention regulating the conduct of maritime warfare.33  Admiralty 
Secretary Greene spoke with Fisher for guidance during the conference.34  Finally, 
Fisher commented on the conference’s proceedings during a lunch with Russian 
diplomats.35  Thus, Fisher was not uninterested the conference’s proceedings or its 
outcome.  However, no evidence exists, as Nicholas Lambert speculates, that Fisher 
gave additional, secret orders to Ottley prior to the Conference. 
Collision 
Even before he arrived in London, Joseph Choate strongly favoured the 
immunity of private property at sea.  While still on board his ship bound for 
Southampton, he wrote his son: 
I still think that the immunity of private property at sea will be the one 
important question – Whether England is prepared to yield the position 
she has held so obstinately and come in to our view that all private 
property at sea except contraband and violating blockade ought to be 
exempt from capture and destruction I hope to learn her expectations.  
It seems so manifestly for her interest.  I hope she will.36  
Not unlike Mahan and his efforts to influence the views of the British 
delegation, First Sea Lord Fisher tried to influence the American delegation upon its 
arrival in London.  He provided a copy of Julian Corbett’s article arguing against the 
principle of immunity of private property to Choate. 37  In the article, Corbett 
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masterfully dismantled the arguments in favour of immunity.  Corbett examined the 
history of the principle and showed, like Mahan in his contemporaneous commentary, 
that the ability to capture private property at sea was not inhumane, immoral, unjust, 
or inconsistent with protection of private property in war on land.  In fact, ‘the sea 
service, in demanding the retention of its right to general capture, asks no more than 
what is universally granted to the land service.’  ‘Command of the sea’ means control 
of communications, and by capturing property at sea, a navy interrupts an enemy’s 
communications, ‘without in any way demoralising our personnel or goading the 
enemy’s people to irregular retaliation.’  The risk of having property captured at sea 
also had a deterrent value ‘beyond measure’, and was far more effective than a 
blockade in ‘destroying the enemy’s commerce by control of sea communication.’  
Capturing property at sea was a critical means of offence for the Royal Navy, one that 
could not be surrendered.38  Fisher thought the article had ‘done splendid service with 
Choate’.39  Events would prove Fisher was mistaken. 
At a meeting at the Foreign Office in London between Foreign Secretary 
Grey, the US ambassador, and the primary American and British delegates to the 
conference, Grey tried to gain unanimity on a number of subjects as well as the 
manner of approaching them at the conference, including the issue of the immunity of 
private property at sea.  Sir Ernest Satow noted in his journal that while Choate would 
advocate immunity, he would maintain support for blockades.  Grey wanted the 
British delegates to argue that abolition of blockade logically would follow from 
adoption of the immunity principle.  Because Germany favoured both immunity and 
abolition of blockade, Britain’s plan would separate the US from Germany.  In 
addition, Choate indicated he would probably support Britain’s proposal to abolish 
contraband.  Satow thought at the end of the meeting, ‘we are agreed on all points 
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except “private property at sea”.’40  However, Satow did not realize the depth of 
Choate’s support for the principle. 
The American ambassador in London previously had reported to Secretary of 
State Root that Britain was ‘extremely strong against the immunity of private property 
at sea – holding about the view which our Captain Mahan has vigorously enforced.’  
Nevertheless, when Choate was in London,  
he seemed enthusiastic in favor of this doctrine and rather startled the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs by holding before him the prospect of a 
union of all nations against the British position – inquiring whether 
under these circumstances Great Britain would still feel disposed to 
maintain its ground.  Sir Edward replied with a good deal of adroitness 
that they would take that question into consideration when 
circumstances arose.41   
President Roosevelt was ‘astounded at what … Choate said.’  He confirmed that he 
held ‘to our traditional American view, but in rather tepid fashion’, but asked, ‘Is it 
worth my while to call the matter to the attention of either Root or Choate?’42  
Unfortunately, by the time Roosevelt learned of Choate’s action, the relations 
between the two countries at the 1907 Conference had been harmed. 
Choate aggressively asserted America’s positions and denied cooperation to 
Britain.  On 14 June, Grey was unable to convince Choate to present the British 
proposal to abolish contraband.43  At the first meeting of the Fourth Commission of 
the conference on 24 June, Choate read the American proposal banning the capture of 
private property at sea, excluding contraband and ships attempting to violate a 
blockade.44  Choate tried to get Britain to change its position, arguing that adoption of 
the immunity principle was inevitable.  He told Satow that he would make a speech in 
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support of immunity.  Satow told Choate Britain’s reply ‘would be in a friendly 
tone.’45  However, Satow did not know the tenor Choate’s speech would take.   
Choate’s lengthy speech reviewed the history of the immunity principle and 
America’s leadership in advocating its adoption, including efforts to obtain adoption 
by the signatories to the 1856 Paris Declaration.  Choate’s arguments were directed 
primarily against Britain and were highly critical of any nation that opposed immunity 
of private property at sea in time of war.  He quoted various British supporters of 
immunity including Lord Palmerston, John Stuart Mill, and Lord Loreburn’s October 
1905 letter to The Times (London). Choate described the value of the right of capture 
in modern times as ‘greatly diminished and … still rapidly diminishing.’  He further 
urged adoption of the principle on the grounds of humanity.46  Choate received praise 
for his speech from a variety of sources.  US industrialist and peace activist Andrew 
Carnegie said it was a ‘great speech’ and encouraged a vote on the issue, saying, ‘It 
would be an object lesson to the people of Britain to see her standing apart when 
Germany and America and most of the other nations stand together.’47  Andrew 
White, the head of the American delegation in 1899, told Choate ‘all thinking 
Americans’ would be grateful for the speech and, ‘It is a pity that … the English 
could not have taken a different view of it.’48   
The British recognized the speech was directed primarily against them.  Satow 
described it as ‘full of repetitions, quotations, mainly directed against us’.49  At the 
next meeting of the Fourth Commission, Satow said Britain had carefully studied the 
question but could not support the immunity principle because to do so ‘would seem 
to involve the abolition of the right of blockade.’  He then announced that ‘animated 
by a sincere desire to relieve neutrals, so far as possible, of the burdens of war,’ 
Britain would propose to abolish contraband of war.50  US delegate Uriah Rose then 
made another long speech extolling immunity, using a colourful American analogy 
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that implicitly compared Britain to swine for opposing the doctrine.51  Angered, Sir 
Edward Fry responded, countering Rose’s assertion that the capture of private 
property at sea was cruel.  When merchant ships at sea were captured, ‘[n]o one is 
killed, no one is even wounded; it is a peaceful proceeding.’  He concluded, ‘To 
complain therefore of the capture of merchant ships and not to prohibit war on land is 
to choose the greater of two evils.’52  Satow described Rose’s speech as ‘tedious’ and 
‘intended for home consumption’.53   
By this time, the American delegation had formed a view of Britain’s 
approach to the conference.  General Davis wrote Assistant Secretary of State Bacon: 
In naval questions the policy of the British Government is 
slowly disclosing itself, and may be stated as follows.  It is the desire 
of the Government to retain the right to capture enemy private property 
on the high seas in time of war and there is no present indication of a 
disposition on its part to forego that right, or to submit to its 
modification.  As a concession, and with a view to secure its retention, 
England is willing to abolish the distinction of contraband of war.  
That is she is willing to allow property hitherto regarded as contraband 
to go free, even though destined to a hostile port; but retains the right 
of blockade to the full extent to which is now recognized by 
International Law. 
This is an important modification and may be regarded as 
excluding from the list of contraband all property useful to a 
belligerent in war.  The right of search of neutral vessels would also be 
restricted to a mere verification of nationality.  The right of blockade 
would be retained and, as it is after all the most efficient method of 
preventing neutral commerce with belligerents, the sacrifice of the 
principle of contraband is not a very extensive concession.  This much 
may be said, however, the exercise of the right of search is a very great 
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annoyance to neutral shipping, and any stipulations which diminishes 
the scope of its exercise adds materially to that freedom from 
annoyance which neutrals are so desirous of securing, especially in 
behalf of their shipping which carries passengers as well as freight.54 
On the day set for a vote on the United States’ immunity proposal, Satow 
suggested a delay was in order, until Britain’s proposal to abolish contraband could be 
decided, because each issue was related.55  Choate opposed any further delay and 
demanded a vote without further discussion.  When the vote was taken, twenty-one 
nations, including Germany, voted with the US, while eleven countries voted along 
with Great Britain against the immunity of private property at sea.56  Without 
unanimity, the US proposal for immunity of private property failed.57  Britain had not 
been isolated on the immunity issue as Choate had predicted, but the US and 
Germany now were firmly viewed as ‘pulling together’ against Britain.58  Late in the 
conference, Sperry wrote his son that members of the sub-committee on which he 
served ‘all had a contempt for Captain Ottley, R.N.’59   
Even members of the British delegation thought Britain now was viewed as an 
obstacle to achieving any meaningful results at the conference.  Lord Reay told Prime 
Minister Campbell-Bannerman, ‘I am afraid this impression has been confirmed by 
our attitude on the immunity of private property at sea.’60  Reay also was concerned 
of the consequences on Britain’s proposal to abolish contraband.  He told Campbell-
Bannerman: 
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The unfavourable impression on the conference by our proposal to 
declare that an unarmed collier was a man of war cannot be 
exaggerated.  It was generally felt that this rendered our proposal of 
abolishing contraband nugatory.  Several delegates friendly to England 
… came to me asking how the government could have mentioned such 
an absurd proposal.   
 …  Any expectation we had of carrying the abolition of 
contraband was destroyed by this untenable proposal of declaring a 
defenceless collier to be a man of war.61 
Campbell-Bannerman’s private secretary sent Reay’s communication to 
Foreign Secretary Grey for comment.  Grey defended the positions taken and asserted 
that as to Britain ‘playing “le beau role” there is at the conference a tendency to make 
proposals restricting the use of naval power, which are not all seriously meant, & 
which it is known we shall oppose.  But in light of this I think the initiative we have 
taken about contraband & appeal courts & floating mines … & the fact that we have 
not resisted anything important except immunity – of enemy’s ships from capture … 
is not such a bad record.’62  However, Grey wrote to First Lord Tweedmouth, saying, 
‘We must compromise now & then upon points which are not of vital importance.  I 
hear Ottley is coming over to consult with the Admiralty on various points and if in 
his opinion compromise … is admissible, & from the point of view of the Conference 
desirable, I hope the Admiralty will consider them in this light.  We have stood out 
firmly on points which are vital, that is right of capture at sea, & it is only in regards 
smaller points that I make the suggestion.’63 
Choate would take his revenge for Britain’s opposition to the immunity 
principle on the proposal to abolish contraband.  At a meeting of the delegations, 
‘Choate told the British that if their proposal were adopted it would convert Britain 
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from the Mistress of the Seas into the Tyrant of the Seas, and that they were claiming 
the right to sink neutral vessels carrying contraband while professing to want 
abolition of contraband.’64  Britain formally made its proposal to abolish contraband 
on 24 July.65  Sperry announced the United States’ opposition, saying a restrictive list 
of contraband items was preferable.66  Reay indicated surprise at America’s position, 
and referenced statements made by Marcy, the American minister to France in 1856.  
General Porter responded that, ‘since the old-fashioned policy of Marcy the 
Government of the United States has had experience and at the present time prefers 
the more modern policy of Roosevelt.’67  Informed of the situation with the US, 
Foreign Secretary Grey offered to speak to the American ambassador if the British 
delegation ‘find that you are having difficulties with the United States Delegates 
which you think are unreasonable’.68 
Choate cabled Secretary of State Root for instructions, saying Russia, France 
and Germany would oppose the proposal.  Britain’s proposal, ‘is obviously designed 
in special interest of Great Britain whether as a neutral or a belligerent.  …  Admiral 
Sperry … is strongly opposed to our voting for this British proposition and thinks the 
United States should adhere to its established law of contraband but get a definition of 
it as near your instructions as possible for which he is making every effort.’69  
President Roosevelt responded indicating a preference for specific enumeration of 
contraband rather than abolition ‘which would probably give rise to very serious and 
doubtful questions.’70  When the final vote was taken on 31 July, twenty-five nations 
voted with Britain in favour of abolishing contraband.  Only five nations voted no:  
France, Germany, Russia, the US, and Montenegro.71  Britain’s plan came closer to 
success than the US proposal for immunity, but also failed for lack of unanimity.  
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Two months later, Britain proposed a convention abolishing contraband 
amongst those twenty-five nations that had supported the proposition.  Britain 
circulated a draft convention and invited all the countries that had voted in favour of 
abolition, plus the US.  Sperry and Porter attended on behalf of the US but said 
nothing.  They did not need to speak.  Every delegate present stated that they now 
could not, or would not, join in any such convention.  The only person who spoke 
favourably was the delegate from Haiti.72  Satow described the result:  ‘A complete 
defeat for the unwise policy of trying to force a convention on people who had merely 
accepted the principle of abolition.’73  The newspaper W.T. Stead published regarding 
the proceedings at The Hague described the event as ‘Une débâcle britannique’.74  
Britain’s effort to abolish contraband had met the same fate as the United States’ 
proposal for the immunity of private property at sea. 
Disappointment or Opportunity? 
When the 1907 Conference ended a few weeks later in October, the views of 
the US and Great Britain were mixed.  Choate told Root that the ‘work done at the 
Conference is much more satisfactory than the papers – especially the English papers 
would have you believe.  The English are so angry at the failure of their pet scheme 
for insuring the naval supremacy of Great Britain that they can find no good in 
anything done.’75  The formal report of the American delegation reviewed each of the 
fourteen conventions adopted at the conference and recommended each of them.76 
Britain did indeed take a different view.  Foreign Secretary Grey, while 
congratulating Fry on the end of the conference, told him, ‘If the results of the 
Conference are in some degree disappointing, it is I think because there is too little 
goodwill and too much suspicion on the part of some of the other Powers.’77  Fry told 
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Grey that at the conference, ‘There were elements of friction, but we avoided an 
explosion.’78  Fisher told King Edward VII, ‘Mr. Choate swore to me before going to 
the Hague Conference how he would side with England over submarine mines and 
other matters, but Germany has collared the United States absolutely at The Hague!’79  
He told First Lord of the Admiralty Tweedmouth:  ‘I hope the Foreign Office will 
begin to appreciate German diplomacy – How well the Germans have done it!  
Choate tied with black & yellow ribbons to Marschall’s chariot wheels would be a 
lovely picture!’80  Charles Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, despite his conservative views, described the conference as a ‘fiasco’ to the 
King’s private secretary and said, ‘I do not think our Delegation was composed as it 
should be but console myself with the thought that we have not sacrificed a good 
diplomatist to the unrealizable ideals of the radical party.’81  He later told the King’s 
private secretary, ‘The results of the Hague Conference have been so meagre that it 
was decided … that any honours conferred on those who took part in it should be of a 
departmental character so as to avoid criticism in the Press.  …  I understand that the 
proposal made by Tweedmouth is to confer on Ottley a K.C.B., but this is an 
Admiralty affair which does not concern us.’82  Across the top of this communication, 
King Edward VII scrawled that he ‘wishes the understanding that the Admiralty 
should recommend Ottley for K.C.M.G for his birthday honours the K.C.B. is too 
much.’83 
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http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35343. 
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However, opportunities remained which might benefit Britain.  In a 
confidential memorandum to Foreign Secretary Grey, Fry stated, ‘in most cases we 
have been able to defeat proposals which would have been injurious to us and we 
have been able to carry proposals which we considered opportune.  Our supremacy at 
sea exposes us to great risks of a coalition being formed against us.’  In his cover 
letter, Fry told Grey, ‘It will I think be very desirable to consider whether an 
agreement can be arrived at by the great powers on contraband, blockade, rights and 
duties of neutrals and other subjects which the conference has not been able to settle, 
but on which divergent views have been clearly defined.’84  That opportunity for an 
agreement among the great naval powers indeed would present itself at the London 
Naval Conference of 1909. 
Conclusion 
The 1907 Conference resulted in the adoption of a number of conventions, 
many of which still are part of the fabric of international law more than 100 years 
later.  Eight conventions (VI to XIII) related to naval warfare.  Five of those 
conventions have continuing vitality.85  However, the Conference resulted in conflict 
and confrontation between the US and Britain regarding the laws of naval warfare.  
The two nations clashed on the cherished American principle of the immunity of 
private property at sea.  In retaliation for Britain’s opposition to that principle, the US 
opposed Britain’s proposal to abolish the concept of contraband.  Britain 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a convention amongst those nations that supported 
its proposal.  But what would have been the result, standing alone, if contraband had 
been abolished?  An effective blockade still could be employed by a naval power, and 
with it, the right to stop and search neutral vessels for contraband or to determine if 
the destination was a belligerent port.  Britain was the only great power with a large 
enough navy to attempt such actions with any degree of success.  However, such 
actions likely would incite protests from neutrals as experienced during the South 
African and Russo-Japanese wars.  Moreover, the conventional definition of an 
‘effective’ blockade required the blockading fleet to be close to the enemy coast and 
                                                
84 Fry to Grey, and attached memorandum, 22 Oct. 1907, FO 800/69, 215-222. 
85 See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 67-138. 
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ports, which with modern technologies such as torpedoes and mines risked their 
destruction. 
As Sir Edward Fry intimated to Foreign Secretary Grey, an opportunity 
existed for a more comprehensive agreement on naval issues.  Although blockade law 
was not a topic for the conference, Italy had presented a proposal to define the area 
within which a blockade could be considered effective.  After Britain’s proposal to 
abolish contraband failed discussions ensued to categorize goods into various types of 
contraband.  The Admiralty then realized Italy’s proposal was a potential means of 
achieving the ability to conduct an effective blockade under modern conditions.86  
More time was required to consider this opportunity and to attain an agreement.  The 
conflict and confrontation between the United States and Great Britain perhaps had a 
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The London Naval Conference of 1909 was the last of the three international 
conferences to address the laws of naval warfare in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.  It was the most exclusive, with only nine major sea powers and The 
Netherlands in attendance.1  Called by Great Britain, the conference was intended to 
establish agreement among the major sea powers on the ‘generally recognized 
principles of international law’ to be applied by the International Prize Court 
established at the 1907 Hague Conference.2  The ‘Declaration Concerning the Laws 
of Naval War’ produced by the 1909 conference represented hard fought 
compromises.  The conference teetered on the brink of dissolution due to the refusal 
of certain nations – first Germany and then the United States – to compromise their 
traditional positions.  Despite all the efforts and considerable negotiating, the 
Declaration ultimately failed of its intended purpose.  Britain never acceded to it 
following years of vociferous debate.  While the US Senate ratified the declaration, 
President William Howard Taft never signed the treaty.3  Indeed, none of the nations 
in attendance ultimately acceded to it.   
This chapter provides a different perspective on the London Naval Conference 
of 1909.  It first reviews its genesis, followed by the preparations and efforts at 
cooperation between Britain and the US.  Next, this chapter considers the most 
important issues and positions taken during the conference by the two nations:  
principally on the issues of contraband, blockade, and continuous voyage.  It shows 
                                                
1 The nine sea powers were:  Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, Spain, and the US.  The Netherlands later asked to be added with the 
support of the US.  See Grey to His Majesty’s Representatives, 27 Feb. 1908, in 
Foreign Office, Correspondence and Documents Respecting the International Naval 
Conference, held in London, December 1908-February 1909 (London:  HMSO, 
1909), 1 (hereafter International Naval Conference); Grey to His Majesty’s 
Representatives, 14 Sept. 1908, ADM 116/1080. 
2  Grey to His Majesty’s Representatives, 27 Feb. 1908, International Naval 
Conference, 1. 
3 Coogan (1981), 127, 134-135. 
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the compromises both made in order to achieve unanimous agreement on the laws of 
naval warfare.  Finally, it analyses Britain’s actions at the conference and corrects 
previous scholarly interpretations. 
Genesis and Preparations 
 The London Conference of 1909 had its genesis in Britain’s desire for the 
international prize court established by Convention XII at the 1907 Conference to 
have an established and agreed body of law to apply in cases brought before it.  
Moreover, Britain had been unable to conclude an agreement at the 1907 Hague 
Conference on the subjects of blockade and contraband.  Having failed to achieve 
abolition of the concept of contraband entirely, Britain wanted at least an agreement 
identifying specific items as absolute or conditional contraband.  Britain also had 
issues regarding the scope of a blockade and the doctrine of continuous voyage.  In 
late September 1907, Sir Charles Ottley, the British naval delegate at the 1907 
Conference, told the Foreign Office that while he thought a compromise with 
Germany ‘might prove acceptable to France and other Powers’, it likely was too late 
in the conference to obtain the necessary approval of all the nations present.  He 
sought consent to tell the delegates from the principal naval powers that blockade, 
‘with 2 or 3 other purely naval questions, would be discussed at a small conference to 
be held in London’ in the spring of 1908.  The Foreign Office told Ottley ‘that a great 
effort should be made’ to obtain an agreement at The Hague, ‘as we and other 
Departments are weary of conferences’.  He concurred, but if no agreement was 
possible, the Foreign Office and Admiralty could be counted on to achieve resolution 
of the blockade question at a small conference of naval powers.4  Foreign Secretary 
Grey did not want the subject of blockade left for determination by the new 
International Prize Court.5   
However, Germany tied an agreement on blockade and contraband to abolition 
of the doctrine of continuous voyage at the 1907 Conference.  It wanted to limit the 
area within which a neutral merchant ship attempting to avoid a blockade could be 
seized, such that a ship carrying contraband but heading for a neutral port next to a 
blockaded port could not be stopped.  Britain and the Admiralty wanted to be able to 
                                                
4 Hardinge, Minute to Grey, 20 Sept. 1907, FO 372/74. 
5 Grey, Minute, n.d. (but likely 20 Sept. 1907), ibid. 
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seize a neutral ship carrying contraband anywhere within an area of 800 miles from a 
blockaded port.  The Admiralty viewed the 800-mile limitation as a ‘tremendous 
concession’ because its existing rules would ‘enable us to capture a vessel even at 
Yokohama if she was proceeding to a European blockade port.’  The Foreign Office 
concluded that the distance between these positions was ‘so wide that it may be 
doubted whether it can ever be reached over even at a future Conference.’ 6  
Concerned that ‘[p]oor Sir E. Fry is probably weary of the struggle’, Grey reluctantly 
decided to defer any further attempts to reach an understanding on blockade and 
contraband until a new conference the next spring.7  Doing so meant ‘an interminable 
delay in the creation of the Prize Court of Appeal’ on which the delegates had reached 
agreement, because an understanding on contraband and blockade would ‘form a 
most important code of law’ for the new court to apply.8  Indeed, the second 
paragraph of Article 7 of the International Prize Court Convention provided that in the 
absence of an applicable treaty, ‘the court shall apply the rules of international law.  If 
no generally recognized rule exists, the court shall give judgment in accordance with 
the general principles of justice and equity.’9  Britain was concerned what those 
principles would be, given that its positions on the laws of naval warfare were viewed 
very differently (i.e., pro-belligerent rights) compared with those of Continental 
powers. 
Slade first discussed the planned naval conference with Ottley and Eyre 
Crowe of the Foreign Office on 8 January.10  Shortly thereafter, Grey asked if the 
Admiralty agreed with holding a conference of leading naval powers, and identified 
eight other countries (not including The Netherlands at the time) to invite.  He 
suggested creating a small committee to decide the specific topics for the conference 
and to prepare a memorandum on Britain’s position on each topic and ‘how far the 
maintenance of the British doctrine on each point is really vital to the interests of this 
                                                
6 Maycock, Minute, 24 Sept. 1907, ibid.  See also Fry to Grey, 24 Sept. 1907, ibid.; 
Fry to Grey, 2 Oct. 1907, ibid. 
7 Hardinge, Minute, 24 Sept. 1907, ibid.; Grey, Minute, 24 Sept. 1907, ibid. 
8 Maycock, Minute, 26 Sept. 1907, ibid. 
9 James Brown Scott, ed., The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences:  The 
Conference of 1907 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1920), I:  661-662. 
10 Slade diary, 8 Jan. 1908, MRF 39/2, Slade Papers.  (I thank Professor Andrew 
Lambert for providing a copy of Slade’s diary.) 
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Country and what concessions it would be possible to make in order to secure 
unanimity among all the Powers.’11  Captain Edmond J.W. Slade had been appointed 
Director of Naval Intelligence in November 1907, succeeding Charles Ottley, who 
became secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence.12  Slade concurred in the 
Foreign Office’s suggestion.  He recognized the importance of having an agreed code 
of naval warfare before the 1907 prize court convention was ratified.  The proposed 
code had to be viewed from two aspects:  (1) when Britain was a belligerent; and (2) 
when it was a neutral, ‘and of these the former is far the more important.  The code of 
law may mean all the difference between the effectiveness of our main weapon or its 
comparative ineffectiveness when we are [a] belligerent’.13  Assistant Admiralty 
Secretary W. Graham Greene agreed and suggested Slade should be one of the 
Admiralty’s representatives on the proposed committee.14  First Lord of the Admiralty 
Lord Tweedmouth concurred.15  First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher likely received Grey’s 
proposal and the minutes of Slade and Greene.16 
                                                
11 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 14 Jan. 1908, ADM 116/1079.  
Christopher Martin contends that Grey’s communication ‘implies a clear 
intention to sacrifice whatever rights necessary in order to achieve consensus’ at the 
proposed conference.  Christopher Martin, ‘The Declaration of London:  a matter of 
operational capability’, Historical Research 82, no. 218 (Nov. 2006):  745.  I 
disagree.  If that was Grey’s intention, no reason existed to ask the Admiralty or the 
proposed committee to determine Britain’s vital interests and what concessions might 
be possible on the proposed topics.  Grey’s memorandum is just what it appears:  a 
request for analysis and guidance in anticipation of the conference. 
12 N. Lambert (2012), 94.  For a description of Slade, his heritage, and career before 
and after his appointment as DNI, see Cobb (2013), 98-108.  However, Cobb 
incorrectly identifies Slade as a member of Britain’s delegation to the 1907 
Conference.  See ibid., 100, 270.  
Ruddock Mackay and Nicholas Lambert have criticized Slade as being 
hidebound and reliant too much on history to inform modern thinking.  See Mackay 
(1973), 396; Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, 
SC:  University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 173-174.  Matthew Seligmann argues 
that Slade was neither, and instead ‘held sensible, informed, and realistic views about 
the security problems that faced Britain.’  Seligmann (2012), 89-92. 
13 Slade, Minute, 17 Jan. 1908, ADM 116/1079. 
14 Greene, Minute, 20 Jan. 1908, ibid. 
15 Tweedmouth, Minute, 21 Jan. 1908, ibid.  
16 See ‘Proposed conference of the Powers in connection with subjects not decided at 
the last Peace Conference’, 14 Jan. 1908, ibid.  The first page of the Admiralty’s 
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Slade promptly began preparations for the London Conference.  The other 
members of the Naval Conference Committee were the Earl of Desart, the treasury 
solicitor; Eyre Crowe and C.J.B. Hurst from the Foreign Office; and Ottley.17  Slade 
and Ottley were primarily responsible for preparation of the British positions.18  By 
17 February, the draft invitation letter was finished.19  Ten days later, Grey officially 
invited Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the 
United States to a conference to discuss certain topics important to maritime warfare.  
England identified eight subjects for discussion: 
(a.) Contraband, including the circumstances under which particular 
articles can be considered as contraband; the penalties for their 
carriage; the immunity of a ship from search when under convoy; 
and the rules with regard to compensation where vessels have 
been seized but have been found in fact only to be carrying 
innocent cargo; 
(b.) Blockade, including the questions as to the locality where seizure 
can be effected, and the notice that is necessary before a ship can 
be seized; 
(c.) The doctrine of continuous voyage in respect both of contraband 
and of blockade; 
(d.) The legality of the destruction of neutral vessels prior to their 
condemnation by a Prize Court; 
                                                                                                                                      
minutes on Grey’s proposal indicates with a large checkmark that they were referred 
to First Sea Lord Fisher. 
17 Lord Desart was the King’s Proctor and a member of the inter-departmental Walton 
Committee appointed in July 1906 to examine the topics proposed for the 1907 
Conference.  Grey reconvened that committee to review the conventions agreed at the 
1907 Conference and to make recommendations whether Great Britain should accede 
to them.  Desart became the committee chair after Attorney General Walton died.  
Ottley, Crowe, and Hurst were members of both committees.  See ‘Report of the 
Inter-Departmental Committee appointed to consider the Subjects which may arise for 
Discussion at the Second Peace Conference’, 21 Mar. 1907, FO 881/9041X, 32; 
Second Peace Conference Inter-Departmental Committee, Meeting Minutes, 31 Jan. 
1908, FO 881/9325X.  Ottley had been Britain’s naval delegate, and Crowe and Hurst 
technical delegates, at the 1907 Conference.  See Scott, ed., 1907 Conference, I:  8.  
18 Coogan (1981), 105-106. 
19 Slade diary, 17 Feb. 1908, MRF 39/2, Slade Papers. 
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(e.) The rules as to neutral ships or persons rendering ‘unneutral 
service’ (‘assistance hostile’); 
(f.) The legality of the conversion of a merchant-vessel into a war-
ship on the high seas; 
(g.) The rules as to the transfer of merchant-vessels from a belligerent 
to a neutral flag during or in contemplation of hostilities; 
(h.) The question of whether the nationality or the domicile of the 
owner should be adopted as the dominant factor in deciding 
whether property is enemy property.20 
Britain asked the invitees to submit memoranda on their views as to the ‘correct rule 
of international law’ on each of the topics, along with the bases for those positions.21  
Slade and the other committee members worked on Britain’s positions in April and 
May.22  They soon recognized that the country ‘cannot maintain the attitude adopted 
by the text books’ regarding blockade.23  The committee prepared a memorandum 
describing the country’s positions on the eight subjects after analysing British court 
decisions.  Grey sent the memorandum to the other invited nations, which now 
included The Netherlands.24   
Grey’s memorandum elicited an immediate response from Germany.  The 
German government thought the conference and memoranda exchanged should be 
directed toward establishing treaty laws to be enacted, without distinguishing laws 
now in force.  Germany sought the United States’ agreement to this approach and 
asked whether the US intended to exchange a memorandum and if so, in what form.25  
The US State Department then asked the Navy Department for its views.26  While the 
                                                
20  Grey to His Majesty’s Representatives, 27 Feb. 1908, International Naval 
Conference, 1-2. 
21 Ibid., 2. 
22 Slade diary, 10 Apr. and 13 May 1908, MRF 39/2, Slade Papers. 
23 Slade diary, 20 May 1908, ibid. 
24 Grey to MacDonald, with Inclosure, 8 July 1908, International Naval Conference, 
2-11. 
25 Hatzfeldt to Root, 28 July 1908, enclosing von Schoen to de Salis, 10 July 1908, 
RG 59, NF 12655 – M862, roll 822, NARA(II). 
26 Adee to Secretary of the Navy, 10 Aug. 1908, ibid. 
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US Naval War College studied Britain’s memorandum on its legal precedents and the 
topics for the conference,27 the Navy recommended that Germany and Britain should 
simply be referred to the Naval War Code of 1900 and proposed amendments of 
1903.28  The State Department told Grey and Germany that the US would not submit 
a memorandum of its views, and quoted an excerpt from the instructions to the 1907 
Conference delegation referring to the US Naval War Code of 1900, with 
amendments proposed in 1903 as the basis for discussions.29  The War College later 
made the same recommendation, with a few explanations on the eight identified 
topics.30  The War College also suggested a conference with Professor George C. 
Wilson, who was to be one of the US delegates.31  The State Department took 
umbrage with this suggestion ‘to coach the delegate.’  The State Department was 
responsible for foreign affairs, and the conference, ‘although it concerns maritime 
law, falls within [its] jurisdiction’.32  As a result, no meeting occurred and the pre-
conference views of the US Navy were ignored.  The refusal to obtain the Navy’s 
opinions later would create problems during the conference.   
An issue arose during the summer regarding who would be Britain’s naval 
delegate.  Grey thought Lord Desart should preside over the conference.  He asked if 
that appointment was agreeable to the Admiralty ‘as the Department most intimately 
concerned.’33  Sir Reginald McKenna, who had succeeded Lord Tweedmouth as First 
                                                
27 See, for example, Memoranda dated 27 Aug., 31 Aug., and 4 Sept. 1908, RG 8, 
series 2, box 87, folder 2, NWCNHC. 
28 Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, 27 Aug. 1908, RG 59, NF 12655 – 
M862, roll 822, NARA(II); Scott to Adee, 29 Aug. 1908, ibid.  No evidence exists 
that the Navy solicited Mahan’s views.  After the 1907 Conference he had embarked 
on a campaign to provoke public discussion against international arbitration of 
disputes.  See Mahan to Laughton, 6 Sept. 1907, Alfred Thayer Mahan Papers, 
manuscript collection 17, box 2, folder 19, NWCNHC; Mahan to Laughton, 1 Nov. 
1907, ibid. 
29 Scott, Minute, 4 Sept. 1908, ibid.; Howard to Grey and Inclosure, 7 Sept. 1908, 
ADM 116/1080. 
30 Merrell to Secretary of the Navy, 29 Sept. 1908, RG 8, series 2, box 87, folder 2, 
NWCNHC. 
31 Smith to Secretary of the Navy, 29 Aug. 1908, RG 59, NF 12655 – M862, roll 822, 
NARA(II). 
32 Scott to Adee, 2 Sept. 1908, ibid. 
33 Grey to McKenna, 1 May 1908, FO 800/87, f. 156. 
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Lord of the Admiralty on 12 April 1908 following the resignation of Campbell-
Bannerman as Prime Minister,34 agreed with Desart’s appointment, but wanted the 
naval delegate to have diplomatic standing so he could fully participate in all 
meetings of the conference, because he was ‘given to understand that the Department 
was not satisfied with the position assigned to Captain Ottley at the Hague 
Conference’.35  Despite McKenna’s request, Britain’s naval delegates did not receive 
diplomatic status.36  The Admiralty nominated DNI Slade as its representative in mid-
July.37  However, First Sea Lord Fisher wanted Ottley to be ‘one of the members’ of 
the delegation because he was at the 1907 Conference and so ‘more intimately 
associated with the Admiralty views on the subject than anyone else.’38  Grey asked 
McKenna if Ottley could represent the Admiralty ‘owing to the difficulty of having so 
many delegates.’39  McKenna apparently spoke with Grey and decided to change 
delegates.  Fisher told Slade that Ottley would replace him because it ‘is essential to 
have Ottley on it as he was of course the manager of the whole business at the Hague 
Conference but apparent objection is raised (internal … so I gather) to more than one 
English Naval Representative’.  Fisher thought Slade would be ‘extremely glad as I 
am’ that he now would be free to work in the Admiralty.40  The Admiralty formally 
told the Foreign Office it wanted Ottley instead of Slade at the end of August.41  Grey 
mollified everyone by appointing both Slade and Ottley.  Lord Desart, along with 
                                                
34 D.M. Cregier, ‘McKenna, Reginald (1863-1943)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
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Ottley, Slade, Crowe, and Hurst, comprised Britain’s delegation.42  However, as late 
as 25 November, the Admiralty asked the Foreign Office to confirm that Slade would 
continue as one of the delegates in addition to Ottley, although Slade ‘should be 
recognized as more directly representing’ the Admiralty by virtue of his position as 
DNI.43 
The Foreign Office reviewed the memoranda received from the invited nations 
as of early September.44  Russia and Germany questioned the feasibility of limiting 
the conference’s work to ‘formulating the existing rules of international law.’  Both 
preferred that the outcome of the conference be a treaty stating rules for the future.  
However, Britain desired a declaration of the laws the attending powers thought 
binding at the present time.  It believed ‘the rules agreed upon should purport to be 
what the Powers recognize as the existing law, even though it may be necessary to 
restate some of the old principles in terms more applicable to the altered conditions of 
modern commerce.’45   
Grey learned that Rear Admiral Charles Stockton, the drafter of the US Naval 
War Code of 1900, would represent the US.  Because Stockton was in Europe 
already, Grey asked if he would meet Britain’s delegates for ‘a preliminary exchange 
of views’ so that ‘some sort of understanding could be established as to the particular 
lines to be followed by them in handling the several questions.’46  Slade first met 
Stockton in late October and described him as ‘deaf & not very quick’.47  Slade’s 
assessment was in error; Stockton was neither.  Stockton viewed the meetings as an 
                                                
42 Grey to Desart, 9 Nov. 1908, International Naval Conference, 18. 
43 Greene, Minute, 19 Nov. 1908, ADM 116/1079; McKenna to Grey, 25 Nov. 1908, 
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opportunity to learn which points were important to Britain.48  After meetings with 
Slade and Ottley, Stockton reported to Secretary of State Elihu Root and the US 
Navy’s General Board that Britain was ‘in a peculiar situation with respect to the 
International Prize Court’ as the only nation at the 1907 Conference that had not 
signed the prize court convention.  Because of the unsatisfactory experiences with 
Russia’s prize courts during the Russo-Japanese War, Britain wanted an international 
code of naval warfare that ‘will not be too prejudicial to their interests and which will 
still enable them to accept the Prize Court Treaty.’  According to Stockton, Slade and 
Ottley understood Britain likely would have to compromise on issues relating to 
blockade, which all agreed was a vital belligerent right.  They asked Stockton’s view 
of France’s proposition of a rayon d’action.  Ottley mentioned an 800-mile radius.  
Stockton thought the concept could work if an indeterminate area was defined that 
would still prevent captures thousands of miles away from the scene of operations, as 
had occurred during the South African War.49  The president of the US Naval War 
College generally agreed with Stockton’s analysis, including the American position 
that liability for capture for attempting to violate a blockade should exist from the 
moment the neutral ship leaves its home port, at least within a large radius from the 
blockaded port, which would be the practical application of the rayon d’action 
proposed by France.50   
Slade completed a detailed memorandum on the positions Britain should take 
at the conference after analysing the statements received from all the invited nations 
except the US and Spain.  On contraband, he thought agreement could be reached on 
categories and itemization of contraband along the lines proposed at the 1907 
Conference.  He also believed Britain could safely concede that a neutral ship 
carrying contraband was subject to seizure only if a certain proportion of its cargo 
was contraband.  Regarding blockade, Slade determined that British decisions were 
more in line with Continental practices than generally believed.  He concluded, ‘It is 
therefore probable that we shall be able to arrive at a working compromise, without 
endangering our interests.’  British courts had ruled that liability for attempting to 
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49 Stockton to Root, 5 Nov. 1908, ibid.; Stockton to General Board, 18 Nov. 1908, RG 
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breach a blockade consisted of the actual attempt to enter a blockaded port and not the 
intent to do so.  Slade suggested that the French rule regarding radius of action could 
be adopted if the conference agreed to ‘a formula which is capable of wide 
interpretation, and which will give us all that we were practically able to assert in 
former wars.’  He recommended that the proposal made with the Admiralty’s 
approval at the 1907 Conference be modified to replace the 800-mile zone with ‘an 
area of operation limited by the range of action of the vessels employed in 
maintaining the blockade.’51   
On continuous voyage, Britain faced the same difficulty because British court 
decisions did not support the country’s position.  British courts in fact had applied 
nearly the same principles as France.  Slade again thought the Admiralty’s position 
from the 1907 Conference could be slightly rephrased so that a neutral ship carrying 
contraband was liable to be seized anywhere if the ultimate destination of the goods 
was an enemy port, even if the vessel might first stop at neutral ports.  The proposed 
rule did not limit the right to stop and search a neutral, subject to having to pay 
damages if a prize court later determined that a vessel had improperly been seized.  
This rule would avoid the abuses suffered during the Russo-Japanese War.  However, 
application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade could not be supported.  
The American Civil War decision in The Springbok, which allowed seizure of 
contraband goods destined for a neutral port because they ultimately were intended 
for a blockaded port, was ‘very much more drastic than anything [Britain had] 
attempted to enforce.’  On the conversion of merchant ships into warships, enemy 
property, and the transfer of merchant ships to neutral owners during or in 
anticipation of war, Slade recommended that Britain either insist on its position or 
leave the question open.  On the other topics for the conference, he thought the 
country could either safely concede its positions or that suitable compromises could 
be reached.52 
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Slade submitted his memorandum for approval by the Admiralty.53  Assistant 
Secretary Greene closely considered Slade’s positions on contraband and blockade, 
‘on which their Lordships last year were prepared to compromise’.  Greene 
concluded: 
As regards contraband it is not now proposed to alter the rule that 
articles of contraband may be seized anywhere if the ultimate 
destination of the suspected cargo is hostile even though the vessel 
may first call at neutral ports; as regards blockade it is considered that 
an elastic rule substituting radius of action of the blockading vessels 
for an arbitrary 800 mile zone is preferable in several respects, while it 
gives practically all the latitude which we could reasonably require and 
is more in agreement with the actual line taken by British Prize Courts 
during our naval wars.54 
On destruction of neutral prizes, Greene thought a concession allowing destruction in 
exceptional circumstances could be achieved without adverse consequences.  Britain 
could not absolutely oppose conversion of merchant ships into warships on the high 
seas because its past actions had approached that practice.  However, Britain’s 
position should be conceded only if strong rules were agreed to prevent abuse.55 
The Admiralty’s Naval Law Branch took a harder view.  It noted that no 
international code of naval warfare necessarily could avoid adverse decisions by the 
International Prize Court:  ‘In the long run it is considered the interests of the 
strongest Naval Power must suffer, and suffer heavily.’  Nevertheless, if the 
International Prize Court was to become reality, ‘an agreement on some of the main 
principles of international law is naturally desirable and a compromise is necessary.’  
Slade’s conclusions were ‘concurred in generally as being the best possible in the 
circumstances and best calculated to bring about an agreement with other Powers.’  
While the concessions proposed were ‘considerable’, few of them, viewed separately, 
were of ‘vital importance to’ Britain.  The Naval Law Branch commented specifically 
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only on two points relating to blockade.  First, it did not believe British law was clear 
that liability for violating a blockade arose only from the attempt, not the intention to 
do so.  As long as blockades could be effectively maintained without relying on intent 
as the controlling factor, the point could be conceded.  The Naval Law Branch 
favoured the 800-mile radius rule over the ‘radius of action’ rule.  The latter ‘is a 
convenient expression for ordinary purposes but a lawyer could – and would – make 
it mean anything.’56 
Greene responded to the Naval Law Branch’s minute.  He noted that the 
general question of whether there should be an international prize court had 
previously been decided and acquiesced in by the Admiralty.  Moreover, the Naval 
Conference Committee’s opinion was that the nation’s interests would not suffer if 
the proposed compromises were made.  Greene recognized that the position of Britain 
as a neutral had to be considered as well as when it was a belligerent.  Even as a 
belligerent, Britain would have to consider the interests of neutrals, ‘and except 
perhaps in the disputed issues of blockade and carriage of contraband, as to which we 
are prepared to negotiate, we should be obliged to limit our action in any 
circumstances.’  He reminded that cases involving the seizure of enemy ships would 
not be within the International Prize Court’s jurisdiction; only seizures of neutral 
vessels.  Moreover, if Britain’s powers now were compared with those during the last 
great naval war, the differences were due ‘to the Declaration of Paris and the great 
change which has taken place in the maritime commerce of the world.’  Greene also 
thought an ‘arbitrary and unscientific’ limit of 800 miles would result in disputes and 
opportunities for evasion ‘near the outer fringe of the radius.’57   
On the same day, the Naval Conference Committee presented a ‘Further 
Report’ that restated the need for a convention on agreed rules of law for application 
by the International Prize Court.  Some long-held rules were not entirely ‘applicable 
under modern conditions’.  The committee had ‘approached the consideration of the 
various points of controversy … with a desire to reconcile divergence where possible, 
and in other cases, where the divergences are too marked to be reconciled, to find 
materials for compromise’.  The committee then reviewed its positions on the various 
                                                
56 Naval Law Branch, Minute, 24 Oct. 1908, ibid. 
57 Greene, Minute, 26 Oct. 1908, ibid. 
 240 
topics for the conference.  It thought agreement could be reached on lists of absolute 
and conditional contraband, but that neither food nor raw materials should be 
considered contraband unless destined for the enemy’s armed forces.  If a ship’s 
destination was a neutral port, the contraband cargo could still be seized if its ultimate 
destination, whether by sea or land, was enemy territory.  On blockade, the 
destination of the ship mattered, not the destination of the cargo.  Recognizing that no 
serious limitation on Britain’s ability to impose a blockade could be considered, the 
committee thought that the right of seizure of a blockading fleet should be ‘defined as 
that of operating in an area sufficiently large to secure it from the danger of attack 
from the shore, and to enable it to effectively prevent entrance to or departure from 
the blockaded port or coast.’58  Grey circulated the ‘Further Report’ to the Cabinet for 
approval, noting the only controversial sections were those dealing with blockade and 
transfer of title of merchant ships from belligerent to neutral owners.59 
Slade concurred in Greene’s minute. 60   First Lord McKenna concurred 
‘generally’, noting that while ‘there is a good deal in the remarks of N. L. Branch on 
the subject of blockades’, the recommendation that the 800-mile radius rule should 
‘be preferred if the Conference will accept it.’61  Fisher then wrote in his distinctive 
hand, initialled and dated:  ‘Concur generally in the summary pages 24 & 25’ – 
referring to Slade’s original memorandum – and ‘Concur in A’ – referring to 
McKenna’s preference for the 800-mile rule.62   
Two weeks later, McKenna, Fisher, the Second Sea Lord, Greene, and Slade 
met to ‘discuss the attitude that should be taken up by the Admiralty’ at the 
forthcoming conference.  Slade thought the discussion of blockade by McKenna 
showed ‘that he had not the smallest conception of what was meant.  …  The second 
sea lord was not much better.’  However, after an hour’s discussion ‘they eventually 
decided to accept the views that [Slade] had put forward.’  At the meeting, Fisher 
‘produced some wonderful statements, and they were swallowed by McKenna with 
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evident gusto.’  Slade thought it was ‘astonishing how [Fisher] forces his views … 
down every body’s throat.’63  The participants agreed that, ‘it was desirable to adopt 
the suggestion to treat ‘Rayon d’action’ as governing the powers of seizure under 
International Law.’  The group recognized it would be difficult to seize neutral ships 
bound for a blockaded port when there was an adjacent neutral port to which they 
could claim they were destined.  The concept of ‘rayon d’action’ therefore was more 
advantageous because it provided the ‘greatest latitude to the blockading force and 
permitted … the widest dispersal of that force’ in order to stop all trade with a 
blockaded port.  ‘The effect of such a definition would be determined by the size of 
the force employed to maintain and support the blockade.’  The Admiralty therefore 
authorized its representatives at the conference to adopt the positions described in 
Slade’s memorandum.64 
Grey circulated a summary of the positions expressed in the memoranda 
received from the invited countries as well as Britain’s observations on those views.  
This document, later known as the ‘red book,’ served as a basis for the deliberations 
at the conference.  The summary and observations indicated areas of agreement and 
points where ‘common experience’ and ‘modern developments of maritime 
commerce, navigation, and war’ made it possible to state general principles of 
international law apparent from each nation.  Grey reiterated that the goal of the 
conference was not to make new law, as at the 1899 and 1907 Conferences, but rather 
to state ‘a common law of nations’ to be contained in the proposed declaration.65 
The instructions to the British and American delegations were quite different.  
International law Professor George C. Wilson joined Admiral Stockton as the United 
States’ two plenipotentiaries to the conference.  Wilson had commented on Stockton’s 
draft of the US Naval War Code and had led the summer international law discussions 
at the Naval War College since 1902.  Stockton and Wilson were to be guided ‘in the 
consideration of any matter discussed at the Conference by the general and specific 
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provisions of the instructions [from the 1907 Conference] relating to maritime warfare 
and the rights and duties of neutrals.’  They were to use the 1900 Naval War Code 
and suggested amendments from 1903 as the basis for discussions and ‘to secure as 
far as possible the adoption in conventional form of their provisions.’66  Thus, the 
United States’ instructions were general and based on analyses prepared in 1900 and 
1903. 
In contrast, Grey’s instructions to Britain’s delegation provided relatively 
precise guidance on each of the subjects to be considered.  For example, absolute and 
conditional contraband would be recognized but the items in each category should be 
identified.  Britain’s ‘absolute dependence’ on blockade for its security meant it was 
‘imperative’ to maintain that weapon intact.  Recognizing that modern armaments 
necessitated that any blockade fleet be stationed a considerable distance from the 
coast or ports blockaded, a rule defining rayon d’action as ‘the area of operation of 
the blockading force’ would be acceptable and would ‘safeguard all belligerent rights 
in regard to blockade which Great Britain has been able practically to assert in former 
wars,’ while also reassuring neutrals that their ships would not be subject to seizure 
until actually approaching a blockade.  On continuous voyage, neutral ships were 
subject to seizure if carrying contraband destined for the enemy, whether direct or via 
some intermediate conveyance by land or sea from a neutral port.  Specific directions 
also were provided on the other topics.  Grey reminded the delegates to ensure that 
those belligerent rights ‘which have been proved in the past to be essential to the 
successful assertion of British sea power, and to the defence of British independence, 
are preserved undiminished and placed beyond rightful challenge.’  At the same time, 
‘the widest possible freedom for neutrals … should remain before your eyes as the 
double object to be pursued’.67  With this guidance, the British delegation certainly 
understood that Britain’s belligerent rights had to be satisfactorily maintained. 
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Confrontation and Compromise 
The conference opened at the Foreign Office on 4 December with a ‘rather 
colourless’ speech by Grey.68  It adjourned from 18 December until 11 January 1909, 
and concluded on 26 February.69  Slade thought the US would support Britain’s 
views, but that Germany was ‘going to take a very uncompromising attitude’ and 
would give Britain ‘a great deal of trouble’.70  The US viewed Slade as ‘the 
mouthpiece of the British Navy.’  Ottley rarely spoke.71  Britain’s expectation of close 
cooperation with the US soon evaporated.  The lack of specific instructions meant the 
US delegates had to seek guidance or approval at almost every turn, which often 
required the State Department to obtain the views of the Navy before responding.  
This poor diplomatic practice often delayed the American delegation in stating the 
country’s definitive position on an issue.  On more than one occasion, the US 
delegates provisionally indicated their concurrence with a decision of the conference, 
only to later receive contrary instructions.72  The first major question was whether the 
US should forego its long-time adherence to the doctrine of continuous voyage.  
Secretary Root did not consult the Navy on that issue.  His response was unequivocal:  
‘The United States will certainly not consent to the surrender of that doctrine unless 
there are weighty reasons of which I am not now advised.’73  By 15 December, 
Stockton reported that while all the powers were conciliatory, Germany would not 
accept the United States’ view of continuous voyage.  However, it might be possible 
to obtain the abolition of conditional contraband in exchange for yielding on 
continuous voyage.74 
Whether to give up continuous voyage as applied to contraband also was a 
significant issue for Britain.  Ominously for the future, Slade reported that Germany 
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‘does not consider there is any International Law binding on all nations, and that, 
therefore, a simple declaration of the rules of what other Powers may consider to be 
existing law is of no value at all.’  Nevertheless, Germany was ‘willing to make a 
deal’ and would agree to England’s proposed lists of absolute and conditional 
contraband as suggested at the 1907 Conference in return for Britain giving up 
continuous voyage.  Such an agreement would avoid the issues that arose in the 
Russo-Japanese War regarding declarations of contraband items.  Slade recognized 
the significant implications of such a deal, which ‘would prevent our stopping the 
whole of the German trade by sea,’ because part of it could continue through neutral 
Belgian and Dutch ports.  However, he concluded that the value of the doctrine to 
Britain was ‘very doubtful’ for several reasons.  First, it likely would not affect the 
enemy much.  Additionally, Britain’s experiences in the South African War militated 
against the doctrine.  Although attempts to apply it caused great difficulties and cost 
to the Boers, Britain ‘did not maintain our rights intact because we did not wish to add 
to our enemies by bringing Germany in, and yet, at the time, we had absolute 
command of the sea, and we were, relatively to the Germans, in just as good a 
position as we are at the present day, if not better.’75  However, Germany thought 
Britain placed a high value on continuous voyage.  Slade therefore believed England 
should get more in return for abandoning continuous voyage than just agreed lists of 
absolute, conditional, and ‘non’ contraband.  He thought Germany should 
compromise on its position that a belligerent had the right to sink neutral prizes.  This 
right was of no value to Britain as a belligerent, but if Germany would restrict this 
right to limited situations, with payment of compensation required, British maritime 
trade would gain significantly.  Regarding the right to transform a neutral ship into a 
warship on the high seas, Slade’s opinion was that Britain should never yield on this 
point to Germany.76 
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The Naval Law Branch stated that if continuous voyage as applied to 
contraband was abandoned, Britain would give up the right to seize neutral ships 
carrying contraband destined for the enemy if:  (1) the ship first stopped at a neutral 
port before continuing to an enemy port, and (2) the ship’s final destination was a 
neutral port.  The Law Branch could not express any opinion as to the relative value 
vis-à-vis the proposed lists of contraband items and restricting the right to sink neutral 
prizes.77  Assistant Secretary Greene agreed that the relative value of the doctrine of 
continuous voyage depended on what was or was not contraband, ignoring the 
difficulties of determining its ultimate destination.  In contrast, an agreement 
itemizing contraband would greatly benefit Britain, both as a belligerent, because it 
would be clear what goods could be seized, and as a neutral, given the size of its 
merchant marine.  Whatever the decision, the law of blockade would not be limited.  
Greene agreed that Britain should insist on its positions regarding a belligerent’s right 
to sink neutral prizes and the conversion of merchant ships into warships on the high 
seas.  He discussed his views with Second Sea Lord Admiral William May and DNI 
Slade.78 
Whether to bargain away continuous voyage in return for Germany agreeing 
to Britain’s lists of contraband and ‘free’ goods was the subject of a meeting on 15 
December between Foreign Secretary Grey, First Lord McKenna, and the members of 
the British delegation.  The discussions and the alleged disagreement between Grey 
and McKenna as to its outcome have been the subject of much discussion by 
historians.79  Slade apparently prepared the initial draft of the meeting minutes.80  The 
draft indicated that McKenna strongly asserted that continuous voyage was valuable 
to Britain as a belligerent, especially in a war against Germany.  Even if goods were 
not seized, freights and insurance would rise due to the risk of seizure.  Grey thought 
otherwise and pointed out the difficulties of determining the ultimate destination of 
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the goods.  Neutrals likely would protest as during the South African War and Britain 
would have to retreat from its position.  Grey thought institution of the International 
Prize Court was important and ‘therefore certain concessions, not of vital importance, 
might be made in order to prevent the present Conference from coming to a barren 
conclusion.’  After discussing the issues of sinking neutral prizes and conversion of 
merchant ships to warships on the high seas, Grey authorized Britain’s delegates to 
surrender continuous voyage in return for Germany’s agreement on the three lists of 
contraband and restrictions on the right to sink neutral prizes.  The delegates were to 
maintain Britain’s position on the conversion of merchant ships, but ‘failing 
acceptance the best possible arrangement [was] to be made.’81 
After review, Grey suggested three additions to the draft minutes.  The first 
was his further response at the meeting to McKenna’s arguments, in which Grey 
stated the value of abandonment of continuous voyage to Britain when it was a 
neutral.  The second and third proposed additions made clearer that Britain might not 
sign the prize court convention or refuse its jurisdiction in cases involving the sinking 
of neutral prizes or conversion of merchant ships if no satisfactory agreement on those 
issues was obtained.82  McKenna agreed with Grey’s proposed second and third 
additions to the draft minutes.  However, he thought the first suggested addition did 
not accurately or completely state his arguments at the meeting.  McKenna had 
argued that the issue had to be considered from the point of view of Britain as the 
stronger naval power in war.  From this standpoint, the gain to Britain as a neutral in 
war if continuous voyage was surrendered was greatly outweighed by the gain to 
Germany from access to neutral ports in a war with England.  ‘It might be true that 
there would be difficulty in proving the “continuous” carriage of contraband … and 
that it might not be possible to ignore the protests of a strong neutral; but a serious 
hindrance to this part of Germany’s trade, coupled with a blockade of her own ports, 
could not fail to be of the first importance to us in war.’  McKenna understood that 
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Britain’s delegation therefore would not surrender continuous voyage unless Germany 
relinquished its view on sinking neutral prizes.83  
Grey responded by recounting his understanding of the discussions.  He had 
strongly argued that the conference should not break down on the issue of continuous 
voyage, because the doctrine was not as important to Britain as blockade, and 
practically would be of little use in war.  He understood the meeting’s conclusion to 
be that the delegates were authorized to abandon continuous voyage in return for an 
agreement on contraband.  If Germany would ‘agree to leave Absolute Contraband 
subject to … continuous voyage, so much the better.’  However, if the other powers 
insisted on the right to sink neutral ships, the Admiralty could ask the Cabinet to 
decide if that was so serious an issue that Britain should not sign the prize court 
convention or retain the right to ‘take the law into our own hands’ if a belligerent sank 
a neutral British prize.84  After seeing Grey’s minute, McKenna said ‘there was a 
misunderstanding & … there was no substantial difference of opinion between 
himself & Sir E. Grey in regard to the decision arrived at at [sic] the meeting’.  
McKenna agreed with Grey’s proposal to insert his original three additions as well, 
with all but the first sentence and concluding paragraph of McKenna’s minute.85  
McKenna also wrote personally to Grey ‘to remove any impression … that I intended 
to back out of the arrangement we agreed at the conference.’  McKenna quoted 
Grey’s statement of understanding from the latter’s minute of 26 December and 
indicated he entirely agreed.86  Thus, the final meeting minutes included not only 
Grey’s proposed additions, but also McKenna’s further response to Grey’s argument 
on the value of continuous voyage to Britain.87 
 Britain and Germany soon reached an understanding on Britain’s classes of 
contraband and ‘free’ goods, and elimination of the doctrine of continuous voyage 
except for absolute contraband, for which it was retained.  The categorizations 
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favoured Britain and resolved issues that had arisen during the Russo-Japanese War.  
Foodstuffs and fuel were included in the list of ‘conditional contraband’, while raw 
cotton and numerous raw materials were ‘free’ goods that could never be considered 
contraband.88  Moreover, Germany even would ‘go some way to meet [Britain] with 
regard to destruction of neutral prizes.’  However, the US now was the impediment to 
an agreement.  While it agreed with the lists of absolute and conditional contraband, it 
would not surrender continuous voyage at all, even if that broke up the entire 
conference. 89   The American delegates thought the US should agree to the 
compromise on continuous voyage.  They warned that the country would ‘incur 
odium and damage [its] international influence’ if it maintained its position and was 
held responsible for breaking up the conference.90  Stockton thought the ‘military 
value of continuous voyage [was] exaggerated.’  In return for surrendering the right as 
to conditional contraband, ‘Continentals give up requirements of special notification 
at line of blockade, and claims for unlimited destruction of neutral prizes.’ 91  
Secretary Root agreed to abandon continuous voyage, but only if conditional 
contraband was abolished.  Not surprisingly, the other nations refused to agree to the 
new condition.  Stockton again pleaded with Root to accept the British-German 
compromise, because the ‘military value of continuous voyage for blockade and 
conditional contraband [w]as occasional and secondary.’  Moreover, its abolition was 
‘of great value’ to America’s trade as a neutral.92  Finally, the US conceded the point.  
Stockton’s announcement of the change in position was greeted with ‘great 
applause’.93 
However, the US soon quashed any thought the conference now would 
proceed smoothly to conclusion.  While it agreed to some proposals, on many it 
refused or nit-picked the wording.  For example, Stockton favoured the agreement on 
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the scope of a blockade being the rayon d’action of the blockading force, which was 
‘elastic, varying according to circumstances’.94  However, the US insisted that the 
domicile of the actual owner, not the nationality, would determine ownership of 
property on a belligerent merchant ship. 95   Slade wrote, ‘The Americans are 
impossible and there is strong probability of their wrecking everything’.96  The US 
would not agree that a member of the enemy armed forces found on board a neutral 
ship could be made a prisoner of war, because this ‘gives [the] right of visit and 
search without seizure of [the] ship.’97  It asked for a special protocol or convention 
allowing the International Prize Court to act as a court of arbitration in order to 
overcome issues with the US Constitution.  Because the US Supreme Court was the 
final appeal level for all court decisions, including prize court rulings, establishing an 
international prize court above the Supreme Court created difficulties under the US 
Constitution.98  By 18 February, all issues had been resolved except for the US 
demand for a separate protocol regarding the prize court acting as a court of 
arbitration.99 Foreign Secretary Grey then met with the American ambassador and 
suggested the conference issue a vœu in favour of such a protocol in the future, which 
Britain would support.100  Finally, the US accepted the suggested course of action.101  
On 26 February the conference met in plenary session and signed the ‘Declaration 
Concerning the Laws of Maritime War’.102 
The Admiralty viewed the results of the conference favourably.  DNI Slade 
prepared a memorandum based on the draft proof of articles of the convention, which 
was referred to First Sea Lord Fisher and First Lord McKenna.  Slade stated, ‘Taking 
the draft as a whole, the majority of the proposed rules follow our existing law.’  He 
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identified seven ‘principal concessions’ that Britain had made, but some of these 
‘concessions’ were limited or had countervailing benefits.  For example, while Britain 
had abandoned the doctrine of continuous voyage as to conditional contraband, ‘it 
was of no practical value as in most cases it would be impossible to obtain the 
requisite proof.’  Slade considered ‘substitution of the “rayon d’action” of the 
blockading squadron as the limit within which seizure is allowed for breach of 
blockade’ to be a concession.  He was concerned how British prize courts would 
receive ‘this very shadowy & indefinite clause’ because they had not previously 
accepted it.  Slade noted that the Law Officers in 1900 had recommended acceptance 
of the rule, now agreed, that members of the enemy armed forces found on board a 
neutral passenger ship could be taken as prisoners of war.  Britain also had accepted 
that neutral merchant ships convoyed by neutral warships were not subject to search 
or seizure.  Slade concluded, ‘On the other hand the continental powers have made 
very considerable concessions to us and have in most points accepted the rules which 
have been administered by our courts.’103 
Greene was more positive in his analysis.  Regarding continuous voyage, he 
thought: 
It will be seen that as regards “continuous voyage” the concession 
proposed falls short of what was under consideration when the subject 
was before their Lordships in December last.  The rule is maintained 
intact as regards “Absolute contraband”, and, as regarding “conditional 
contraband” shipped for a country with no seaboard, such as the 
Transvaal in the late war, the belligerent would have the same rights as 
if it were shipped to a hostile port.104   
Rather than concede anything on converting merchant ships on the high seas, the 
issue was omitted entirely from the convention.105  While England’s position on 
destruction of neutral merchant ships was not accepted, strict conditions were 
established ‘which should prevent the right from being much abused.’  Britain 
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obtained a favourable agreement on transfer of enemy ships to a neutral nation after 
the outbreak of war.  On blockade, England carried entirely its ‘view that the 
blockade of an enemy’s port or coast should not, as regards capture of neutral vessels, 
be restricted to a limited cordon of vessels off the blockaded area.  The “radius of 
action” should give that elasticity to the action of a blockading fleet which is actually 
essential.’  Finally, lists of absolute and conditional contraband were agreed to, as 
well as a ‘free’ list of goods that could not be declared contraband.  Greene noted, 
‘We secure three definite lists of contraband … which in the absence of total abolition 
of contraband is what was aimed at during the Hague Conference – though the lists 
are not as satisfactory from our point of view as could have been desired.’106  He then 
concluded: 
The general result seems to be that as a neutral Great Britain 
gains, and as a belligerent, while she loses claims to the exercise of 
some extreme rights which have been put forward on her behalf, she 
gains in the clearer definition of a belligerent’s powers of action under 
international law, and in being able to act against neutral trade with an 
enemy within the powers reserved, without difficulties such as those 
which arose in the case of the South African war.107 
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First Lord McKenna approved and agreed with Greene’s analysis.108 
Eyre Crowe agreed that the results of the conference were favourable.  He told 
Ernest Satow, ‘I think you will find that we have done fairly well.  The preliminary 
article of the Declaration lays down that the rules now agreed upon represent 
substantially the existing law.  This is the compromise we have had to make with the 
Germans.  It gives us really all we want.  The Admiralty are quite satisfied with the 
whole result.’109 
The final report of the delegation to Foreign Secretary Grey was equally 
positive.  It concluded that it ‘is a matter for congratulation that in respect to the 
important subject of blockade we have been able to secure full recognition of the 
principles on which you directed us to lay stress.’  This included adoption of the area 
of operations of the blockading ships as the area within which capture is authorized.  
Notice of a blockade now could be through a general announcement.  In order to 
obtain agreement on itemization of contraband, a concession was made regarding 
application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to contraband.  However, the 
continuous voyage doctrine was maintained for absolute contraband.  Moreover, if 
more than one-half of the cargo on a neutral ship was found to be contraband, the 
entire ship could be seized.  The other topics had resulted in either agreement with no 
adverse consequences for Britain or no agreement, thereby allowing Britain to 
continue to assert its position on those topics.110  Grey asked the Cabinet to authorize 
the British delegates to sign the convention, because the conclusions were ‘in 
accordance with the instructions already approved’.111 
The American delegation similarly thought the Declaration was favourable.  
Stockton and Wilson believed the description of the area in which neutral ships were 
liable to seizure for violation of a blockade – ‘the area of operations of the war-ships 
detailed to render the blockade effective’ – was favourable.  In surrendering 
continuous voyage as applied to conditional contraband and blockade, the US ‘gave 
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up a belligerent right now regarded as of little value.’  Determining the ultimate 
destination of conditional contraband would be difficult at sea, and freeing ‘such 
articles from the fetters of the continuous-voyage doctrine’ would be very valuable to 
the US merchant trade when the country was a neutral.  Destruction of neutral prizes 
was allowed only under ‘exceptional circumstances’.112  State Department Solicitor 
James Brown Scott, who had been at the 1907 Conference, separately analysed the 
proposed Convention and the delegation’s report.  He concluded that while the 
‘United States was asked to surrender certain of its cherished and fundamental 
doctrines’ on continuous voyage and enemy domicile, the ‘Continental Powers were 
likewise forced to concede certain principles to which they attached great importance, 
especially’ regarding blockade and destruction of neutral prizes.  He recommended 
that the Convention be submitted to the Senate for approval.113 
Analysis:  A Good Deal Lost 
Given the approbation of the conference’s results by participants, the 
Admiralty and the Foreign Office, as well as the United States, the Declaration of 
London seemed destined for ratification.  Despite the difficult negotiations and 
grudging acceptance of many of its provisions, almost no opposition to the 
Declaration occurred in the US.  The General Board of the Navy approved the 
Declaration in September 1909, and the US Naval War College then amended the 
Naval War Code to comport with its provisions.  After ratifying the International 
Prize Court Convention in February 1911, the US Congress approved the Declaration 
of London on 24 April 1912.114 
However, the Declaration was subjected to intense criticism in Britain.  The 
subsequent arguments and debates that led to its rejection have been analysed 
repeatedly.115  Opponents to the Declaration primarily raised two arguments against it, 
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neither of which withstands scrutiny.  First, opponents claimed that the Declaration 
unduly restricted Britain’s rights as a belligerent by permitting only a traditional close 
blockade of an enemy’s coast and ports.  However, modern naval weapons, such as 
torpedo boats, mines, and submarines made such traditional close blockades 
impractical if not impossible.116  John Coogan concludes that, ‘Fisher, Arthur Wilson, 
Slade, Ottley, and other senior officials simply did not understand that the 
technological changes which made close blockade suicidal had rendered an effective 
commercial blockade of Germany impossible.’117  Coogan’s conclusion is contrary to 
everything known about these officers and an arrogant assumption.  His view that 
senior Admiralty officials did not understand that technological changes precluded a 
traditional close blockade – an argument concocted and promoted by Maurice 
Hankey118 – is wrong.  It ignores that in the Declaration, the area of operations of 
blockading warships was the area within which seizures could occur.  It also ignores 
the Rapport of the Drafting Committee to the conference, which made clear that 
Article 17, which contained the concept of rayon d’action, was adopted in light of ‘all 
modern means of defence.’119  Article 17, along with the provisions that general 
notice of a blockade was sufficient and whether a blockade was ‘effective’ was a 
question of fact (and that a single ship could effectively blockade a port), allowed for 
execution of a blockade under modern, distant conditions.  The ‘obvious and 
immediate effect upon the operational ability of the navy was that the new 
interpretation of commercial blockade under the Declaration of London freed it from 
conducting a close commercial blockade off the coast and ports of the enemy, thereby 
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reflecting the operational limitations imposed by mutual sea denial.’120  The Royal 
Navy wanted an 800-mile radius of action at the 1907 Conference.  In the Declaration 
of London, it got more:  an ‘elastic’ area that only the Royal Navy could effectively 
impose and enforce against other Continental powers, including Germany.   
Second, opponents argued that the Declaration unreasonably limited neutral 
rights and expanded belligerent rights to the detriment of Britain’s ability to maintain 
its food supply during war.  The Declaration classified foodstuffs as conditional 
contraband.  Conditional contraband presumptively could be seized if ‘consigned to a 
fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed 
forces of the enemy.’ Moreover, the Declaration stiffened the proof required to justify 
seizure of conditional contraband in Article 35.121  According to opponents, Britain’s 
food supply therefore could be interdicted even if such goods were on board neutral 
merchant ships, because every viable port in Britain arguably was fortified or near a 
military base.122  This argument relied on reading the word ‘enemy’ in Article 34 
broadly, as not limited to ‘the enemy government’.  Again, the Rapport of the 
Drafting Committee shows that ‘enemy’, as used in the context of Articles 30, 33, and 
34, meant ‘a fortified place belonging to the enemy or a place used as a base’.123  
Neutral vessels whose goods were not consigned directly to the enemy government or 
its agent therefore were not presumptively subject to seizure if bound for most ports.  
Moreover, the Declaration’s drafters had opposed successfully a German attempt to 
broaden ‘base’ to include ‘any port in the neighbourhood of which a military garrison, 
however insignificant in size was stationed.’124  Eyre Crowe told Ernest Satow that 
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‘enemy’ could only be interpreted to mean ‘the enemy government’ in light of 
Articles 33 and 34.125  Professor John Westlake of Cambridge University reassured 
Satow that ‘enemy’ in Article 34 could ‘only mean the enemy state, that being the 
regular meaning of the phrase in French when there is nothing in the context to 
qualify it.’126  Thus, the report of the Drafting Committee, the drafting history, and 
normal interpretation of the critical words renders the second primary argument of the 
Declaration’s opponents meritless.  Far from unduly broadening belligerent rights 
against neutrals, the Declaration expanded neutral rights to the benefit of Britain. 
In light of these facts, historians have struggled to explain adequately Britain’s 
supposed failure to protect its belligerent rights at the London Conference.127  Several 
historians have argued that the Declaration of London was inconsistent with the 
Admiralty’s war plans against Germany.128  However, such arguments rest on the 
belief that the 1907 War Plans were mere ‘propaganda’ and ignore the recently 
rediscovered 1909 War Plans.129  The Admiralty’s strategy for war with Germany, 
especially as embodied in the 1909 War Plans, envisioned an observational blockade 
of Germany’s ports and coasts, with several layers of warships stationed at greater 
distances.130  The Royal Navy’s war plans, therefore, were consistent with the concept 
of a rayon d’action for the enforcement of a blockade.  Other proffered explanations 
are not only unsatisfactory, they fail to account for the undisputed facts and instead 
allege mendacity and incompetence on the part of the Admiralty.  Sir Hew Strachan 
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simply concludes, ‘The only rationalization of the Admiralty’s, and of Fisher’s, 
position is hard-headed cynicism:  that in the event of Britain being at war the 
declaration [of London] would be neglected, in the event of neutrality, it would be 
enforced.’131  
John Coogan, Avner Offer, and Nicholas Lambert have presented explanations 
for Britain’s alleged irrational expansion of neutral rights and surrender of belligerent 
rights at the London Conference.  Coogan contends ‘second thoughts’ arose on 
surrendering continuous blockade at the meeting on 15 December 1908.132  Offer 
claims that McKenna attempted to ‘throw a spanner in the works’ in mid-December 
1908 when the Admiralty agreed the doctrine of continuous voyage could be 
abandoned.  Noting Fisher’s statement during the conference that ‘in the next war … 
we should most certainly violate the Declaration of Paris and every other treaty that 
might prove inconvenient’, he posited a Machiavellian strategy by Fisher, who had no 
intention of following any international agreement limiting Britain’s belligerent 
rights.  He also suggests that neither Slade nor Ottley, both of whom allegedly were 
losing Fisher’s confidence at the time, received a proper briefing and so took 
positions inconsistent with Fisher’s plans.  ‘Fisher may have allowed Ottley and Slade 
to get on with the job in the interest of good relations with the Liberal government, 
and also as a subterfuge which might create false confidence in Germany.’133   
Most recently, Nicholas Lambert has claimed a ‘hitherto kept secret’ plan for 
‘economic warfare’ against Germany that was unveiled by Fisher in late 1908.  For 
Lambert, the various approvals by the Admiralty of the positions to be taken at the 
conference ‘did not constitute total approval.’  Grey misled McKenna into believing 
continuous voyage would not be compromised unless Germany gave up much more 
than it had offered as of 15 December 1908.  Lambert speculates that McKenna gave 
in to Grey because he recognized ‘inevitable defeat on a seemingly minor technical 
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point’ and because ‘he may have wanted to keep his powder dry’ in anticipation of the 
upcoming debate on the number of capital ships to be laid down the next year.  
Lambert argues Fisher officially objected to the London Conference without success.  
He relies on some of Fisher’s typical outlandish statements, including the same one 
quoted by Offer.  ‘Fisher believed that it would prove cost-effective for Britain 
cynically to disregard the law and accept the financial penalty afterward.’  The 
Admiralty, including McKenna, had a ‘cavalier attitude toward the sanctity of 
international agreements.’  Remarkably, Lambert baldly asserts that McKenna misled 
the House of Commons in 1911 when he stated the Board of Admiralty was consulted 
before the declaration was signed and that both he and the Board supported it.134 
As any good trial lawyer knows, to be valid, a ‘theory of the case’ must fit all 
the known facts.  The arguments presented by Coogan, Offer, and Nicholas Lambert 
fail the ‘fit’ test.  First, the discussions and memoranda arising from the meeting on 
15 December among Grey, McKenna, and the British delegates do not indicate 
‘second thoughts’, an attempt by McKenna to engage in sabotage, or an effort by 
Grey to hoodwink McKenna.  Nicholas Lambert’s speculation about the reasons for 
McKenna’s actions is just that, speculation.  It is not based on evidence, and therefore 
does not constitute a sound argument.  Fairly read, the meeting minutes and 
communications exchanged reveal a full ventilation of the pros and cons of whether to 
surrender continuous voyage and what to demand in return.  Coogan, Offer, and 
Lambert ignore the fact that Britain obtained more in exchange for partially 
abandoning continuous voyage than it was willing to concede.  The doctrine 
continued to apply to absolute contraband and Britain obtained significant restrictions 
on destruction of neutral prizes.  Britain also received important compensation in the 
agreed lists of absolute and conditional contraband and ‘free’ goods.  Those lists, 
which included foodstuffs and fuel as conditional contraband and all manner of raw 
materials as ‘free’ goods, favoured Britain when it was a neutral, and would limit 
issues with neutrals as experienced in 1899-1900 and 1904-1905.  Far from indicating 
incompetence, the analyses prepared by Slade and others in the Admiralty on the 
topics for the conference reveal a solid grasp of the essential issues and provide a 
sound basis for the positions ultimately adopted. 
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Offer’s and Lambert’s reliance on Fisher’s views on the laws of warfare – and 
in Lambert’s case the Admiralty’s alleged views as well – ignore the fact that neither 
Fisher nor the Admiralty could decide to ignore international law during time of war.  
Only the British government, not some individual or even a department, could make a 
decision of such importance.135  Even Hankey recognized that views such as those 
held by Fisher and others in the Admiralty – ‘that in time of war these international 
treaties will at once be swept away’ – were ‘delusive and dangerous.’136  Fisher surely 
understood from his experiences at the 1899 Conference and the events during the 
South African War and the Russo-Japanese War that international agreements once 
made were not easily ignored.  He often made outlandish statements for effect and 
possible deterrence.  Lambert also relies on Fisher’s statement, which he incorrectly 
describes as ‘scrawled’ on an official paper that ‘the inevitable result of Conferences 
and Arbitrations is that we always give up something.  It’s like a rich man entering 
into a Conference with a gang of burglars!’137  In context, Fisher’s statement likely 
was written in advance of the 1907 Conference given the reference to ‘private 
property at sea’ immediately preceding the quotation.  Fisher had a visceral, ‘old-
school’ reaction to any laws of warfare.  As Viscount Esher recorded in his diary, 
‘Jacky is furious at our yielding points to other powers at the Naval Conference.’138  
However, anger and outlandish statements by Fisher do not establish a hidden agenda 
to tear up the Declaration of London or ignore the laws of warfare if war came.  
Instead, Fisher’s statements reflected ‘frustration and impotence.’139  Moreover, while 
Fisher may well have been focused on Lord Charles Beresford’s charges and 
discussions regarding the future naval building program during the same period, the 
documents show he reviewed and approved many if not all of the positions taken by 
Slade, Ottley, and the Admiralty at the conference.  Indeed, Fisher could not be 
‘furious’ at what was occurring at the conference unless he knew what was happening 
there. 
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Finally, Nicholas Lambert simply ignores evidence that does not support his 
theory – and that essentially is all of it.140  In his view, ‘approvals’ really are not 
approvals.  Fisher’s alleged strong objections to the conference are contradicted by his 
approval of minutes and memoranda by Slade and others.  Lambert asserts that 
McKenna misled the Commons in 1911 when he unequivocally stated that Fisher and 
the Admiralty were consulted and approved the Declaration.141  Such a serious charge 
should have some foundation in fact.  Lambert ignores the facts that Slade, Lord 
Desart, and Ottley supported the Declaration, even when it subsequently was 
criticized.142  Given the United States’ ratification of the Declaration, it must have 
been wrong, too, under Lambert’s theory.  A more appropriate conclusion is that 
Britain’s rejection of the Declaration of London was a good deal lost. 
Enactment of the Naval Prize Bill to implement the provisions of the 
Declaration ultimately failed in December 1911 due to politics and the decision of the 
predominately Conservative House of Lords ‘to treat the bill as a partisan issue.’143  
Less than a year later, the government formed a committee to revise the rules for prize 
courts.  In addition, the Admiralty incorporated the substance of the Declaration in its 
Handbook for Boarding Officers and Prize Officers in War Time.144  ‘Thus, the 
Declaration of London provided the rules of engagement for trade control on the 
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outbreak of the First World War.’145  Despite its rejection by the House of Lords, the 
Declaration of London still had some vitality in August 1914. 
Conclusion 
Unable to obtain an agreement at the 1907 Conference on the issues of 
contraband and blockade, and realizing that the International Prize Court convention 
failed to provide the law applicable in the absence of a treaty, Great Britain proposed 
the London Naval Conference for a few, key sea powers.  Its preparations were 
detailed and careful.  Britain grasped the inconsistencies between its asserted 
positions on the laws of naval warfare and British legal precedents.  It understood that 
rules from wars long ago needed to be modernized in light of technological changes.  
It entered the conference knowing it likely would have to compromise on some of its 
long-held positions to achieve a unanimous statement of the laws of naval warfare, 
but rightly believed compromises could be made without jeopardizing its critical 
belligerent rights.  Britain would gain if an agreed international declaration of the 
laws of naval warfare existed, whether it was a neutral or belligerent in any future 
war.  It did not want to repeat its experiences from the South African War or the 
Russo-Japanese War. 
In contrast, the US approached the London Conference with little preparation.  
It relied on positions developed at the turn of the century in the Naval War Code of 
1900, with amendments suggested in 1903.  It did not compare its views to those of 
other countries or consider compromises it could make without harming its neutral or 
belligerent rights.  Decisions had to be made on a rush basis during the conference.  
Faced with the need to negotiate concessions or render the conference nugatory, the 
US initially stood its ground, but eventually, grudgingly compromised.  It reached 
conclusions regarding the modern usefulness of the doctrine of continuous voyage 
and necessary modifications to the law of blockade in light of technological 
developments consistent with Britain’s analyses. 
The outcome of the conference was a declaration that significantly increased 
Britain’s rights as a neutral, yet protected necessary belligerent rights in light of 
modern conditions.  The Declaration of London was a reasonable agreement and 
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favourable to Britain.146  The fact that ratification ultimately failed due to opposition 
by the Conservative House of Lords and others does not detract from its merits.  The 
primary arguments made by opponents against the Declaration do not withstand 
scrutiny.  Historians have wrongly criticized the Admiralty, Edmond Slade, and 
Fisher for the positions taken at the London Conference and its outcome.  Historians 
have sought to tar them with allegations of incompetence or mendacity.  However, a 
careful analysis that does not ignore facts shows that the positions taken were rational 
and consistent with Britain’s need to protect its ability to enforce a meaningful 
blockade in time of war, particularly with Germany.  Slade, Ottley, McKenna, 
Greene, Lord Desart, Grey, and even Fisher were not wrong in their decisions and 
analyses regarding the Declaration.  Stockton, Wilson, the General Board of the US 
Navy, and Scott at the State Department also were not wrong.  The Declaration was a 
good deal lost when the House of Lords rejected it.   
On the eve of the First World War, the US Naval War Code and the handbook 
for Royal Naval officers embodied the Declaration’s essential terms.  The Declaration 
of London had greater relevance to the belligerents than the nearly sixty-year old 
Declaration of Paris.  Its status was much like the United States’ current position on 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:  not ratified, but most of it 
accepted as customary international law.  After the war started, the United States 
asked all the belligerents to adhere to the Declaration.147  Britain alone responded that 
it would ‘adopt generally the rules of the Declaration … subject to certain 
modifications and additions’.148  Those ‘modifications and additions’ initially were a 
new list of contraband, application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to any 
contraband cargo, and a change in the burden of proof to be applied by prize courts in 
deciding whether a seizure was lawful.149  The United States objected to these 
                                                
146 Editorial Comment, ‘Naval Prize Bill and the Declaration of London’, The 
American Journal of International Law 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1912):  180-186. 
147 Bryan to American Ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, 
and Brussels, 6 Aug. 1914, box 14, folder 2, JBScott/Georgetown Papers. 
148 American Ambassador to Bryan, 24 Aug. 1914, ibid. 
149 Tracy, ed., Sea Power and the Control of Trade, 125-126. 
 263 
changes as inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Declaration.150  As Imperial 
Germany began to violate the laws of war on land, and later the laws of naval warfare, 
Britain countered by backing further away from the provisions of the Declaration 
until July 1916, when it finally announced that it would not apply the Declaration at 
all.151 
During the First World War, James Brown Scott described the Declaration of 
London as the ‘high tide, historically, of the liberalization’ of the laws of naval 
warfare.152  The Declaration was not a ‘liberalization’, but a hard fought statement of 
the laws of naval warfare, unanimously agreed by the most significant naval powers 
of the time.  Nevertheless, the ‘tide’ of the laws of naval warfare that started to flood 
in 1899 indeed crested and began to ebb in 1909.  
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For too long pre-First World War naval historians have ignored or minimized 
the relevance of the laws of naval warfare to their research.  We are told that the First 
World War ‘erased’ the pertinence of the laws of warfare.1  Perhaps obscured by the 
failure of the belligerents to adhere to the laws of warfare during the First World War, 
many naval historians have focused only on small pieces of the puzzle that is the laws 
of naval warfare.  In effect, they have begun their examination of the story in the 
middle of the book – around 1905 – instead of starting at the beginning in 1899, 
thereby losing much of the context for later events.  Other historians have minimized 
the significance of the laws of naval warfare due to incompatibility with their 
arguments, and have tried to explain away the studies and analyses of limitations on 
naval warfare on the ground that no country, and certainly not Britain and the Royal 
Navy, ever expected to follow them.  However, the First World War was a conflict 
the magnitude and nature of which no pre-war planner seriously contemplated.  It was 
a ‘total war’ unlike any ever faced by any nation.  Looking backward requires a clear 
and unbiased view of events of the period under study, not reflection through a tinted 
glass. 
The 1899 Conference ushered in a new era of international law, especially for 
the laws of war.  It again adopted conventions to which nations not in attendance 
could accede, thereby building upon the foundation for the development of 
international law established with the Declaration of Paris in 1856.2  Although the 
tangible accomplishments of the 1899 Conference seemed limited, ‘the precedents it 
established … paved the way for further advances in international law’.3  This was 
especially true regarding the laws of naval warfare.  Since 1856, Great Britain had 
consistently refused to discuss the laws of maritime warfare at any international 
                                                
1 Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper:  Breaking and Making International Law during 
the Great War (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2014), 3. 
2 Lemnitzer (2014), 3. 
3 Daniel Hucker, ‘British Peace Activism and “New” Diplomacy:  Revisiting the 1899 
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420. 
 265 
conference.  Without Britain’s willingness to discuss international maritime law at the 
1899 Conference, naval strategic planning as well as international law would have 
followed a far different trajectory in the fifteen years preceding the First World War.  
Once the door was opened in 1899, it could not be closed.   
Between the 1899 Conference and the commencement of the 1907 
Conference, Great Britain and the United States – and their navies – undertook 
considerable examination and analysis of international law and its relationship to 
naval warfare and strategy.  The US Naval War College intensely studied the 
implications of the laws of war for naval planning through its annual International 
Law Situations.4  In Britain, Professor Thomas Holland engendered debate on the 
laws of naval warfare in light of the US Naval War Code of 1900 and through his 
participation on, and testimony before, the Royal Commission on Supply of Food and 
Raw Material in Time of War.  Cambridge University Professor Lassa Oppenheim 
published his treatise on international law.5  Great Britain and the United States 
received lessons on the practical application of the laws of naval warfare from the 
South African and Russo-Japanese wars – lessons that would impact naval planning 
and the willingness of belligerents to adopt measures that would adversely impact 
neutrals in future wars.  
The 1907 Conference resulted in the adoption of thirteen conventions, twelve 
of which entered into force.  Of those, eight related in whole or in part to naval 
warfare.  Five of them still are part of the fabric of the laws of war over 100 years 
later.6   However, it was Britain’s failure to achieve agreement on contraband, 
blockade, and the law to be applied by the planned International Prize Court that 
furthered discussion of the laws of naval warfare.  The result was the 1909 
Declaration of London:  a statement by the leading sea powers of what the laws of 
maritime warfare were, not what they might be in the future.  Although Britain did not 
                                                
4 See generally United States Naval War College, General Index to International Law 
Situations: Topics and Discussions, Volumes I to X, 1901-1910 (Washington, DC:  
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5 See, for example, Lassa Oppenheim, War and Neutrality, vol. II of International 
Law:  A Treatise (London:  Longmans, Green, 1906). 
6 See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. 
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ratify the Declaration, both the Royal Navy and the US Navy essentially incorporated 
it into their respective handbook and code for naval officers prior to the First World 
War.   
The First World War did not result in the immediate abandonment of the laws 
of war, at least not regarding naval warfare.  When the war began, Britain confirmed 
that it would generally adhere to the principles of the Declaration of London.  Britain 
did not immediately renounce the Declaration or its applicability.   The fact Britain 
sought to expand the continuous voyage doctrine far beyond its recognized scope or 
as stated in the Declaration of London during the war does not detract from its 
importance.  The Declaration provided guidance and some framework for belligerents 
and neutrals.  Moreover, Imperial Germany first violated the laws of war on land, not 
at sea.  Britain receded from the Declaration gradually, and often as the quid pro quo 
for some violation of the laws of war by Germany.  Only after nearly two years of 
war, in July 1916, and after the US by its relative inaction in response to Britain’s 
treatment of neutral shipping had made clear it would not join the conflict on the side 
of Germany, did Britain completely abandon the 1909 Declaration.  Thus, the 
discussions and development of the laws of naval warfare between 1899 and 1909 
impacted at least the initial years of the First World War, and also the years since.  
The laws of naval warfare were not abandoned at the commencement of hostilities.  
International law mattered.   
Between 1899 and 1909, the laws of naval warfare influenced naval planning 
and strategy in Great Britain and the United States.  ‘In 1899, both Britain and the 
United States were wedded to fossilized policies on maritime rights.’7  However, their 
perspectives and starting points were quite different.  Britain was still the 
acknowledged world’s superpower at sea.  But much as in 1856, it was ‘aware of the 
danger that its lead as the dominant global power was slipping away.’8  The United 
States – excluding Alfred Thayer Mahan – still was focused on maintaining its rights 
as a neutral without a blue-water navy.  For Britain, the proposed international 
conference in 1899 was the catalyst for a secret naval disarmament proposal to 
Russia.  The Royal Navy viewed the government’s acceptance of the conference with 
                                                
7 Coogan (1981), 237. 
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dismay, realizing that the door was now opened for discussions on limitations on the 
conduct of naval warfare.  The US saw the Tsar’s invitation as an opportunity to 
lobby the international community again for acceptance of its long-cherished 
immunity policy.  In 1899, Britain sought to ban submarines, because they were 
weapons of the weak and represented a challenge to its naval supremacy.  At the 1899 
Conference, Mahan infamously ensured that poison gas shells were not outlawed, 
with massive consequences fifteen years later in the First World War.   
The South African and Russo-Japanese wars taught the US and Britain that 
insistence on respect for international law could force belligerents to change their 
naval strategies.  International maritime laws could not be ignored or stretched in the 
face of objections from strong neutrals.  The lessons learned during those wars 
influenced positions in both countries through the 1909 London Conference.  The US 
Naval War College prepared a code of naval warfare intending for it to be the 
framework for a global undertaking.  It dropped it after realizing that its lone 
adherence to the Code would place it at a disadvantage in war.  In Britain, the Royal 
Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Materials in Time of War concluded that 
international law would act as a restraint on naval warfare, largely based on the 
Commission’s reading of evidence presented by the Admiralty.   
At the 1907 and 1909 conferences, Britain no longer was the exclusive master 
of the house in international maritime law.  It could no longer act unilaterally and 
with little regard for other navies as it searched for a legal framework that would 
allow it to exercise its naval strategy.  It therefore needed to compromise on key 
issues.  Britain sought to balance its needs as a neutral with the maintenance of 
belligerent rights it wanted to exercise in a modern war.  It endeavoured to restrict and 
itemize what products could be considered contraband and therefore subject to 
seizure.  Conversion of merchant ships into warships on the high seas – essentially 
becoming modern and more lethal privateers – became an important issue that the 
laws of naval warfare might limit or even outlaw.  During the preparations for the 
1907 Conference, the US and Britain came astonishingly close to switching their 
positions on the principle of the immunity of private property at sea during war, an 
issue that had divided them for over a century.  When efforts at coordination failed, 
the two nations clashed at the 1907 Conference.  Realizing that modern technologies 
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made its traditional weapon of a close blockade virtually impossible, Britain first tried 
to abolish the concept of contraband in exchange for a favourable definition of an 
effective blockade at the 1907 Conference.  When that effort failed, it called for a 
conference of the major sea powers and obtained recognition of an area of operations 
for blockades that ensured their continued viability for naval planning.  Unlike the 
1899 and 1907 conferences, which proposed new international law, the Declaration 
Concerning the Laws of Maritime War signed in London in February 1909 was a 
unanimous statement of the laws of naval warfare as agreed at that time with which 
Britain and the US agreed.  Although both nations had embarked on the journey from 
different starting points in 1899, over the following ten years their positions and 
views gradually had coalesced.  Great Britain’s objective was to determine laws of 
naval warfare that would allow it to maintain its ability to defend and protect itself 
and its empire whether as a belligerent or a neutral.  For the US, its path was one of 
increasing recognition of its greater role on the world’s stage and need for a larger 
navy.  It no longer could focus primarily on neutral rights; its rights as a belligerent 
mattered, too.     
By presenting a study of the laws of naval warfare covering the 1899-1909 
period, this thesis returns them to their rightful place as an important factor in naval 
planning in the years preceding the First World War.  It has significant implications 
for revisionist historians such as Nicholas Lambert.  Relying to a great extent on 
Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher’s often outlandish pronouncements against the 
laws of warfare generally and limitations on maritime conflict specifically, Lambert’s 
most recent book ignores inconsistent facts, engages in baseless speculation, and fails 
to address the Admiralty’s substantial efforts to direct and influence the laws of naval 
warfare before and during Fisher’s leadership as First Sea Lord.  Lambert’s analysis 
of Britain’s preparations for the 1907 Conference and the reasoning behind the 
positions taken at the 1909 London Conference are mistaken.  The simplistic 
descriptor that ‘“Jacky” Fisher was no respecter of the laws of war’9 has no real place 
in pre-First World War naval history.  Fisher’s statements often were tied to his belief 
in deterrence as a means to avoid wars.  He certainly could not determine Britain’s 
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policies or decide to ignore a binding international agreement.  Neither the British 
government nor the Admiralty organized interdepartmental committees and spent 
many man-hours of work studying the laws of naval warfare and what positions to 
adopt for no real purpose.  ‘Britain took law enormously seriously’.10  The United 
States and its Navy did as well.  The extensive analysis and debate on both sides of 
the Atlantic belie the notion that the laws of naval warfare were of little or no moment 
in naval thinking or planning.  The gentlemen – and they were all ‘gentlemen’ in the 
classical sense – charged with governing nations, running departments, and leading 
navies, would not simply tear up international agreements the moment war came.  A 
gentleman’s word was his bond.   
By showing the importance of the laws of naval warfare on planning and 
strategy in Great Britain and the United States between 1899 and 1909, this thesis fills 
a void in the current, vibrant research on naval planning and preparations in the years 
before the First World War.  Naval historians have ignored the 1899 Conference.  But 
it set the stage for every international conference that came after.  Britain’s offer of 
naval disarmament to Russia provides a specific, concrete example of the effect of 
finance on the Royal Navy in 1899, as well as an indication of the government’s 
concern regarding commerce raiding as the rationale for building more fast cruisers.  
Prime Minister Salisbury’s government was willing to trade ships for pounds Sterling 
– at least with Russia – and failing that, would build more cruisers to protect its far-
flung maritime commerce.  These facts further illustrate the effect of finance on 
subsequent naval reforms and the Royal Navy’s focus on a guerre de course as a real 
threat.11  Mahan’s role in the debates surrounding the laws of maritime war during 
this period has generally been ignored.  Studies of Mahan have focused on his 
contributions as ‘a naval historian and theorist of naval operations’.12  His efforts to 
alter the policies of the United States toward the immunity of private property at sea 
and to attain close cooperation between the US and Britain have been extensively 
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revealed for the first time.  Neo-revisionist historians such as Christopher Bell, 
Matthew Seligmann, and others have begun to take a fresh, more complete look at 
pre-First World War naval planning.13  This thesis furthers their work and provides 
new perspectives that must be considered. 
By engaging in a comparative analysis, this thesis provides an under-utilized 
perspective in naval history.14  Britain and the US ended the nineteenth century in far 
different positions in terms of naval power.  By 1909, their positions as sea powers 
were far more similar.  The US had become an imperial nation, and while its empire 
was not as vast as that of Britain, it faced potential conflicts in the far reaches of its 
realm, which required the projection of naval power.  Its navy had grown 
considerably since 1899.  The 1899 Conference, when their naval power was most 
disparate, saw the best cooperation between Great Britain and the United States at any 
of the international conferences.  Their positions were consistent at the 1899 
Conference because Britain and the Royal Navy wanted to maintain as much as 
possible their belligerent rights, while Mahan acted independently of the US 
government to ensure that the US Navy would have the ability to develop into the 
blue-water fleet he envisioned.  The theoretical studies after the 1899 Conference and 
the practical experiences in two wars caused Britain to turn more toward neutral 
rights.  The United States’ studies and experiences reinforced its traditional pro-
neutral rights stance.  Despite Mahan and Fisher’s ultimately successful efforts to 
undermine support for the immunity of private property at sea during the preparations 
for the 1907 Conference, efforts at cooperation at that conference and the 1909 
London Conference essentially failed.  By the 1909 Conference, Britain was willing 
to compromise on some belligerent rights in order to obtain an agreement on the 
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existing laws of naval warfare.  The US ultimately conceded traditional positions 
more grudgingly.  It was turning into the naval power Britain had been. 
This thesis has examined the evolution of naval thinking in the United States 
and Great Britain in the early twentieth century from a new perspective.  Fundamental 
to the way naval power is exercised is the legal basis for that use.  This study has 
examined the development of the laws of war as applied to naval warfare and their 
influence on what became the basis for the exercise of American and British sea 
power in the twentieth century and today.  By engaging in a comparative study and 
examining and analysing the laws of war and naval planning in Great Britain and the 
United States during the 1899-1909 period, this thesis fills a void in the existing 
research, provides insights into the influence of the laws of war on naval planning in 
two disparate navies during a critical period of naval history, and reveals aspects of 
maritime history not previously studied.  It should also thereby inform the twenty-first 
century’s on-going debate regarding the laws of war and their implications for 
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